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ABSTRACT
The contemporary preoccupation with metaphor lies in 
its capability of deconstructing and disempowering 
metaphysics, and of creating a logic of uncertainty or a 
Derridian logic of supplements in opposition to the logic 
of identity and of non-contradiction. As a figure of 
speech saying one thing but meaning something else, 
metaphor contains in itself a certain alterity and 
otherness which resists a logical identity as well as a 
systematic philosophy.
In my study of metaphor in the texts of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and Derrida, I inquire into the problematic 
relation or difference between philosophy and metaphor, 
focusing on how the former is metaphorized at the hands of 
literature. At issue is the question of how Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and Derrida confronted by way of metaphor the 
problem of logocentrism inherent in the history of western 
philosophy. If metaphor has been traditionally interpreted 
back into a conceptual term and thus is to be undone at the 
very moment of recognition, now metaphor undoes concept and 
philosophy.
In my discussion of Nietzsche, the metaphoric 
resistance to concept is shown to be characterized by the 
metaphor of a journey which never arrives at its
iv
destination. For Nietzsche, as soon as metaphor is born, 
its concept, the supposed parents of metaphor, dies; 
metaphor is an orphan whose parent died at its birth. My 
discussion of Heidegger is also dominated by this metaphor 
of journey. As for Heidegger, words are on the way toward 
beings and Being, but there is no happy union between them 
as in conceptual unity. Always on the way toward beings 
but never reaching its destination, discourse in Heidegger 
is fundamentally metaphoric and is characterized by the 
fundamental gap and distance between saying and meaning. 
Finally in my study of Derrida, I try to demonstrate how 
this journey of metaphor is forced to come to its 
destination by the intrinsic necessity of philosophy for 
its survival--philosophy is formulated by its suppression 
of the other, metaphoricity. Philosophy's relation to 
metaphysics is thus a strange mixture of dependence and 
suppression.
v
INTRODUCTION 
Crisis of Discourse 
and Metaphor
Recently much critical and philosophical attention has been 
paid to the problem of metaphor. Such increasing attention 
is surprising, since metaphor has been regarded as no more 
than a figure of speech throughout the history of 
philosophy and literary theory, thereby not deserving any 
independent thematic treatment. But suddenly metaphor has 
become to play an immensely significant role in both 
philosophy and literary theory, and innumerable articles 
and books on metaphor have begun to pour out as if to prove 
the growing philosophical importance of the study of 
metaphor. What does this unexpected happening of 
"metaphormania" suggest?1 How and why does metaphor begin 
to invade all discourses like medieval plague? Has the 
meaning of metaphor changed, or have we changed and 
metaphorized unwittingly so that we feel at home in 
metaphor? If this contemporary enthusiasm for metaphor is
1 In the Preface to his collection of essays on 
metaphor, Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, Mark 
Johnson exclaims that "We are in the midst of a 
metaphormania." and paraphrases Wayne Booth's analogical 
prediction that "judging from the jump in interest in 
metaphor between 1940 and the present, if we extrapolate to 
the year 2 039, there will then be more students of metaphor 
than there are people" (italics added) (ix).
1
considered, we cannot but ask these questions which pop up 
in chains.
According to the classic definition of metaphor by 
Aristotle, metaphor is one of the literal and rhetorical 
figures of speech that says one thing, but means another. 
This fundamental gap between saying and meaning, between 
intention and signification, is the very condition and 
essence of metaphor, thereby causing an inevitable 
pluralism or dissemination of metaphoric sayings. While 
literary and logical language is supposed to have clear, 
definite, and exact meanings, metaphor tends to upset and 
disrupt this ideal language paradigm and produces ambiguity 
and uncertainty. In order to check and control this 
unpleasant dissemination of meanings in metaphor, the study 
of metaphor has always involved the task of a good judge 
who has to extract facts from equivocation, circumvention, 
and beguilement. If philosophy is a judge, metaphor is a 
suspect to be judged, and the study of metaphor becomes 
criminology. When a judge succeeds in separating falsity 
and deception from truth, a suspect becomes either a 
criminal or an innocent; the undecidability of saying "yes" 
or "no" is transformed into a decisive saying of either 
"yes" or "no." If we translate this analogy (metaphor) 
into plain words, the study or theory of metaphor has aimed 
at reducing its ambiguity and vagueness to distinctiveness, 
transforming the unspeakability into speakability. The
truth elements of metaphor are to separated from false ones 
so that metaphoricity is undone. Thus the traditional 
theory of metaphor is a mode of self-destruction.
The word "theory" comes from the Greek verb theorein. 
to look at, to observe, to contemplate, and to examine.
Here the act of looking involved in theorein is, we have to 
emphasize, not a private or individual behavior, but a 
public and social act. Upon some special occasions 
demanding justice and judgement, certain individuals were 
appointed as public delegates and judges (as theoros) in 
order officially to witness and tell their signification 
with authority. Theory is thus a matter of public 
discourse and public knowledge which are sanctioned by the 
city and are protected from any private whims and 
opinions.2 Along with theory, criticism, etymologically 
speaking, has such a public and judicial implication: 
krisis means separation, dispute, trial, examination, and 
court of justice. To criticize is to separate untruth from 
truth, facts from illusions, in order to judge and decide 
as in a dispute concerning a legal case in court. 
Accordingly, the aim in both theory and criticism is to 
attain an authoritative public discourse, to attain 
socially reliable language with the ideal of clarity and 
distinctiveness.
2 In this etymological explication of the meaning of 
theory, I rely on Wlad Godzich's Foreword to de Man's 
Resistance to Theory (xiv-xv).
If theory and criticism are born out of the social 
necessity of public discourse and judgement, then the 
problem with their acts concerns the degree of their 
justice, that is, the question of how much their decisions 
and judgements can be justified and how much they are to be 
inevitably entangled with violence, for example, as in the 
trial of Socrates. What if truth cannot be boiled down 
into "yes" or "no," and truth, as with Heidegger, never 
discloses itself completely and withdraws itself into a 
darkness at the very moment of its revelation? What if a 
suspect is unable to give an indisputable alibi and a judge 
has no means to present any evidence in favor of or against 
his alibi unless he is caught on the spot? In the absence 
of evidence, a judge (theorist or critic) finds himself 
unable to judge: a suspect cannot be identified either as a 
criminal or an innocent. Here is the predicament of a 
judge. Even though he cannot judge, he, as a delegate 
appointed by the public, has to decide, because he cannot 
suspend the case forever. Here the figure of a judge takes 
an essential role, that is, in the absence of evidence he 
is free to make a suspect either a criminal or an innocent. 
A judge is possessed of a supreme power as a maker of 
reality and of truth as well as a maker of evidence. This 
power, however, accompanies a profound suspicion concerning 
the justice of a judge. As soon as the origin of his power 
is taken into consideration, it turns out that it is
exactly his inability to judge, his violence over a 
suspect, and his corruptibility that gives him such 
enormous power. Power goes along with guilt, misjudgment, 
corruption, and force. A judge is forced to judge, and in 
turn he gains power. If he is a private man, he may remain 
undecided and thus powerless. The fact that he is a public 
figure in the judicial system throws him into a totally 
different situation. As a judge who is appointed by the 
public, he has to make a public and official announcement 
which should be necessarily clear, exact, and unambiguous. 
As a member of the legal institution, his individuality is 
transformed into publicity, his right to undecidability 
into an obligation to decide.
Institution is an anonymous and impersonal power which 
transforms a metaphor into a literal and logical paraphrase 
or interpretation. Logical language, pursuing the 
principle of identity and non-contradiction, operates by 
binary opposition, true or false, yes or no, positive or 
negative. The degree to which a suspect is responsible for 
the crime and the complexity surrounding the crime are 
forgotten as soon as institution takes over the case. If 
metaphors are considered from that institutional and public 
perspective, they are, as Locke says, "for nothing else but 
to insinuate wrong ideas ... they are certainly, in all 
discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be
avoided."3 Literature, as the carrier of emotion, of 
personal and private discourse and opinions, is opposed to 
philosophy, which is supposed to be public and 
institutional. In this regard, criticism has a 
philosophical function as a surveillance of literature and 
as an interpreter of metaphor. Of course, the distinction 
between literature and philosophy cannot be pushed too 
rigorously, because the former contains the latter in 
itself and the latter is the violent transformation of the 
former. In its origin philosophical discourse is the 
negation, exclusion, and ignorance of metaphoric discourse 
The contemporary fascination with metaphor both in 
literary theory and philosophy is the reflection of our 
awareness of this violent origin of philosophy and of the 
public discourse of power. Philosophy does not have any 
solid ground on which to found itself, and its presumed 
traditional ground is only the forgetting of its 
groundlessness or metaphoricity. As such, postmodernism, 
if we employ such a term, can be characterized by its 
profound suspicion and consequent denouncement of any 
systematic philosophy, especially metaphysics at the 
vanguard of philosophy. Postmodern science, as Lyotard 
reports, is "theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous 
catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical. . . It is
3 John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
Vol. II, bk. Ill, chap. X, 146.
producing not the known, but the unknown."4 "To risk 
meaning nothing" and "to start to play" is what Derrida 
proposes to aim in his writings.5 In its reaction to 
public discourse, contemporary thinking seems to go toward 
a "counter-discourse" for whose formation metaphor is 
essential.6 Nietzsche's deconstructive thinking renders 
truth as the double forgetting of metaphor or as the worn- 
out metaphor: "What is truth? a mobile army of metaphors, 
metonyms, ... Truths are illusions about which it has been 
forgotten that they are illusions, worn-out metaphors ..."7 
With Nietzsche, philosophy begins to dephilosophize itself, 
to put it otherwise, to metaphorize philosophy. Noticing 
such a metaphorical origin of philosophy, I. A. Richards 
maintains that "as it [philosophy] grows more abstract we 
think increasingly by means of metaphors that we profess 
not to be relying on. The metaphors we are avoiding steer 
our thought as much as those we accept."8
4 Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. 60.
5 Derrida, Positions. 14.
6 Foucault uses the term of counter-discourse in 
defining the literature's reaction to representative 
language of philosophy in the nineteenth century. It is 
"non-discursive discourse: to manifest language in its 
brute being." See The Order of Things. 119, and 44ff.
7 Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral 
Sense, 1 250.
8 I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric. 108.
In what context and how much is metaphor philosophy if 
Nietzsche and Richards are right? To reverse the question, 
how does philosophy become metaphor or literature? Is it 
possible to break the traditional barrier between them, and 
if so, is it desirable and legitimate in terms of truth and 
discourse? These questions are deconstructive strategies 
through which the relation between beings and their 
discourse (between a suspect and a judge) is unsettled and 
threatened to be reformulated under a new light, and they 
reflect the voice of those who require justice--the attempt 
of friends and families of a suspect to check the power of 
a judge by appealing to the final court of justice. 
According to Levinas, Western philosophy has been the 
history of injustice and power, the history of totalistic 
desire for power which subjugates the uncertainty and 
becoming of beings and violates the other.9 For Heidegger, 
the history of Western metaphysics is punctuated and 
dominated by the forgetting of the difference between Being 
and beings as well as by the powerful desire to transform 
beings into a standing reserve. In the process of 
transformation from justice to power and from uncertainty 
to certainty, the absolute alterity of beings has been 
destroyed and appropriated into the logical space of
9 In his book Totality and Infinity Levinas defines 
Western traditional philosophy as a philosophy of power, 
against which he advocates a philosophy of justice and the 
ethics of the Other. See the chapter titled "Metaphysics 
and Transcendence," 33-52.
identity. Thus philosophy has been the discourse of power, 
official and public announcement, subjugation of the other, 
and forgetting of becoming.
The contemporary preoccupation with metaphor, it 
seems, lies in its capability of decomposing and 
disempowering power, of transforming a public discourse 
back to a private one, thereby creating a logic of 
uncertainty or a Derridian logic of supplements,10 that is, 
pluralistic meanings against the totalitarian univocity.
As a figure of speech saying one thing but meaning 
something else, metaphor contains in itself a certain 
alterity and otherness which is not easily translated into 
a logical identity. In opposition to the traditional 
interpretive paradigm wherein metaphor may be translated 
into literal words, now metaphor becomes something 
untranslatable— a suspect whose truth never comes to light, 
thus frustrating a judge's obligation to decide. However, 
such a deconstructive power of metaphor is also its 
impotence, and the ideal of justice is also its 
impossibility. The question is in regard to the 
fundamental complicity of justice with violence, that is, 
the question of how justice is possible or even conceivable 
without presupposing violence. By the same token, purely 
private or metaphoric discourse is also the impossibility 
of discourse; theoria, as a matter of public discourse, has
10 See Derrida, Of Grammatolocrv. 141-64.
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no space without polis, and criticism cannot come into 
being without violently separating truth from falsity. The 
pluralistic meanings inherent in metaphor can be the death 
of language, if they are never to be reducible into 
univocity. For its own survival, metaphor is in need of 
literal and logical discourse, as justice presupposes 
violence. If philosophy is destroyed by the hands of 
metaphor, metaphor is also to be deprived of its authority 
because of its complicity with philosophy.
Indicating only symptoms of public discourse, metaphor 
is not a solution to the contemporary crisis of public 
discourse. Rather than trying to resolve the crisis, 
philosophical interest with metaphor seems to encourage and 
radicalize it. As such, to confirm metaphor in 
philosophical discourse is “an affirmation that affirms 
nothing, 1111 an affirmation of neither philosophy nor 
literature. In the following studies of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and Derrida (those "prophets of extremity"12) , I 
want to inquire into such a problematic relation between 
philosophy and metaphor. This means to ask about the 
meaning of difference between philosophy and literature, 
between literal language and metaphoric language, from 
Nietzschean, Heideggerian, and Derridian perspectives. By
11 See Foucault's definition of "contestation" in 
Language. Counter-Memory, Practice, 3 6 .
12 Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche. 
Heidegger. Foucault. Derrida.
11
asking such a question, the nature of the contemporary 
crisis of discourse, I think, can be clarified and be
properly situated. If philosophy is radicalized and
invaded by metaphor, the crisis of public discourse is the 
crisis of the border which was supposed to exist between 
philosophy and literature. This border conflict issues in 
demands to redefine their proper territories. Here the 
question is the act of definition itself, if the border is 
always shifting since there are no proper territories 
belonging to either philosophy or metaphor.
With its focus of inquiry on the difference between
philosophy (rather metaphysics) and metaphor, this study of 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida does not intend to 
present a new theory of metaphor or a better interpretive 
strategy of metaphor. At issue is the question of how 
these prophets of extremity confronted the crisis of public 
discourse by way of metaphor. If metaphor has been 
traditionally interpreted back into a conceptual term and 
thus is to be undone at the very moment of recognition, now 
metaphor resists such a conceptual translation. The crisis 
of public discourse is this strong resistance to 
conceptualization and to the traditional hierarchy of 
philosophy over literature. If there is any coherent theme 
or thesis in my reading of different authors, it is this 
metaphoric resistance to literal language or philosophy.
In my discussion of Nietzsche, the resistance has been
12
characterized by another metaphor of metaphor, that is, the 
journey metaphor. As a figure of speech, that is, a 
linguistic phenomenon characterized by not meaning what it 
says, metaphor is always to be interpreted by being 
transformed into a concept which means what it says. 
However, this interpretation in my reading of Nietzsche is 
suspended, since metaphor's journey to concept is 
structurally unable to come to its destination. For 
Nietzsche, as soon as metaphor is born, its concept, the 
supposed parents of metaphor, dies; metaphor is an orphan 
whose parents died at its birth. Thus metaphor cannot 
return to its concept. My discussion of Heidegger is also 
dominated by this metaphor of journey. As for Heidegger, 
the nature of words is metaphoric. Words are on the way 
toward beings and Being, but there is no happy union 
between them as in conceptual unity. Being always on the 
way toward beings but never reaching its destination, 
discourse in Heidegger is fundamentally metaphoric and is 
characterized by the fundamental gap and distance between 
saying and meaning.
From a Nietzschean and Heideggerian perspective, 
metaphor is a wandering (of an orphan) on the way toward 
metaphysical presence and Being (his home and parents). 
Philosophy as public discourse always attempted to put an 
end to this metaphorical wandering by finding a concept 
corresponding to its destination. In my discussion of
13
Derrida, especially of his non-conceptual concept of 
differance, I tried to demonstrate how this metaphysical 
necessity of conceptual translation of metaphor is the very 
raison d'etre of metaphysics--metaphysics is formulated by 
its suppression of the other, metaphoricity. Metaphysics' 
relation to metaphor is thus a strange mixture of 
dependence and suppression.
In inquiring into the relation between metaphor and 
philosophy, I replace the latter by metaphysics, which thus 
becomes a metaphor for the whole of philosophy. My 
reasoning is as follows: Heidegger redefines the history of 
western philosophy as the history of metaphysics, and by so 
doing he instigates a contemporary ongoing discussion about 
the nature of philosophy as metaphysics and its relation to 
literature, after Kant's exclusion of metaphysics from the 
proper domain of philosophy. For those who are influenced 
by Heidegger, his request to overcome metaphysics becomes a 
kind of imperative for a new way of thinking, and his 
request raises naturally another related question of 
whether or not metaphysics can be overcome. As for 
Derrida, most of his writings, not to mention his numerous 
readings of Heidegger and his redefinition of metaphysics 
as logocentrism or as language itself, can be seen as 
critical attempts to respond to such a question. It is 
however an open question whether there has ever been 
metaphysics in a sense that Heidegger and Derrida defined.
In discussing the texts of three different prophets of 
extremity, I do not pretend that there is any linear 
progression or consistent development of themes common to 
them all. Since they articulated their thoughts from their 
different perspectives, it is frustrating to seek a theme 
on which they converge without exception. And their 
relation to their predecessors is that of misreading rather 
than that of an evaluative and dialectically correct 
reading. Because of this radical break of their 
perspectives intrinsic in their thinking, I abandoned my 
early attempt to let them come to the common horizon in a 
linear and progressive way, and instead I have pursued ny 
topic from different angles. In pursuing my topic I have 
read the texts of these authors for their implications. 
Since their texts are neither thematically nor explicitly 
concerned with the problem of metaphor, I had to bring to 
the surface that which remains implied in the texts. This 
implicative reading of their texts out of such a profound 
necessity may appear sometimes in conflict with the 
intentions of their authors. Nonetheless, my readings can, 
I think, be textually justified.
CHAPTER ONE 
Irony of Metaphor 
in Nietzsche
That Nietzsche's life-long counter-evaluation of western 
philosophy and Christianity culminates in his conception of 
the will to power does not mean that he founds another 
system of thoughts which will replace old ones. As an 
interminable overcoming of itself and as a chaotic and 
contradictory diversity of primordial impulses, the will to 
power is not a concept, but the very limit and the 
impossibility of conceptualization or generalization. It 
is another name for difference.1 As such, it finds its 
earliest expression in the notion of "pathos of difference" 
in his first book The Birth of Tragedy, which accounts for 
the opposition between Dionysus and Apollo, between 
Dionysus and Socrates, and between Greek music and modern 
opera. Although these binary oppositions are not those of 
kind and quality, but of degree and quantity, they have 
been born out of a fundamental "pathos of difference," and 
form a necessary and inevitable opposition for the
1 Seeing the relation of forces in will, Gilles 
Deleuze describes the will to power as "the difference in 
the origin." See his Nietzsche and Philosophy. 8. For a 
clearer explanation of will to power as difference, see 
Alphonso Lingis, "The Will to Power," 40-41.
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evaluation of values and forces.2 For the sake of its 
self-overcoming, the will to power initiates and 
establishes such temporary opposition, temporary in that 
once they serve out their purpose of self-overcoming, they 
are discarded for another oppositions. Never being 
theoretical or conceptual, they are a practical and 
economical opposition, and their validity lies in their 
force of engendering the continuous play of replacements. 
For example, the opposition of Dionysus and Apollo in The 
Birth of Tragedy is valid only for the early pre-Socratic 
Greek and as soon as Socrates appears, it is replaced by 
another opposition, that is, between Dionysus and Socrates. 
And with the introduction of Christianity Socrates is 
replaced by Christ.3 Since these oppositions are
2 Deleuze explains the relation of quantity and 
quality in Nietzsche as follows: "Nietzsche always believes 
that forces were quantitative and had to be defined 
quantitatively ... However Nietzsche was no less certain 
that a purely quantitative determination of forces remained 
abstract, incomplete and ambiguous." See his Nietzsche & 
Philosophy, p. 43.
3 As for an example of such metaphoric replacements, 
see Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche et la m£taphore. In chapter 
IV, titled "Architectures Metaphoriques, " she traces the 
transformation of metaphors, which represent the stages of 
the procession of science, away from active life toward 
nihilism or abstract ideals: "De 1'architecture de la ruche 
a celle du cachot, en passant par celles de la pyramide 
«§gyptienne, du columbarium romain, de la Tour (de Babel), 
du chateau fort; celle de la toile d'araign^e, d'un simple 
assemblage de poutres, d'un £chafaudage, tel est 
l'itin^raire m^taphorique qu'emprunte Nietzsche" (90). This 
chapter has been translated by Peter T. Connor and Mira 
Kamdar in Looking After Nietzsche.
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historically determined, they are temporal through and 
through, and their temporal replacements are the very 
expression of the will to power. Whenever the will to 
power emerges and is realized, it is through the form of 
metaphorical replacements.
For Nietzsche, the danger of Socrates (metaphysics) 
lies in his attempt to resolve the opposition and to turn 
their metaphorical and historical play of replacements into 
a never-changing concept, into truth. Socrates, in 
Nietzsche's critique of him, represents a symptom of decay 
and of death, since he wants to freeze life into a cold 
eternity by depriving it of historicity, temporality, and 
the play of transformations: death is the very way of 
attaining eternal truth. It is in the figure of Socrates 
that Nietzsche, in The Birth of Tragedy and The Twilight of 
Idols. finds the essence of Socratic irony. In the search 
for eternal and universal truth, which for Nietzsche does 
not exist at all, Socrates rather rejected truth as well as 
life, truth in the sense of plurality and temporality. 
Therefore, Socrates is the figure of impossible search and 
longing, since he looks for something that does not exist. 
In an ironic turn, he who wanted to cure and improve life 
ended up rejecting life itself. As with the example of 
Socrates, the search for truth in the sense of ahistorical 
universality is destined to be the very story of irony.
18
Irony therefore is opposed to metaphor in a way that 
Socrates is opposed to Dionysus, and likewise this 
opposition is created out of the will to power.4
Truth, seen from the perspective of metaphor, is a 
temporal play of replacements, whereas truth in irony is an 
atemporal gaze into eternity and oneness. For ironic
4 Throughout this chapter, I use the term "irony" with 
two senses in mind, that is, a self-conscious or self- 
reflective irony and an irony ignorant or unconscious of 
its ironicity. As I will explicate later, Dionysus 
represents the first type of irony, Socrates the second 
type. In defining Socrates as an unreflective ironist, I 
follow Kierkegaard's The Concept of Irony: with continual 
reference to Socrates. In that book Kierkegaard says of 
Socratic irony that "His [Socrates'] abstract is totally 
empty designation. He starts with the concrete and 
arrives at the most abstract and there, where the 
investigation should begin, he stops ... so the abstract as 
the negative has its truth in the ironic" (46) . Here 
Socrates is described as an abstract philosopher, who 
makes, though unwittingly, life empty and void with his 
conceptualization.
This twofold differentiation of irony, I think, is 
necessary, since irony essentially relates the question of 
self to reflexivity. Naive philosophers and scientists, 
believing concepts and truths as universal and absolute, 
subordinate themselves to them and are bound to them to the 
degree of becoming their prisoners. But contrary to 
philosophers and scientists, artists, who are concious of 
the falsity and groundlessness of these concepts, use them 
ironically, that is, without believing their truth values, 
and they use these already-existing concepts only in order 
to turn them into metaphors for their artistic purpose of 
creation and freedom. Charles I. Glicksberg explains how 
Nietzsche, along with other major contemporary writers, 
"utilize[s] the resources of irony as part of [his] 
metaphysical outlook": "[His] irony embodies an existential 
contradiction, not to be reconciled by the casuistry of 
reason, between the human longing for ultimate meaning and 
the lack of meaning..." See his The Ironic Vision in 
Modern Literature, 5. Later in iry discussion of irony and 
metaphor I will inquire into how irony gives birth to 
metaphors.
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Socrates, truth is the unity of all ideals, such as reason, 
virtue, justice, and happiness. Since that desired unity 
cannot be realized, Socrates's search for truth is a 
journey into a never-never land. As for metaphor, it 
readjusts and focuses the sight of the ironist fixed upon 
the eternal truth of being so that he can see its diversity 
and multiplicity. Of course, the relation between metaphor 
and irony is much more complex than this brief 
characterization of them, and their borderline sometimes 
appears impossible to define: the opposition of irony and 
metaphor is not one of kind, but of degree.5 But as with 
other binary oppositions, irony and metaphor are a 
necessary pair, crucial for the reading and understanding 
of Nietzsche.
While Socrates' search for being can be characterized 
by his effort to find its center and unity in its 
plurality, Nietzsche's investigation into being is rather 
an attempt to decenter the presumed center of being and 
introduce a play of its multiplicity free of the center.
If being is text, and Socrates and Nietzsche are readers,
5 According to Wayne Booth, though they are same in 
that they say one thing but mean another, the process of 
decoding them is different from each other. The metaphoric 
process of decoding is usually one of "exploration or 
extension," while that of irony is “one of repudiation or 
reversal." Of course, this distinction, though very 
useful, cannot be pushed too far, and it is true mostly for 
conventional metaphors. See his A Rhetoric of Irony, 22- 
24.
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Socrates is ironic insofar as he attempts to find a non­
existing center in a text, whereas Nietzsche is metaphoric 
in that he replaces a presumed center with peripheral 
points.6 Then the problem with the relation of metaphor 
and irony becomes a problem of reading, in a diverse sense 
that such an inquiry presupposes a reading of Nietzsche who 
in turn is a reader of Socrates, who is a reader of being. 
The reader is either ironic or metaphoric, even before he 
sets out an investigation into the relation between irony 
and metaphor. When one takes reading as a centripetal 
movement into a center, he tends to be ironic, and finds 
himself entangled with many peripheries. Likewise at 
finding no center in Nietzsche's texts, ironic readers of 
Nietzsche are frustrated and are thus inclined to abandon 
any further reading or otherwise attempt to seek a 
satisfaction by taking one of the peripheries as a center. 
For ironic readers, reading is a story of irony, the story 
of the impossibility of reading. The binary opposition, 
between Dionysus and Apollo, Nietzsche and Socrates, and 
metaphor and irony, hinges upon the problem of reading.
6 Among many Nietzsche scholars who sees being as 
text, see Jean Granier, "Perspectivism and Interpretation," 
192: "By introducing the notion of interpretation,
Nietzsche imposes a definition of Being as 'text.' Being 
is similar to a text that requires our exegesis, a task 
complicated by the fact that the text is obscure, often 
full of gaps, by the fact that several 'readings' are 
possible and that certain fragments even remain 
undeciphered."
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The question of how to read Nietzsche comes together with 
the question of how to see being, and these questions 
evolve around metaphor and irony. Therefore the study of 
metaphor and irony in Nietzsche has to begin with how to 
read him.7
In order to unravel this close and confusing 
interrelation of metaphor, irony, and reading, I will 
discuss and analyze Nietzsche's essay on language, "On 
Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense,"8 which received 
much critical attention in the seventies and still attracts 
much critical debate.9 Even though this essay, which was
7 In a chapter on Nietzsche in Metahistorv: The 
Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe, titled 
"Nietzsche: The Poetic Defense of History in the 
Metaphorical Mode," Hayden White discusses Nietzsche's 
historiography in terms of the metaphoric overcoming of 
irony. While observing that Nietzsche's 1871 preface to 
The Birth of Tragedy identifies the true targets of it as 
Socratic irony and Wagnerian Romanticism, White says, 
"Nietzsche's purpose as a philosopher was to transcend 
Irony by freeing consciousness from [reductionism and 
representation]...and to return consciousness to the 
enjoyment of its Metaphorical powers" (334) . Even though 
he does not see the dynamic and mutually dependent relation 
between irony and metaphor, my approach to Nietzsche is 
quite similar to White's.
8 In citing from or referring to Nietzsche's two 
texts, I have used the following abbreviations: TL for "On 
Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense," in Friedrich 
Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, and BT for The Birth of 
Tragedy from the Spirit of Music. And when I had to 
consult German texts, I used S&mtliche Werke: Kritische 
Studienausaabe, vol. I.
9 See Paul de Man, "The Rhetoric of Trope," in his 
Allegories of Reading, J. P. Stern, "Nietzsche and the Idea 
of Metaphor," J. Hillis Miller, "Dismembering and
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written in 1873, one year after The Birth of Tragedy, was 
not published during Nietzsche's lifetime, it is "probably 
the longest single piece on a traditional 'philosophical' 
subject he ever wrote."10 It is in this essay that 
Nietzsche most coherently and most comprehensively reflects 
on his philosophy of language, though comments on language 
are scattered throughout all his major texts. But it is 
not certain whether or not Nietzsche's conception of 
metaphor and truth as delineated in this essay undergoes 
any change in his later writings.11 However, my present
Disremembering in Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lies in a 
Nonmoral Sense'," and Lawrence M. Hinman, "Nietzsche, 
Metaphor, and Truth."
10 J. P. Stern, "Nietzsche and the Idea of Metaphor,"
66.
11 As for the continuity of Nietzsche's view of 
language in "Truth and Lying" up to his later writings, see 
Alan D. Schrift's essay, "Language, Metaphor, Rhetoric: 
Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology." Schrift argues 
that "Nietzsche's early views on language, while no longer 
pursued as a specific topic of inquiry, remain a consistent 
theme throughout the entirety of his writings," and goes on 
to insist that "this conception of language [as metaphor] 
is essential for understanding some of Nietzsche's more 
vitriolic and polemical counterdoctrines to the traditional 
philosophical quest for knowledge and truth" (372). 
Maudemarie Clark objects to Schrift's interpretation of 
Nietzsche's philosophy of language, and claims that 
"Nietzsche later abandoned the position of "Truth and 
Lying." Clark therefore sees that "Truth and Lying" “seems 
completely undeserving of the enthusiasm it has recently 
generated." See her Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, 64.
The question of continuity of Nietzsche's view of 
language as metaphor in "Truth and Lying" does not concern 
my discussion of Nietzsche. In order not to be engaged or 
intrigued into a task of surveying all his writings, I 
limit my discussion of Nietzsche to The Birth of Tragedy
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inquiry, being a study of metaphor in its relation to irony 
in Nietzsche's "Truth and Lying," does not concern itself 
with such a problem. After my discussion of it, I will 
move to The Birth of Tragedy, in order to explain irony and 
metaphor in terms of Dionysus, Apollo, and Socrates. For 
they throw light onto the problem of the hermeneutical 
interpretation of metaphors. In my discussion of metaphor 
in both texts, I neither intend to arrive at a new 
definition of metaphor nor to present a better approach to 
it than any traditional ones. What I attempt to 
investigate along with Nietzsche in these texts is rather 
to render metaphor more problematical and more
and "Truth and Lying," his early writings. Dividing 
chronologically Nietzsche's work into three stages in his 
"Nietzsche: Art and Intellectual Inquiry," Peter Putz sees 
that Nietzsche in his second phase is radically skeptical 
about art whereas he puts extraordinarily high value on art 
in his first phase. However, as my discussion of "Truth 
and Lying" will reveal, Nietzsche is not an unconditional 
patron of art. I say this not in order to contradict 
Putz's useful guideline, but in order to indicate 
complexities involved. As a matter of fact, Nietzsche in 
his later writings, such as Will to Power and Twilight of 
the Idols, discards the notion of the thing-in-itself, 
which plays a significant role in "Truth and Lying" as a 
mysterious x, and as Dionysus in The Birth of Tragedy. For 
example, Nietzsche says “The 'apparent' world is the only 
one: the 'real' world has only been added as a lie"
(“Reason in Philosophy" in Twilight of the Idols). And in 
the 1886 preface to The Birth of Tragedy, in this "essay in 
self-criticism," Nietzsche himself admits that he depended 
on Kantian and Schopenhauerian categories.
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questionable, by considering it in its relation to irony, 
truth, and language in general.
I
Throughout the essay Nietzsche distinguishes original 
truth from conventional truth and emphasizes the 
impossibility of attaining the former and on man's 
indifference to it: "He longs for the pleasant, life- 
preserving consequences of truth; he is indifferent to 
pure, inconsequential knowledge" (TL, p. 248). To begin 
with, original truth is defined as "'true in itself,' real, 
and universally valid, apart from man," {TL, p. 251) and as 
the "mysterious x of the thing,... that is inaccessible and 
indefinable for us" (TL, pp. 249-50). Since the thing for 
Nietzsche is in the continuous process of becoming, it 
cannot be represented or described. It is even a 
contradiction to call it a thing since it implies a stable 
entity. The only way to name it without such self- 
contradiction is to designate it by x, the unknowable and 
inaccessible. For Nietzsche to ask about truth after 
defining it as the pure knowledge of x is nothing more than 
to beg the question or a tautology at best: his definition 
of truth precludes any possibility of truth. However, even 
to designate x as x is not a pure knowledge, if the former 
x refers to the unknown reality. By designating a thing,
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which is not a thing, as the unknown x, one has already 
committed an error of relating it to human understanding 
even in a form of negativity. To define it as the 
"inaccessible and indefinable" is an act of judgment and 
evaluation. And by replacing x (reality) by x (word), 
reality is taken as if it were a word and as if the word 
corresponded with the reality. It then follows that 
language begins only where reality ends. And if language 
has nothing to do with truth, then even Nietzsche's essay, 
regardless of what he says, cannot escape from that fatal 
falsity--not only false but also meaningless, because it 
says nothing at all.
In defining truth as the pure knowledge of the 
mysterious x of the thing, Nietzsche is concerned with the 
most fundamental of all fundamentals and the most original 
of all originals, which will support and found those less 
fundamental and less original. But since x is inaccessible 
and unknowable, the supposed foundation turns out to be an 
abyss into which all values are thrown and demolished.12 
As the x of curiosity, it invites men into a free inquiry 
and investigation only in order to frustrate them and 
dispossess them of what they have had and believed.
12 See Alphonso Lingis, "The Will to Power, 1 at which 
he explains that "The Will to Power is an abyss, the 
groundless chaos beneath all the grounds, all the 
foundations, and it leaves the whole order of essences 
groundless" (7).
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Therefore, the questioning of x is a gesture of ironic 
destruction: however serious an inquiry may be, it turns 
into a mode of self-destruction. Any inquiry into the 
irysterious x is destined to be ironic, the quest of 
impossibility, and Nietzsche in rendering truth as such an 
impossibility is ironic too. Like ironic Socrates, 
Nietzsche upholds the nothingness of ignorance or the 
perspective of nothingness, and destroys everything.
In a reflexive reading of Nietzsche, his rejection of 
truth is turned back upon himself and his essay is 
subjected to the same criticism. If truth is impossible, 
it means that any discourse is impossible and reading is 
impossible too. To say that nothing is true is not a safe 
position. Whenever one makes any statement, he is forced 
to deny its validity and, therefore, becomes necessarily 
ironic. There enters an inevitable incongruity or 
contradiction between what one says and what one means. 
Since reading cannot escape from that ironic situation, 
reading itself becomes a story of impossibility.
If original truth is inaccessible and indefinable and 
does not give rise to any discourse, human life will be 
threatened and endangered. For the sake of preservation of 
humanity, a more accessible and definable notion of truth 
has to be invented. Therefore the birth of truth for 
Nietzsche is necessarily social, conventional, and
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anthropomorphic. Now truth is conceived not as a 
metaphysical correspondence between things and human 
knowledge of them, but as a consensus reached by humanity. 
Man sets up his own rules, principles, and truth, 
independent of the mysterious x, and plays according to 
them. For Nietzsche, this anthropomorphic truth, means "to 
use each dice as designated, count its spots accurately, 
forming the correct labels, and never violating the caste 
system and sequence of rank classifications1 (TL, p. 251) . 
According to this, truth is like a dice game and to be true 
is nothing more than to play in accordance with its rules. 
Only after rules of the dice game are decided upon, can one 
distinguish between truth and lying, truth as the correct 
use of dice and lying as the misuse of dice. The liar, 
Nietzsche says, "misuses established conventions by 
arbitrary substitutions and even reversals of names" (TL, 
p. 248) . If society does not endure lying, it is because 
it will interrupt and destroy the play of the dice game. 
Since truth is neither ontological, nor epistemological, 
its significance lies in its engendering continuous play.13
13 Of course, the notion of play does not have any 
subjective implication. For it is not the players but the 
very game itself that plays and is played, as Hans-Georg 
Gadamer clearly pointed out already. The rules of the game 
cannot be made or altered by any single individuals. In 
freeing play from the subjective meaning and seeing it in 
terms of middle voice phenomenon, Gadamer approaches 
Nietzsche's conception of play. Nietzsche's dice throw (a 
metaphor of eternal recurrence) and Dionysiac play resemble
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As Nietzsche explains, "if someone hides an object behind a 
bush, then seeks and finds it there, that seeking and 
finding is not very laudable" because he finds only what he 
has posited already (TL, p. 251). Knowledge is simply the 
memory of the rules of games, and to be true is to keep 
these rules.
By conceiving truth as play, Nietzsche leaves irony 
behind himself and enters into a metaphoric mode. While 
original truth does not engender rules, making it 
impossible to play any game, conventional truth keeps games 
going on by continuously making rules.14 But how does such 
a transition from irony to play, from absolute truth to 
conventional truth, from the impossibility of discourse to 
its proliferation, and from the impossibility of reading to 
its possibility take place? That transition, Nietzsche 
says, takes place through the medium of language, which has 
its origin in metaphor. He states that "the mysterious x 
of the thing appears first as a nerve stimulus, then as an
Gadamer's notion of playing that is being played. Gadamer, 
Truth and Method, 91-119.
14 For a brief explanation of the language game theory 
of truth, see Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Condition, especially chapter 3. In a summary, he makes 
these three observations about language games: "The first 
is that their rules do not carry within themselves their 
own legitimation, but are the object of a contract, 
explicit or not, between players (which is not to say that 
the players invent the rules). The second is that if there 
are no rules, there is no game, ... [thirdly] every 
utterance should be thought of as a 'move' in a game" (10).
image, and finally as a sound" (TL, p. 249). Following 
Aristotle's definition of metaphor as "transference," 
Nietzsche explains: "First, he [man] translates a nerve 
stimulus into an image! That is the first metaphor. Then, 
the image must be reshaped into a sound! The second 
metaphor" (TL, p. 248). Through the process of metaphoric 
transference man enters into the world of language and of 
truth, while he drifts further and further away from the 
mysterious x. To speak more correctly, Nietzsche's 
metaphor here is catachresis, since the unknown x, which is 
not represented by any word, is replaced by a sign, which 
is not adequate to it.15 Between the unknown x and a sign 
there is no appropriate relationship to speak of.
Nietzsche's metaphor in explaining the birth of 
language and truth, however, should not be confused with 
Aristotelian metaphor. While Nietzsche equates language 
with metaphor, Aristotle sees metaphor as only one of the 
tropes of language. For Aristotle, to understand and 
interpret metaphor mostly undoes metaphor and finds a 
proper meaning instead, which, Nietzsche sees, does not 
exist at all. Aristotle defines metaphor in terms of 
transference: "the transference may be from the genus to 
the species, from the species to the genus, or from one
15 Hillis Miller in "Dismembering and Disremembering 
in Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,'"
45.
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species to another, or it may be a matter of analogy."16 
According to this transference theory of metaphor, there 
take place two transferences. On the level of metaphoric 
formation a term is carried away into another term, and 
then on the level of understanding the latter replaces and 
displaces the former. In the sentence "Odysseus has indeed 
performed ten thousand noble deeds," the metaphor "ten 
thousands," Aristotle explains, should be taken to mean 
"many." The metaphor “ten thousand" displaces the proper 
meaning "many," so that the latter has to displace the 
former. In other words, the reader of metaphor should 
leave the land of metaphor for the land of proper meaning 
in order to bring back the message of the latter to the 
former. Whenever there is metaphor, the reader has to be 
carried away into the proper meaning and then be carried 
back into the metaphoric expression with the proper 
message. For Aristotle, one-way transference is to be 
complemented by another counter-transference: the first 
transference "from the genus to the species, from the 
species to the genus, or from one species to another" is 
replaced by the second contrary transference. Even the 
case of metaphor by analogy and catachresis is no 
exception. Though a term, as in catachresis, is missing, 
there is a concept or an image to replace metaphor. Such
16 Aristotle, Poetics. 61.
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two-way transference is the inevitable consequence of 
dualism of proper meaning and non-proper meaning, soul and 
body, and essence and matter. One is the temporary dwelling 
of man, the other the eternal dwelling. Therefore, the 
meaning of the former has to be found by referring to the 
latter. Aristotle's definition of metaphor as the two-way 
transference holds true only if one accepts the dualism of 
proper and non-proper meanings. The proper meaning is a 
home for a wandering metaphor to return to. But the 
question to be asked along with Nietzsche is: what if there 
is no home for metaphor to return to or what if the 
carrier, which carries metaphor away from its home, is lost 
forever so that homecoming is actually impossible? For 
Nietzsche, metaphor is a one-way transference, a one-way 
ticket into conventionality and language: "what we have [in 
language] are just metaphors of things, which do not 
correspond at all to the original entities" (TL, p. 249).
As for Aristotle, metaphor, being a two-way ticket, carries 
the reader into the world of signs, and then carries him 
back to their proper home, to the world of things or of 
their images, so that the reader finds things in signs.
But for Nietzsche, the metaphoric journey is an eternal 
departure from the world of reality without any hope to 
return. If the metaphor is by way of analogy (A is to B as 
C is to D), one term (D) is missing and remains as a void.
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The other terms in that analogy therefore lose their ground 
and foundation. If metaphor operates by transference, a 
term to be transferred, that is, the mysterious x, cannot 
be represented at all and does not give rise to any image 
or idea which will in turn found metaphor. In the absence 
of proper meanings, there is only endless repetition of 
metaphors. The reader of a metaphor is destined to be lost 
in the forest of metaphors.
Since language is a one-way ticket into wandering and 
meandering, its player resides and plays not in a safe 
world of metaphysical presence, but in a dangerous and 
aberrant world of absence. To enter into language is not 
to walk on a pathway leading to a fixed destination 
(Aristotle's proper meaning), but to wander and to be lost 
in a thick forest of metaphors. With Nietzsche's 
description of language and metaphor as a one-way 
transference, the linguistic journey becomes an adventure 
with a risk of no return. Every adventure, however 
dangerous, is undertaken with an imperative request of 
returning home, in order to complete its genetic cycle of 
departure and homecoming. Likewise, one leaves the world 
of things in the play of language only in order to return 
to it. Therefore, the moment one enters into language, in 
either speaking or reading, one is already ready to return. 
As for the reader, especially of Nietzsche, he finds
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himself resisting reading, being afraid that he might be 
lost. The initial temptation of reading turns soon into 
the resistance to reading— such a dual moment constitutes 
the very essence of language.17
Nietzsche, however, does not see the danger and risk 
of metaphor negatively, but on the contrary he takes it 
rather as a positive element of language, not only in that 
metaphor sets in motion the play of language and therefore 
truth, but also in that it bears certain signs of 
materiality.18 Even though he rendered metaphor as 
something that has nothing to do with reality in his strong 
rejection of any fundamental truth, he begins to affirm 
that it is not an absolute severing from reality. But the 
relation between metaphor and reality cannot be 
theoretically identified and is not a matter of pure 
confirmation or negation, for his defense of metaphor is
17 See Paul de Man's well known essay, "The Resistance 
to Theory,"in The Resistance to Theory.
18 As the following discussion will prove, it is not 
quite correct for Hillis Miller to say that Nietzsche 
condemned metaphor in "Truth and Lying" in order to ask 
"Why is it that Nietzsche must use what he condemns?" 
Miller's answer to that question is derived from what might 
be called a practical consideration, that is, "Nietzsche's 
task...is to use metaphors... in such a way as to reveal 
clearly the functioning of metaphors." Rather than arguing 
against his answer, I would like to point out that his 
answer does not do justice to Nietzsche's defense of 
metaphor as the product of will to power, and a way of 
overcoming irony. See Hillis Miller, "Dismembering and 
Disremembering in Nietzsche's 'On Truth and Lies in a 
Nonmoral Sense,'" 46.
partly the result of or a strategy for his stringent attack 
of concepts. In "Truth and Lying," Nietzsche explains the 
creation of metaphor in terms of anthropomophism, man's 
desire for relation with the thing-in-itself which is 
totally incomprehensible. Since it is impossible to 
perceive thing-in-itself, "he [man] designates only the 
relations of things to men, and to express these relations 
he uses the boldest metaphors" (TL, p. 248). Of course, it 
does not mean that before the creation of metaphors man is 
not related to things in any way. Nietzsche's definition 
of "the first metaphor" as the translation of "a nerve 
stimulus into an image" implies that man has encountered 
and has been attacked by things in a way of vague and 
indistinct nerve stimulation. It seems to be certain that 
Nietzsche admits the actual relation, which is not 
cognitive, between prelinguistic man and reality, though by 
doing so he falls into a dualism of feeling and knowing.
In the instance of the first metaphor, the fact that 
man translates a nerve stimulus into an image means that he 
turns a feeling into a pictorial memory, thus making 
reality representable. When a thing hits a man and he 
feels its impact, he begins to translate or interpret the 
thing in terms of the impact. And he mistakes the impact
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as if it were the thing itself.19 As a result of this 
mistaken impression, he gains an image of the thing. If it 
were not man but another animal that is hit by the thing, 
its image, Nietzsche supposes, would have been quite 
different.20 Because the specific image of the thing 
pertains particularly to man, Nietzsche calls it an 
instance of anthropomorphism, the humanization of the 
world. Nonetheless, that anthropomorphism is constituted 
by man's tactile relation to the thing. The relation is 
not intellectual, but of something pertaining to the body, 
and the creation of the first metaphor is initiated and is 
mediated by the body. As such, what severs the first 
metaphor from the thing is not the actual abyss between 
them, but the theoretical abyss of uncertainty, 
unpredictability, and multiplicity which characterized the 
body. When one attempts a theoretical definition of the 
relation between the first metaphor and the thing, the
19 See Nietzsche's critique of cause-and-effect 
relation in The Will to Power, § 229: "If he is suffering 
or in a good mood, he has no doubt that he can find the 
reason for it if only he looks. So he looks for the
reason— In truth, he cannot find the reason, because he
does not even suspect where he ought to look for it--What 
happens?— He takes a consequence of his condition for its 
cause." For Nietzsche's metaphoric deconstruction of 
epistemology, see Alan D. Schrift, "Language, Metaphor, 
Rhetoric: Nietzsche's Deconstruction of Epistemology."
20 Quite ironically, Nietzsche himself hypothesizes,
"if we had ... a varying sensory perception, we could see
now like a bird, now like a worm, now like a plant" (TL, p.
253) .
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abyss opens up and separates one from the other as if they 
had nothing to do with each other- The relation between 
them resists any theorizing, any conceptualization, since 
it remains unstable, unpredictable, and undependable.
Nietzsche's notion of language is therefore not to be 
misunderstood as another version of Saussure's linguistics. 
While Saussure sees the connection between signs and their 
referents as arbitrary, Nietzsche finds a certain natural 
relation between them. Even though Nietzsche sometimes 
presents their relation as arbitrary because of its 
impossibility of definition, it is not certainly a 
Saussure's arbitrariness. Saussure, in order to found a 
rigorous study of language, separates the fact of speaking, 
parole, from the rule and system of language, lanaue. and 
takes the latter as the proper domain of linguistics, 
because parole resists any rules and principles.
Therefore, the science of language as the system of 
unmotivated and arbitrary signs has to defend itself from 
the threat of certain unruly "paroles." and from the threat 
of certain motivated signs like onomatopoeia and 
interjections. Saussure considers a possibility of 
motivation in onomatopoeia only in order to renounce it as 
an exception on the ground that "onomatopoeic formations 
are never organic elements of a linguistic system" and 
"their number is much smaller than is generally supposed."
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For Saussure, not only are onomatopoeic words exceptional 
and non-organic, they undergo a transformation and lose 
"their original character in order to assume that of the 
linguistic sign in general, which is unmotivated."21 As 
such, there is enough reason for Saussure to ignore some 
element of semiotic motivation, the admission of which 
would thwart an attempt to study language as a rigorous 
science.
But for Nietzsche, a certain element of semiotic 
motivation, which is repudiated by Saussure as an 
exception, becomes the very cornerstone of his discussion 
of language, the cornerstone which shakes and unsettles the 
system of language from the bottom. If language is totally 
arbitrary and unmotivated, it can be shaped into any system 
of linguistic totality, since language is nothing and thus 
is unable to resist a system. But if language is endowed 
with a certain motivation, it is resistant to such a 
systematic totalization. It is this aspect of linguistic 
resistance that defines Nietzsche's position against 
Saussure's and makes Nietzsche attribute the origin of 
language to metaphor. For Nietzsche, the metaphoricity of 
language is rather a positive, since it saves language from 
a total arbitrariness and restores language to its relation
21 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General 
Linguistics, 69.
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to things. But to those who see language as a system of 
totality and are concerned with theorizing language, the 
metaphoric origin of language takes a negative and 
deconstructive implication: metaphor renders the system of 
language quite arbitrary.
Since language in its metaphoricity is unstable in 
relation to reality, and cannot be contained safely in a 
system, language for Nietzsche is destined to be an 
unreliable one-way transference into wandering. When a 
nerve stimulus is translated into an image, which is the 
first metaphor, this metaphoric process cannot be reversed. 
Even though the image bears a certain aspect of the nerve 
stimulus, it is too vague and indistinct to identify its 
own source. Granted that the identification is possible, 
the nerve stimulus, the locus of the body, does not lead it 
into a further final source, the thing which produced the 
stimulus. Nietzsche explains that "to conclude from a 
nerve stimulus to a cause outside ourselves is already the 
result of a false and unjustified application of the law of 
causality" (TL, p. 248). Therefore, any attempt to 
reconstruct the thing out of the image through the 
retrogressive movement cannot be successful. Though one 
leaves things in the act of creating language, he cannot 
hope to return to them: to use language is thus to wander 
in a foreign land, and its speaker is an exile there.
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However, man cannot endure the status of exile, so he 
decides to be naturalized in a foreign land, by completely 
forgetting his own homeland. That naturalization is the 
transformation of metaphor into concepts. The fact that 
man resists the materiality of metaphor gives rise to the 
birth of non-metaphoric and proper meanings as in Aristotle 
and Hegel. In order to explain Nietzsche's attitude to 
this conceptualizing process of metaphor, I will discuss 
for a moment Hegel's semiology, and then I will show how 
this is opposed to Nietzsche's position.
Contrary to Saussure but in agreement with Nietzsche, 
Hegel holds language as motivated by reality. As Koj&ve 
explains with the example of "dog," language is created in 
conjunction with the real "dog" through the mediation of 
time.22 The real dog, Hegel sees, dies in time, in order 
to be reborn in language. Here the image and memory of the 
real dog gives rise to the word "dog," and the relation 
between them is the universally motivated and necessary 
one, that is prepared by the teleological scheme of time. 
The word "dog" for Hegel is truth and the birth of language 
is the realization of truth. The real dog corresponds to 
the word "dog, 1 of course with the difference that one is 
given in temporality and the other in eternity. According
22 Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of 
Heael. 141-43.
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to Hegel, man loses reality in language but attains truth. 
The loss of reality is recompensed more than enough by the 
gain of truth: one leaves spatiality behind and gains 
instead concept, one leaves a temporal home for an eternal 
home. As for Hegel, the natural relation of language to 
reality provides a solid and true foundation to the system 
of language: language is motivated and necessary not only 
in its origin but also in its system. In that teleological 
and universal system of language, man's passage into 
language (metaphor) is also the passage into truth (its 
proper meaning).
While Hegel sees the transformation of language into 
concepts as an ascent, Nietzsche finds in it a descent.
The transcendence of language into concept for Nietzsche is 
nothing more than forgetting of its origin; as he says, 
"only by forgetfulness can man ever come to believe that he 
has truth..." (TL, p. 248). Hegel's truth, Nietzsche sees, 
is "just what is left over as the residue of a metaphor"
(TL, p. 251). Then the concept is the ungrateful child who 
forgets those who gave birth to him. From the viewpoint of 
Nietzsche, Hegel's concept like the child forgets its 
origin and in order to justify its second birth attributes 
to itself a wrong origin. The conceptualization of 
metaphor is then a double forgetting, firstly forgetting of 
its origin and then forgetting of the fact of its oblivion.
What is considered proper in metaphor in Aristotle and 
Hegel is nothing other than that which is wrongly imposed 
on metaphor. And if they see metaphor as the two-way 
transference, the supposed second transference into the 
proper meaning is rather a transference away from it.
Quite against their intention to save metaphor from 
Nietzschean wandering, they happen to attach to it a false 
identity, a false home, and false parents: by finding wrong 
parents in the concept, metaphor puts an end to its search 
for real parents. Because of this finding relief in wrong 
identification, Nietzsche condemns concepts, and his 
apparent valorization of metaphor is no other expression 
than his warning against conceptualization as the 
forgetting of metaphor.
Nietzsche's valorization of metaphor against concept 
therefore leads him to render the latter as the slow 
process of forgetting or wearing-away of the former. In 
explaining such a slow conceptualizing process, Nietzsche, 
for example, uses a "coin" metaphor: "truths are ... worn- 
out metaphors without sensory impact, coins which have lost 
their image and now can be used only as metal, and no 
longer as coins" {TL, p. 250) . This coin metaphor, as 
Stern rightly points out in his reading of "Truth and 
Lying," has the apocalyptic implication that the history of 
language is "a process which runs all the way from pristine
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freshness to ossification, decadence, and an apocalyptic 
ending."23 But one should be warned against taking too 
literally such an apocalyptic tone in Nietzsche's coin 
metaphor. For that wearing-away of the coin is not the 
transition from the presence of being to its absence. The
coin is not a metaphor of the thing, but a metaphor of 
metaphor. If the coin is an image, it is the image of 
metaphor as exergue, which gains value only by wearing- 
away. The image is already false. Therefore what concerns 
Nietzsche in the coin metaphor is not the forgetting of 
truth or of the presence of Being, but the forgetting of 
falsity. As such, his coin metaphor has a function of 
undermining the Hegelian uplifting of metaphor into truth: 
Nietzsche plainly states that "truths are illusions about 
which it has been forgotten that they are illusions" (TL, 
p. 250) . Hegelian truth for Nietzsche is only the absence 
and forgetting of the metaphoricity of metaphor. And if 
Nietzsche gives any ontological priority to metaphor
against concept, it seems to be because the former
corresponds more closely to the status of things in its
23 See J. P. Stern, "Nietzsche and the Idea of 
Metaphor," 72. Stern asserts that such a declining process 
is "the way Nietzsche saw European history from the golden 
age of pre-Socratic Greece to his own day and the early 
twentieth century as he prophetically envisaged it."
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negativity, that is, in its absence of systematic order, 
its negation of any claim to truth, and so on.
Nietzsche's metaphor is no doubt not a mere trope 
within the system of language, but language itself. As 
Nietzsche uses the word "truth" dually in "Truth and Lying" 
without defining clearly its duplicity, that is, original 
truth and linguistic truth, his use of metaphor is to be 
understood in that context. Whenever he talks about 
metaphor, it is meant to be original metaphor (language 
itself) as distinct from rhetorical metaphor (a trope in 
language). And as the impossibility of original truth 
gives rise to the birth of rhetorical truth, original 
metaphor produces rhetorical metaphor. If language, as 
Nietzsche says, "works at the structure of concepts," 
linguistic metaphor is defined in its relation to concepts. 
For Aristotle, this linguistic metaphor is a linguistic 
deviation, which therefore should be translated into the 
proper concept. It is only by its self-denial and undoing 
of itself that metaphor enters into the structure of 
concepts. But for Nietzsche, even rhetorical metaphor is 
not to be translated into the concept. As he says in the 
last section in the essay, rhetorical metaphor should be 
used creatively, that is, in a way of destroying the rigid 
system of concepts which he compares with "a prison 
fortress" (TL, p. 254). As man is entrapped and imprisoned
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within and by the system of language, which he created for 
his life preservation and out of creativity and freedom, 
language becomes a supreme danger.
If language does not have any ontological foundation, 
it is not safe to play with it, most of all when unaware 
that one is playing. To place one's trust in language in 
order to be led into truth is nothing more than to be 
deceived into "the presuppositions of metaphysics of 
language," as Nietzsche says in Twilight of the Idols, 
where comparing language to "a deceitful old woman. ,l24 As 
the old woman is unpredictable, unbelievable, and 
untruthful, so is with language. As it is dangerous to 
take her as a woman of faith and truth, so it is with 
language. If one sees words as true to things and tries to 
find concepts in words, he is destined to be deceived and 
deluded by them. Here lies the danger for the players of 
the language game. While man has no choice but to use 
language, he cannot trust it. His relation with language 
is a battle at which the latter tries to catch, imprisons, 
and finally enslaves him, while he wants to use it to the 
best of his creative impulse. In explaining the human 
relation to language, Nietzsche therefore sets "the poor
24 Nietzsche writes, "'Reason' in language: oh what a 
deceitful old woman! I fear we are not getting rid of God 
because we still believe in grammar." See Twilight of the 
Idols. p. 38.
45
man" against "the liberated intellect": language, "to which 
the poor man clings for dear life, is for the liberated 
intellect just a scaffolding and plaything for his boldest 
artifices" (255).
Nietzsche's discussion of the creative use of metaphor 
is based on his conviction that the drive to form metaphors 
is the "fundamental desire in man." That fundamental 
desire, Nietzsche sees, "cannot be discounted for one 
moment, because that would amount to ignoring man himself" 
(254) . As such, man is defined in terms of his metaphoric 
desire. Though Nietzsche gives such an enormously 
important function to metaphor, it is not very certain 
whether he means by it rhetorical metaphor (a trope) or 
original metaphor (language itself). If he means by 
metaphor language in general, his emphasis would be 
commonsensica1. However, it may be that the distinction 
cannot be made too rigid, and that there is a certain 
continuity between them. Even though metaphor as trope is 
the product of conceptualization of original metaphor and 
thus given within the system of conceptual language, it can 
be the most tangible residue of original metaphor, thereby 
resisting Aristotelian transference into concept. Then 
metaphor as trope, instead of being transported into the 
concept, is transported back to the original metaphor.
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Transference of metaphor is not a forward movement as in 
Hegel, but a backward movement.
As man in creating language turns the impossibility of 
speaking into its possibility, so does he in forming 
metaphor overcome the rigid and imprisoning structure of 
concepts. If in creating language man subdued the irony of 
thinking and of truth, in forming metaphor man pushes 
language back into irony, and embraces voluntarily the 
impossibility of finding truth. While the original 
metaphor is positive in setting into motion human desire 
for truth, rhetorical metaphor is negative in its 
frustrating and upsetting that desire. In spite of the 
fact they operate quite contrary to each other, their 
continuity is derived from their relation to irony: a 
system of language, which is created out of the forgetting 
of the ironicity of truth, is destroyed by the hands of 
irony itself, which form metaphor.
II
In his attempt to use metaphor in destroying concepts, 
Nietzsche creates many binary oppositions in order to 
valorize one set of them. The opposition of metaphor and 
concept in Nietzsche corresponds to the opposition of a 
non-system and a system, freedom and need, and art (or 
myth) and science. While the second set of opposition is
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concerned with founding a system, a shelter for living in 
safety, the first one feels constrained within a system and 
therefore is forced to break out of it. Although man needs 
shelter, he also wants to breathe fresh air. If one is 
necessity, the other is freedom. Whereas man builds the 
system of concepts out of necessity for living, he at the 
same time overthrows that system out of his impulse for 
freedom. And now Nietzsche relates the system of concepts 
to the two modes of life, dreaming and awakening, and shows 
that they are distinguished from each other by either the 
absence or the presence of the system. "The wideawake 
person," Nietzsche says, "is certain that he is awake only 
because of the rigidly regular web of concepts, and so he 
sometimes comes to believe that he is dreaming when at 
times that web of concepts is torn apart by art" (254). If 
such a distinction between waking and dreaming solely 
depends on the system of concepts, the distinction itself 
could be undone and reversed, since the system does not 
have any ontological foundation. The distinction between 
day and night for Nietzsche depends on intensity, will 
power, strong passion, and excitation. According to that 
new standard, a wideawake person of concepts can be no 
other than a dreamer, since his life lacks intensity and 
passion, though full of security and comfort. However, 
this does not mean that Nietzsche reverses the hierarchy of
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day and night, or of waking and dreaming. For Nietzsche, 
life in its intensity and strength is on the side of dream, 
and therefore the conceptually awakened life of "the 
scientifically sober thinker" should be intensified and 
strengthened into the status of Apollonian dream as in the 
ancient Greeks. And as such an intensification of life can 
be achieved only through undoing the system of concepts, 
Nietzsche gives a special role to metaphor for that task, 
metaphor as a means of destroying conceptual orders.
The function of metaphor for Nietzsche lies in its 
willful and voluntary confusion of "the categories and 
cells of concepts by presenting new transference" (254) .
For example, one can call "the river a moving road that 
carries man to where he otherwise walks" (255) . The 
metaphor in this example is constructed out of conceptual 
mistake: the concept "river" is confused with another 
concept "road." Such an example of conceptual or 
categorical mistake can be multiplied: the ancient Greeks, 
Nietzsche illustrates, see a tree as a nymph, a bull as a 
god, and so on.25 Nietzsche celebrates the metaphoric 
destruction of concepts and categories and finds its
25 For a definition of metaphor as a category mistake 
(an object ordinarily belonging to one category is 
presented as belonging to another category), see Gilbert 
Ryle, The Concept of Mind. Nelson Goodman also sees 
metaphor as “a calculated category mistake," "a transfer of 
a schema, a migration of concepts, an alienation of 
categories." See his Languages of Art. 73.
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justification from "the world of dreams,“ which is devoid 
of the system of conceptual differentiation, and is 
therefore capable of unsettling and destroying all 
conceptual fixities.26 Thus Nietzsche is able to say that 
in the world of dreams or in forming metaphors "anything is 
possible, and all nature crowds around man as if it were 
only the masquerade of the gods, who only make a joke of 
deceiving man in all forms" (TL, p. 255). As the creator 
of "the boldest metaphors," man, according to Nietzsche, 
can say anything whatsoever and can designate any names to 
things, without being bound to the system of language. As 
I will explain later, these boldest metaphors bring about 
the problem of understanding and interpretation. However, 
not concerned with such an interpretative problem,
Nietzsche presents this metaphoric liberation vividly by 
comparing a liberated metaphor to "a servant" whose master 
is absent, and thereby being a master himself. In a way 
that a servant can do whatever pleases himself during the
26 It is in this respect that Nietzsche's metaphors 
are quite similar to Freud's dream language. For Freud, 
the defense mechanism of consciousness, which 
conceptualizes and categorizes reality according to the 
conventional system of concepts, plays the role of 
protecting man from the impact or shock of reality. But 
during the sleep and dream, the defense mechanism loses its 
control so that some elements of bare experiences, which 
are suppressed while man is awake, are given a free reign. 
Where Nietzsche sees the transference of metaphors into 
concepts, Freud finds the suppression of experience by 
consciousness.
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absence of his master, man wields the unlimited power of 
forming new metaphors, since there are no categories or 
concepts to limit his metaphoric desire.
In Nietzsche's giving free rein to man's drive to 
form metaphors, it is certain that he does not concern 
himself with the hermeneutical problem of understanding or 
interpretation. For in spite of its apparent attraction, 
the metaphoric destruction of concepts brings about a 
serious consequence, that is, the impossibility of the 
language game itself. When one calls the river a moving 
road or a tree a nymph, the new metaphors are not meant to 
replace old concepts. It is because once a metaphor takes 
the place of a concept, the metaphor is not metaphor any 
more, but instead becomes a concept which should be 
destroyed by another metaphor. If a metaphor is to remain 
as metaphor, it should be replaced by another metaphor 
which is to be replaced by another. Then there is only an 
endless play of replacements in metaphor. The difficulty 
of translation means the impasse of any true 
interpretation, and as a result the play of language is 
suspended. Even though one is free to call a tree a nymph, 
he cannot make it understood by others unless the metaphor 
"nymph" is allowed to find its proper meaning in "tree."
To put it another way, one is free to destroy categories
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and concepts by metaphorically confusing them voluntarily, 
but he cannot make his new metaphors accepted by others.
The impossibility of the language game itself in the 
endless replacements of metaphors then naturally requires 
another conception of a language game which is not 
dependent on the system of concepts.
Confronted with the threat of the impossibility of 
language itself, we might well ask whether there is any 
positive ground for forming metaphors. If man's drive to 
form metaphors is not supported by any positive ground, the 
drive seems to be self-destructive. Here we certainly 
don't want to repeat the whole thing again, that is, 
Nietzsche's rendition of the first and the second metaphors 
and their relation to things. As I have discussed already, 
the positive ground in forming metaphors is located in the 
body, in its receiving a certain nerve stimulation.
However, that nerve stimulation can be represented in no 
way and therefore cannot give rise to any language. A 
nerve stimulation should be carried over into an image, 
then to a sound, and finally a word. Such a metaphoric 
process is nothing more then a slow process of forgetting 
metaphoricity. For example, if one hears a word not as a 
word, but as a sound, one cannot enter into any human 
communication. In order that one realizes his drive to 
form metaphors, it is required as a precondition that he
should be in the world of words, not of mere sounds. And 
words are words only when they are given in the system of 
language, since otherwise they are mere sounds. When all 
this is considered, Nietzsche's endeavor to turn concepts 
into metaphors seems to be self-defeating. Even when he 
insists that man in forming metaphors is "guided not by 
concepts but by intuitions,” his defense of metaphor has 
such an element of self-destruction. For "the word is not 
made for these intuitions; man falls silent when he sees 
them, or he speaks in sheer forbidden metaphors and unheard 
of conceptual compounds" (TL, pp. 155-56). Granted that 
man is led by intuitions, he has no way to express them, 
and if he does, it is nothing more than a mere sound that 
does not make any sense. As such, Nietzsche's term, 
"intuitive metaphors" [Anschauungsmetapher], is a self- 
contradiction .
Nietzsche's valorization of metaphor then cannot be 
taken seriously, since he affirms it only insofar as it 
functions as a means for destroying the system of concepts. 
Once metaphor fulfills its designated task, it is to be 
discarded. But on the other hand this rejection cannot be 
pushed to the degree of its annihilation. For "that would 
amount to ignoring man himself." Thus Nietzsche can 
neither praise nor condemn metaphor. However, this 
impossible position of Nietzsche regarding metaphor is the
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one that grows naturally out of his conception of language 
as metaphor. Language is at once arbitrary and motivated, 
and self-reflective and referential. Because of the 
simultaneous coexistence of positivity and negativity in 
language's relation to reality, one cannot take a
definitive position in regard to either language or
metaphor. If one takes a decisive position as in the cases 
of Hegel and Saussure, it is only through ignoring such an
undecidable duality of language. As for Nietzsche, he does
justice to that undecidable dimension of language, and 
exactly by doing so he finds himself unable to take a 
position. While he condemns metaphor, he is forced to 
praise it. And while he praises it, he is forced to 
condemn it. Therefore, whatever statements he makes, they 
are destined to be undermined. Then the problem of 
language is the problem of writing. If one is doomed to 
undermine his own statements at the moment of making them, 
how can he hope to go on writing? Of course, that is also 
the problem of forming metaphors without fixing them into 
concepts. In a way that a metaphor is to be replaced by 
another in an endless process of repetition, writing is a 
blind repetition of a saying and undoing it. For one says 
something only insofar as this saying is undermined by 
another saying. Here we are tempted to ask, "what then is 
the destination or purpose of metaphor and writing?"
54
In order to situate more concretely the question 
concerning the destination of metaphors and writing, I will 
examine the rhetorical or stylistic elements of "Truth and 
Lying". The essay begins with a parable ("In some remote 
corner of the universe... there once was a star ...") and 
ends with creating a set of opposition between "the 
rational man and the intuitive man" which repeats previous 
sets of opposition such as concepts and metaphors. That 
opening parable of the essay runs as follows: on the star 
"clever animals invented knowledge. That was the most 
arrogant and the most untruthful moment in 'world history'- 
-yet indeed a moment." In its opposing knowledge to truth, 
this parable in itself sets a certain direction to 
Nietzsche's later formulation of many binary oppositions. 
While putting the opposition in a form of parable which 
does not require any verification or proof of its 
narrative, Nietzsche is free to make the judgement that 
knowledge is untruthful. After basing the tone of his 
narrative on parable, Nietzsche seeks to illustrate the 
meaning of parable: "Someone could invent such a fable and 
still not have illustrated adequately how pitiful, how 
shadowy and fleeting, how purposeless and arbitrary the 
human intellect appears within nature" (TL, p. 246) . After 
making such an unproved statement about the human
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intellect, Nietzsche makes the purpose of his essay to 
illustrate its meaning.
The opening of the essay sets up the rhetorical 
procedure of the essay. It starts with a parable, which 
gives rise to a rhetorical statement about the human 
intellect, which in turn is taken for granted by the 
author, who is in doubt whether others understand the truth 
of the statement, therefore, the demonstration of which 
becomes the task of his essay. With that purpose in mind, 
Nietzsche goes on to assert that "the intellect, as a means 
of preserving the individual, develops its main power in 
dissimulation" and has nothing to do with truth (TL, 246- 
47). As a master of dissimulation (as the rhetorical 
opening of the essay demonstrates), man develops his 
linguistic dissimulation into truth by transferring a nerve 
stimulus into an image, a sound, and then a concept. While 
metaphors become concepts, dissimulation is transcended 
into truth. The human intellect sets into motion all these 
acts of brilliant transformation, and as a result happens 
to produce all binary oppositions, such as that between 
intuition and reason, the thing and its image, metaphor and 
concept, art and science, and finally the intuitive man and 
the rational man. As we have already discussed, Nietzsche 
seems to valorize the first set of opposition, but he is 
unable to dismiss the other. On the one hand, these binary
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terms of opposition are produced as the consequence of the 
intellectual dissimulation, and as such they are to be
taken not as rigid concepts but as metaphors. If they are
problematic, they are pseudo-problems.27 On the other, the 
intellect, which is responsible for the production of these 
pseudo-problems, cannot be blamed, since life is preserved 
only by its power in dissimulation. Nietzsche therefore is 
unable to either praise or condemn not only the intellect, 
but the system of concepts and reason as well. However, 
his theoretical or thematic impasse regarding these binary 
oppositions does not necessarily mean he is in a practical 
or rhetorical impasse. In his discussion of the system of 
concepts, Nietzsche compares it to "a prison fortress.'1 If
rhetoric can be defined as the art of persuasion, the
metaphor, a prison fortress, dissuades the reader from the 
system of concepts, though the metaphor does not add 
anything to.the theoretical dimension of the problem. 
However, it is by adopting such rhetorical strategies that 
Nietzsche can disentangle himself from the theoretical 
impasse of deciding between concept and metaphor, and can 
unravel the complexities of the issues.
27 Pseudo-problems are those which simply arise out of 
the "confusion between facts and the abstractions by which 
we describe them." See Stephen Karin, The Misuse of Mind. 
71.
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His rhetorical strategies seem to be demanded from the 
very nature of the intellect as a way out of the 
theoretical impasse. Since it is impossible to attain 
truth, the intellect has to resort to its power of 
dissimulation in order to invent conventional truths. Thus 
the dissimulation on the level of the intellect corresponds 
with the rhetorical strategies on the level of writing.
And both are motivated by the impossibility of attaining 
truth. While he acknowledges the necessity of 
dissimulation [Verstellung], Nietzsche however 
distinguishes it from distortion [Verzerrung]. The former 
is the company of metaphor, art, and the intuitive man, 
whereas the latter is that of concept, science, and the 
rational man. Man's dissimulation becomes distortion when 
metaphors become concepts and are fixed within their 
system. Likewise the artist becomes the philosopher, when 
the former begins to be theoretical and systematic. In 
German the difference between dissimulation and distortion 
becomes more apparent and more contrasted: Verstellung 
means "adjusting," and "disguise," while Verzerrung implies 
"contortion," and "grimace." The intellect adjusts itself 
to reality by the art of dissimulation, which however is 
developed into distortion, when its adjustment is oriented 
toward rules and principles: in an attempt to adjust itself 
to a preset standard, the body sometimes has to be twisted,
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and contorted out of its usual form. Therefore, the man, 
given in the rigidly regular web of concepts, feels 
constrained and often makes a grimace. Instead of 
wandering in disguises in their forbidden paths into their 
parents, metaphors can end their wandering by identifying 
themselves with false parents in concepts.
However, Nietzsche's distinction between dissimulation 
and distortion does not resolve our problem of language. 
Though he approves dissimulation against distortion, it is 
found that Nietzsche does not take its necessary 
consequence, that is, the priority of the intuitive man 
over the rational man. Quite contrary to our expectation, 
they are presented in equal terms without preferential 
distinction.
There are ages in which the rational man and the 
intuitive man stand side by side, one in fear of 
intuition, the other with mockery for abstraction; 
the latter being just as unreasonable as the former 
is unartistic. Both desire to master life; the one 
by managing to meet his main needs with foresight, 
prudence, reliability; the other, as in 
'overjoyous' hero, by not seeing those needs and 
considering only life, disguised as illusion and 
beauty, to be real (TL, p. 256).
Now Nietzsche's rhetorical preference of the intuitive man
as in his discussion of dissimulation cannot be found here.
No matter which of them one takes, one has to be ready to
embrace the same amount of loss. While the rational man is
protected from misfortunes by means of concepts and is thus
free from pain, he is evidently not happy. On the other
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hand, the intuitive man, though he is overjoyous, "suffers 
more violently" and "more often." And he is unable to 
learn any lesson from his experiences, since they are not 
conceptualized. Regardless of one's choice, it is destined 
to be neither satisfactory nor consoling. When he 
describes metaphor and concept most concretely and 
pictorially in terms of the two types of men, and when he 
therefore has to defend one of them as he does in his 
discussion of dissimulation and distortion, Nietzsche 
refuses and forsakes his gesture of rhetorical 
valorization. What happens to Nietzsche, who has praised 
metaphors and condemned the system of concepts with 
rhetorical strategies?
However, at this point at which Nietzsche dispenses 
with his rhetorical affirmation on which he has relied 
until now, the question arises as to the nature of his 
description of the rational man and the intuitive man.
Does Nietzsche shift from a rhetorical dimension to an 
ethical one? Within the compass of "Truth and Lying" this 
seems to be very probable. Though Nietzsche is inclined 
rhetorically toward metaphors against concepts, he cannot 
theoretically justify or defend his inclination. But this 
probability is not a very convincing one, especially 
because Nietzsche's intuitive man in "Truth and Lying" is 
the very description of Dionysiac man in The Birth of
Tragedy. And the rational man in "Truth and Lying" seems 
to be Socrates, the theoretical man in The Birth of 
Tragedy. For this reason I will attempt to answer 
Nietzsche's position regarding metaphor and concept by 
turning to another text, The Birth of Tragedy. My 
discussion of The Birth of Tragedy is motivated by the 
proposition that the opposition between Dionysus and Apollo 
would provide a better paradigm of explaining the 
phenomenon of metaphor than the opposition between metaphor 
and concept. Since he narrates The Birth of Tragedy in the 
form of myth, Nietzsche, I think, may develop his 
discussion of language and metaphor without being himself 
too much theoretically involved. And if Nietzsche in the 
end of "Truth and Lying" stares indifferently at the 
undecidable impasse between metaphor and concept, his 
staring may be not into the abyss which is open between 
them, but into a mythical bridge unifying them, whose 
domain is the early Greek world. Therefore, when Nietzsche 
gives up the rhetorical valorization of metaphor, it may be 
not because of a theoretical consideration--that is, in 
destroying the system of concepts by metaphor, he would 
bring about the very impossibility of language--but because
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of his mythical vision that man can speak with metaphors 
even in the absence of that system of concepts.20
Ill
Though The Birth of Tragedy is a genealogical study of 
the rise and fall of Greek tragedy, it is at the same time
28 In my discussion of "nyth" in Nietzsche's The Birth 
of Tragedy, I will attempt to disclose its ironic or 
discursive nature. Nietzsche's relation to Greek myth is 
ironic in that he has to be outside the myth historically, 
culturally, and factually in order that he is to be inside 
the myth on the level of discourse. It Nietzsche were to 
live within the myth which he longed for, like one of 
Dionysus revellers he would be in its possession and would 
be part of the totality that constitutes the myth, thus not 
being individualized away from it into a thinking 
individual. As such, the fact that he is within the myth 
does not allow him to recognize or understand it: the 
mythical totality does not permit any penetration into its 
nature and when it is penetrated it is not myth any more.
In order that one is to talk about myth and its 
signification, one is supposed to be outside its force. 
Otherwise, myth cannot enter into discourse. Discourse of 
myth presupposes its disappearance and loss, and it is 
therefore destined to be only hypothetical. Nietzsche's 
account of Greek myth is not so much historical as 
discursive and not so much mythical as mythopoetic; the 
factual absence of myth generates its discursive presence. 
In Nietzsche's thinking, myth is a hypothetical form of 
totality, which gives unity to his fragmentary thinking and 
writing and thus saves them from a doomed fragmentation.
As such, Nietzsche's myth resembles L6vi-Strauss' concept 
"engineer," which he uses in The Savage Mind in order to 
represent a certain hypothetical unity and totality of the 
fragmentary "bricolage." And for an excellent account of 
the contradictory nature of Nietzsche's relation to Greek 
myth, see Peter Putz, "Nietzsche: Art and Intellectual 
Inquiry." And also for a view to see Nietzsche's myth as 
"an illusion to which we submit while still knowing it to 
be mere illusion," thus being an artistic phenomenon, see 
Benjamin Bennett, "Nietzsche's Idea of Myth: The Birth of 
Tragedy out of the Spirit of Eighteenth-Century 
Aesthetics," 422.
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an inquiry into how reality gives rise to music, language, 
and representation. While the transference of reality into 
representation in "Truth and Lying" is explained in terms 
of metaphor, the same process in The Birth of Tragedy is 
discussed in the mythical horizon of Dionysus and Apollo. 
"The mysterious x of the thing," which remains anonymous in 
"Truth and Lying", appears with the divine name of 
Dionysus. Though Nietzsche borrows that name from Greek 
mythology, he interprets Dionysus not as one of the gods, 
but as the god of all gods, and the unity of all beings.
As such, he affirms all facts of life, and is beyond all 
individuation and differentiation. In rendering Dionysus 
as the origin of all origins, the problem that Nietzsche 
has to encounter and resolve is how this primordial being 
is related to other beings, and how it enters into the 
realm of phenomenal experience.29 His attempt to answer
29 My discussion of Dionysus is concerned not so much 
with its original oneness as with its phenomenal 
appearances. In other words, my discussion is limited to 
the state of man's relation (Apollonian or Socratic) to 
Dionysus after the former's separation from the latter. 
Before nature's (Dionysus') "fragmentation" and "her 
decomposition into separate individuals," man was one with 
nature, and was not differentiated from nature (BT, p. 27). 
In that state of man's original oneness with Dionysus there 
was no subject-object division and therefore man, being 
himself nature, was not conscious of nature as object. But 
this collective oneness with Dionysus has to be broken, not 
only because of the Apollonian principle of individuation, 
but also because Dionysus is doomed to be dismembered and 
individualized as in Greek mythology (see section 10).
After this separation man is seized with a strong desire to 
"sink back into the original oneness of nature" which he
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this problem is an introduction of another deity, Apollo, 
the god of individuation as well as the god of appearance 
and illusion. Since Dionysus as the totality of all beings 
and the origin of all phenomena cannot appear as it is, it 
can appear phenomenally only by taking an Apollonian form 
of illusion and individuation. The phenomenal appearance 
of Dionysus is nothing more than the distortion and 
dissimulation of its own totality and oneness. Then 
Dionysus has to destroy Apollonian individuation in order
can experience only through intoxication and forgetting of 
his individuality. Therefore whether before or after 
separation, man's union with Dionysus never gives rise to 
any verbal representation. Even granted that man in the 
moment of original oneness with Dionysus is in the presence 
of truth, his experience is not given in the mode of 
knowledge or perception, since he does not enter into 
original oneness unless he is intoxicated and forgets 
himself. And when he is awakened from intoxication, he 
does not remember what he has experienced. Though Dionysus 
is truth, he is at the same time the impossibility of 
truth. Therefore, Nietzsche in the later preface of 1886 
has to admit that The Birth of Tragedy is "an impossible 
book," "built from precocious, purely personal insights, 
all but incommunicable" (5). The Birth of Tragedy, the 
book about Dionysus, is thus an impossible book, with much 
Dionysiac self-contradiction. The seeming contradictory 
description of Dionysus in section 18 of The Birth of 
Tragedy, which renders Dionysus as Apollonian illusion, is 
inherent already to Dionysiac truth. As such, X am not 
sympathetic with any philosophical attempt to resolve the 
contradiction within Dionysus. The contradiction in 
Section 18 is not apparently "one of Nietzsche's careless 
mistakes, a slip on his part." For this view of 
contradiction as a mistake, see John Wilcox, Truth and 
Value in Nietzsche. 109. For a more detailed discussion of 
this problem of contradiction, see Maudemarie Clark, 
"Language and Deconstruction: Nietzsche, de Man, and 
Postmodernism.1
to reassert its own oneness which is threatened in the 
Apollonian process of individualization. It is in this 
context that Dionysus is depicted as an "internal 
contradiction" and as "the supreme artist": "God as the 
supreme artist, amoral, recklessly creating and destroying, 
realizing himself indifferently in whatever he does or 
undoes, ridding himself by his acts of the embarrassment of 
his riches and the strain of his internal contradictions1 
(BT, p. 9). When Dionysus creates, it is only in order to 
destroy it. In the same way, his destruction is only for 
the sake of creation. It is then not misleading to see 
Dionysus and Apollo as the two sides of the same God.30
That which concerns us in this brief summary of the 
relation between Dionysus and Apollo is the fact that the 
former cannot come into being without the aid of the 
latter. To put it another way, without illusion and 
dissimulation no truth is possible. Even though one can 
attribute the most fundamental and the most original truth 
to Dionysus, it should be granted that Dionysus is the very 
impossibility of truth in its original oneness. As many 
Nietzsche scholars point out, here is a Nietzsche who is 
bound up with Kantian philosophy which he wants to
30 About the complex relation between Dionysus and 
Apollo, and their development into Greek tragedy, and later 
into opera, see Carol Jacobs, The Dissimulating Harmony, 
chapter one, entitled, "Nietzsche: The Stammering text: The 
Fragmentary Studies: Preliminary to The Birth of Tragedy."
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criticize and reject. Like the Kantian Ding an sich. 
Dionysiac truth is asserted to exist as the ground of all 
beings, which is however beyond cognition and experience. 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche's Dionysus is not only the supposed 
cause of all causes as in Kant, but also the primary 
destruction of all causes. As the supreme artist with 
internal contradictions, it creates and destroys. This 
endless repetition of creation and destruction is the mode 
of Dionysiac being and Dionysiac truth. As such, Dionysus 
provides the criteria for all phenomena upon which their 
truth values can be judged. Since Dionysus is the 
voluntary destroyer of its own creation, the strong 
tendency of all phenomena to self-identity and to resist 
destruction can be seen as an indication of their anti- 
Dionysiac tendency.
Nietzsche's Dionysus is essentially ironic, in that 
its mode of being is contradictory. As the ground of all 
beings, Dionysus destroys these phenomenal manifestations 
and appearances. Since it is the original oneness, it 
shatters all the differentiated and individualized forms of 
beings. The truth of Dionysus is the very impossibility of 
truth, or its truth is the truth of illusion and falsity. 
The eyes of Dionysus, being fixed on the totality and 
original truth of beings, cause the downfall of all that is 
not total and not originally true. Thus Dionysiac irony
66
sees all Apollonian appearances of beings not as proper 
concepts, but as metaphors. Appearances are metaphors, and 
irony in Dionysus lies in its self-conscious use of 
metaphors for the sake of their negation, and its negation 
is derived from its vision of the totality.31 As there is 
no Dionysus without the assumed totality of all beings, no 
irony is possible without the vision of totality.32 
Therefore, the ironic destruction of metaphor is not from a 
pure negativity, but from a positive vision of totality.
As with Kierkegaard, irony is inseparable from "its divine 
infinitude, which allows nothing whatever to endure."33
31 "Irony is in one sense metatropological, for it is 
deployed in the self-conscious awareness of the possible 
misuse of figurative language...It points to the potential 
foolishness of all linguistic characterizations of reality 
as much as to the absurdity of the beliefs it parodies."
See Hayden White, Metahistorv. 37.
32 Kenneth Burke in "Four Master Tropes," from which 
Hayden White's understanding of irony and metaphor is 
derived, says that "in relativism there is no irony." For 
Burke, metaphor is perspective and irony is totalistic.
This essay appears in his A Grammar of Motives. See also 
his "Perspective as Metaphor" in Permanence and Change: An 
Anatomy of Purpose. 89-96.
Nietzsche himself is no doubt a perspectivist, as his 
definition reveals "In so far as the word 'knowledge' has 
any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable 
otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless 
meanings.— 'perspectivism.'" See The Will to Power, §481. 
For more discussion of his perspectivism, see Jean Granier, 
"Perspectivism and Interpretation," in The New Nietzsche; 
Arthur Danto, "Nietzsche's Perspectivism," in Nietzsche: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, and Tracy B. Strong, "Texts 
and Pretexts: Reflections on Perspectivism in Nietzsche."
33 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 40.
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Nietzsche's inquiry into how Dionysus gives rise to 
representation finds in music the most unmediated 
phenomenal manifestation of Dionysus. While Apollo is the 
patron of plastic and visual arts, Dionysus inspires non­
visual music. Here the priority of music above plastic art 
is due to the fact that music is imageless, thereby being 
"earlier than appearance and beyond it" (BT, p. 46). 
However, we should be warned against any temptation to take 
music as Dionysus himself. For music is already 
appearance, though imageless: "for it is impossible for 
music to represent the essential nature of the will 
[Dionysus]...Rather we should say that music appears as the 
will" (BT, p. 45). Though music is not Dionysus, it is 
prior to language, which requires images for its own being, 
and it follows that "language, the organ and symbol of 
appearance, can never succeed in bringing the innermost 
core of music to the surface" (BT, p. 46). Nietzsche here 
establishes a hierarchy of Dionysiac manifestation, from 
imageless music, to images, and then to language. And 
based on this hierarchy, he explains the process of how 
music brings forth language through the figure of 
Archilochus, the lyrical poet, the union between musician 
and poet.
He [the lyrical poet] is, first and foremost, a 
Dionysiac artist, becomes wholly identified with the 
original Oneness [Ur-Einen], its pain and
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contradiction, and producing a replica [Abbild] of 
that Oneness as music, if music may legitimately be 
seen as a repetition [Wiederholung] of the world; 
however, this music becomes visible to him again, as 
in a dream similitude, through the Apollonian dream 
influence. That reflection, without image or idea, 
of original pain in music, [Jener bild- und 
begrifflose Wiederschein des Urschmerzes in der 
Musik], with its redemption through illusion, now 
produces a second reflection as a single simile or 
example... we see Dionysus and the maenads, we see 
the drunken reveler Archilochus, sunk down in 
sleep...and now Apollo approaches him and touches him 
with his laurel. The sleeper's enchantment through 
Dionysiac music now begins to emit sparks of imagery 
[Bilderfunken], poems which, at their point of 
highest evolution, will bear the name of tragedies 
and dramatic dithyrambs (BT, p. 38)
Casting aside his subjectivity, the lyrical poet achieves a
union with Dionysus, and as a result he is able to repeat
that union in a musical representation. However, that
musical representation has nothing to do with the poet's
subjectivity, since Dionysus uses the poet and turns him
into a means for his own phenomenal appearance. Thus the
poet becomes the embodiment of Dionysus. The poet does not
see any images, because he himself is "his images, his
images are objectified versions of himself": "The Dionysiac
musician, himself imageless, is nothing but original pain
and reverberation of the image" (BT, p. 39). In his
original oneness with Dionysus, the poet becomes a metaphor
of Dionysus, without seeing himself as a metaphor nor
knowing himself as such--a metaphor which is impossible to
translate. This impossible metaphor is a kind of nerve
stimulation before it is translated into an image in "Truth
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and Lying." There is a certain signature of Dionysus in a 
nerve stimulation, which is located in the body, thus 
without subjectivity. This absence of subjectivity is a 
precondition for receiving a nerve stimulation in a similar 
way that the poet can enter into the union with Dionysus 
only through the rejection of his subjectivity. The 
Dionysiac image, which is inscribed into a subject without 
subjectivity, is imageless. Insofar as the lyric poet 
remains in that state of Dionysiac oneness, he is yet not 
poet, but a Dionysiac reveler. As a Dionysiac reveler, the 
lyric poet writes with his own body. Primitive poetry is 
one of bodily movement or stimulation, and inarticulate 
cries of ecstacy.
Before inquiring further into the problem of verbal 
representation of Dionysiac truth, we should not forget 
that when Nietzsche gives a mythological explanation to the 
birth of lyric poetry through Archilochus, his explanation 
is meant to be understood only within the context of the 
Greek Dionysiac community. Such a consideration is 
necessary, since we have to explain how the lyric poet, 
without binding himself to the conventional system of 
concepts, could speak in images and metaphors to his 
community. Due to the very nature of Dionysus as the 
destroyer of individuation and cultures, no community can
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be founded on the system of concepts. If society depends 
for its own being on the system of concepts or the 
synchronic structure of language, as Nietzsche says in 
"Truth and Lying," what then is the foundation of Dionysiac 
community, 'if not society? This question, we remember, is 
the very focus of our discussion of "Truth and Lying," and 
in our attempt to answer the question we come to the 
present investigation of Dionysus and Apollo. Maybe the 
best description of Dionysiac community can be found in 
Nietzsche's depiction of the dithyrambic chorus in section 
8 :
The dithyrambic chorus on the other hand is the 
chorus of the transformed, who have forgotten their 
civic past and social rank, who have become timeless 
servants of their god and live outside all social 
spheres. While all the other types of the Greek 
choric verse are simply the highest intensification 
of the Apollonian musician, in the dithyramb we see a 
community of unconscious actors all of whom see one 
another as enchanted. (BT, p. 56)
As we have seen already through the figure of Archilochus,
the dithyrambic chorus is transformed into metaphors of
Dionysus. The transformation is effected only by the
chorus' forgetting of their selves, past, and social rank,
thus standing themselves outside society. All the
subjectivity of the chorus members is emptied and evacuated
for the sake of Dionysus. Being drained out of their
contents, they become empty forms or empty signs, waiting
for Dionysus to fill their emptiness. When their self­
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evacuation is complete, they, being no longer artists, 
becomes art works of Dionysus. Now the subject of 
representation is not man, but Dionysus. And the medium of 
representation is not language, but the very body of man 
with which Dionysus writes. Therefore, being art works of 
Dionysus, they are incapable of understanding Dionysus. If 
the dithyrambic chorus is a community, it is the community 
of art works, not of artists; therefore the community is 
incapable of understanding the meaning of itself.
If the members of the dithyrambic chorus are metaphors 
of Dionysus, the problem is then what happens to the 
audience to that primitive tragedy. Is there any reader of 
metaphors other than Dionysus? Nietzsche says that "an 
audience of spectators, such as we know it [as the 
observer, not as empathic participants], was unknown to the 
Greeks" (BT, p. 54). For Nietzsche, only Dionysus is the 
reader of metaphors, and all the others, whether actors or 
spectators, are his metaphors. Nietzsche has to explain 
that "the votary of Dionysus could not be understood except 
by his own kind" (BT, p. 28),34 Of course, that
34 Here we might wonder about how Nietzsche sustains 
an impossible position. Despite his assertion that only 
Dionysus is the reader of metaphors, Nietzsche's discourse 
is moving on the fundamental assumption that he is one 
reader. He thus asserts something that is impossible to be 
asserted. In the likewise manner, metaphors created out of 
divine possession are impossible metaphors, since they are 
not figure nor language.
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understanding is not a cognitive understanding, but another 
word for participation, that is, "projecting oneself and 
then acting as though one had really entered another body, 
another character" (BT, p. 55}. Through that projective 
participation one is related to metaphors. "Metaphor, for 
the authentic poet, is not a figure of rhetoric but a 
representative image standing concretely before him in lieu 
of concept" (BT, p. 55). The poet sees dithyrambic chorus 
members and finds in them metaphors of Dionysus while 
himself being transformed into another metaphor.
Therefore, "the poet is poet only insofar as he sees 
himself surrounded by living, acting shapes into whose 
innermost being he penetrates" (BT, p. 55).
If the Dionysiac ecstatic artist is merely the art 
work, Apollonian dream artist is the one who produces art 
works. Apollo as the principium individuationis transforms 
the Dionysiac artist-art work into an individual artist.
For the drunken reveler Archilochus to be lyrical poet, he 
has to be put to sleep, so he can translate the imageless 
music through images under the influence of Apollo. Life 
is either dream (illusion) or intoxication (the original 
oneness). Apollo has to make Archilochus sleep off his 
Dionysiac intoxication. Now being himself not the images
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of Dionysus any more, he is allowed to see these images.35 
But seeing also accompanies not-seeing, since seeing comes 
only after Dionysiac oneness or totality is broken. As 
Nietzsche put in the 1871 preface, “the laws of optics" 
"depend on the necessity of error" (BT, p. 10). Seeing is 
the Apollonian translation of music into "sparks of imagery 
and poems," which is the translation of the untranslatable 
and incomprehensible. Once the poet himself was a metaphor 
of Dionysus; now he becomes its translator. Once the poet 
was a passive recipient of nerve stimulations; now he 
transforms himself into an active translator of them into 
images and metaphors.
The problem with Apollonian illusion and optics is how 
this transition from non-seeing to seeing, and from 
imageless music to images is realized, or how Dionysus 
allows himself to be translated into images. According to 
Nietzsche's account of Archilochus, Archilochus becomes a 
pictorial or verbal translator of music through Apollonian 
images while he is released from the grip of Dionysus.
35 Although Nietzsche makes a distinction between the 
lyric poet and the epic poet in terms of whether the poet 
himself becomes his own images or he merely sees these 
images, the distinction cannot be pushed too far. For 
example, Archilochus in his self-forgetting becomes 
imageless images (music) of Dionysus, but this music has to 
be rendered "visible to him again1 "through the Apollonian 
dream influence" (BT, p. 38). Therefore, Archilochus, once 
being himself images, sees images like the epic poet and it 
is only in that dreamlike seeing that he produces lyric 
poetry.
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Later in section 9, Nietzsche explains this transition from
Dionysus to Apollo in terms of "a phenomenon which is the
exact opposite of a familiar optical one" (BT, p. 59):
After an energetic attempt to focus on the sun, we 
have, by way of remedy almost, dark spots before our 
eyes when we turn away. Conversely, the luminous 
images of the Sophoclean heroes--these Apollonian 
masks--are the necessary productions of a deep look 
into the horror of nature; luminous spots, as it 
were, designed to cure an eye hurt by the ghastly 
night....and now we see that the poet's entire 
conception was nothing more nor less than the 
luminous afterimage which kind nature provides our 
eyes after a look into the abyss (BT, pp. 59-60)
Quite contrary to the conventional metaphor of the sun in 
representing truth or presence, Nietzsche here uses 
complete darkness (or the ghastly night) as a metaphor of 
Dionysus. Dionysus is not the presence of truth, but its 
absence, and therefore in Dionysiac experience is nothing 
to be seen. Since Dionysus is the eclipse of the sun, it 
is the abyss, the primordial void and chaos, into which all 
supposed meanings of life are drowned and lost forever. 
Therefore, the Dionysiac wisdom, which is put through the 
mouth of Silenus, is the celebration of death.36 When the 
members of the Dithyrambic chorus are in union with 
Dionysus, they experience this complete nothingness which
36 To the question of what is man's greatest good, 
Silenus answers, "Ephemeral wretch, begotten by accident 
and toil,... What would be best for you is quite beyond 
your reach: not to have been born, not to be, to be 
nothing. But the second best is to die soon" (BT, p. 29).
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comes after their self-abnegation and self-evacuation. If 
Dionysus then withdraws itself from any manifestation with 
images, it is because "there is nothing to be disclosed--no 
being, no ground, not even Being (e.g., as eidos), but only 
the abyss of indetermination, nothing."37 Nietzsche takes 
Dionysiac nothing as the primordial oneness and unity 
underlying all phenomenal appearances and truths. This 
look into the abyss, this seeing into nothing, is the cause 
of Dionysiac man's and Hamlet's inability of action: "both 
have looked deeply into the true nature of things, they 
have understood and are now loath to act" (BT, p. 51). If 
the Dionysiac understanding is the understanding of 
nothing, meaninglessness of life, and the absence of truth, 
how then does it allow itself to be interpreted as 
beautiful images? How does this nothing give rise to 
Apollonian images and further verbal representations? The 
Apollonian interpretation of Dionysus through images then 
is not the act of interpretation, but of giving in the 
sense of giving something to empty hands.
Nietzsche's account of Dionysus underlies the fact 
that what is proper is nothing, abyss, and absence, and 
therefore any Apollonian interpretation of Dionysus is 
destined to be improper. The carrying over from Dionysus
37 For this Dionysiac nothing and abyss, see John 
Sallis, "Dionysus--In Excess of Metaphysics."
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to Apollo is a metaphor without its proper meaning.
Between Dionysiac truth and Apollonian illusion is only 
another abyss in the sense that the transition from the one 
to the other is not a gradual process, but a disruptive and 
discontinuous jump. A metaphor from one species to another 
species is a category mistake. Dionysus does not provide 
any ground or foundation for Apollonian metaphors. With no 
ground to its metaphors at all, Apollo is doomed to be 
groundless, temporal, and ephemeral. When their 
groundlessness is forgotten, there happens to be the birth 
of epic poetry, as in Homer. Nietzsche views Homer as a 
naive artist in that the latter takes Apollonian metaphors 
as solid entities after forgetting their ephemeral 
temporality. As such, Homer's rise toward epic poetry is 
also a fall into the oblivion of the groundlessness of 
metaphors.
Despite his thesis that Homer's epic poetry marks a
complete victory of Apollonian illusion over Dionysiac
chaos, Nietzsche also calls to attention the Apollonian
victory initiated and stimulated by Dionysus:
nature [Dionysus] often uses illusions [Apollo] ... 
in order to accomplish its secret purposes... In the 
case of the Greeks it was the will wishing to behold 
itself in the work of art, in the transcendence of 
genius; but in order so to behold itself its 
creatures have first to view themselves as glorious, 
to transpose themselves to a higher sphere, without 
having that sphere of pure contemplation either 
challenge them or upbraid them with insufficiency.
(BT, pp. 31-32)
As the will to power Dionysus wants to behold itself, but 
since it is imageless it is unable to do so. This 
Dionysiac contradiction is resolved only by creating images 
false to itself, therefore by creating another 
contradiction. Dionysus transposes itself into Apollonian 
images and thus invites its own destruction by the hands of 
Apollo: Dionysiac nothing is displaced by Apollonian 
images. Without this Apollonian illusion and the following 
falsification of itself, Dionysus cannot be related to 
itself. Its self-reflection always has to take a form of 
illusion, falsity, and metaphoric transference. Then there 
are two moments to Dionysiac reality, that is, Dionysus and 
Apollo, which complement each other. Since Dionysus cannot 
behold itself, it relies upon Apollonian illusions. But 
because these illusions are false, Dionysus, that is 
nothing, destroys them in order not to be deceived into 
taking them as its reality. Being essentially "internal 
contradiction,“ Dionysus is like "a child tossing pebbles 
or building in a sand pile and then destroying what he has 
built" (BT, pp. 143-44). Like Dionysus's taking temporary 
illusions for its appearance, buildings built in and on 
sands expect their own destruction at the very moment of 
their construction.
The problem of Hamlet for Nietzsche lies in his 
inability to play like a child, who is, though a
contradiction, innocent of his contradiction. Since he has 
looked deeply into the true nature of things, Hamlet 
becomes a victim of his own look, and consequently he is 
unable to act. For the groundless nature of things "enters 
[his] consciousness ... it is viewed with loathing" (BT, p. 
51). Unlike a child, Hamlet loathes "building in a sand 
pile," thinking that any sand building is doomed to be 
destroyed. Being conscious of the contradiction of 
Dionysus, Hamlet hates to repeat Dionysiac plays. He 
therefore does not participate in the Dionysiac repetitive 
play of construction and destruction, but remains as a 
spectator who observes such a contradiction. Hamlet, with 
a desire to get rid of contradiction in Dionysus, refuses 
to participate in Dionysiac plays. Thus, being conscious 
of Dionysiac contradiction and being bound to it, Hamlet is 
unable to act--his action does not have any true ground. 
Insofar as he wants to ground his action on a true 
foundation, he represents "the inquiring mind of Socrates," 
which tries to escape from Dionysiac contradiction. Being 
terrified by that contradiction, Socrates makes it his task 
to resolve it by "separating true knowledge from illusion 
and error" (BT, p. 94). Dionysiac repetitive plays of 
construction and destruction for Socrates have to be 
consolidated into a single truth or a single play without 
the moment of destruction. In this respect Socratism is an
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attempt to uplift plays into concepts, concepts with 
logical coherence exclusive of any contradiction.
Socratism also means an attempt to replace Dionysiac 
nothingness with a moral, logical, and metaphysical 
presence. As such, it is "a clever bulwark erected against 
the truth [that is, Dionysiac truth]" (BT, p. 5). As a 
theoretical man, Socrates looks for the ground and 
foundation of all Apollonian illusions and phenomena. 
Instead of finding their ground (or groundlessness) in 
Dionysiac nothingness, Socrates gives metaphysical 
foundations to them, which are utterly anti-Dionysiac. And 
by connecting phenomena to metaphysical principles,
Socrates in turn deserts Apollo too and moves into a world 
of concepts devoid of Apollo as well as Dionysus.
Therefore the initial binary opposition between Dionysus 
and Apollo is forsaken for another set of opposition 
between Dionysus and Socrates.
Socratic irony is the irony of theory or of the system 
of concepts, which is born out of the belief in perfect, 
absolute, and universal truth. Such a belief in absolute 
truth, finding in reality nothing satisfying that standard, 
turns its back to what is given and finds its home in 
transcendental idealism. And quite contrary to his 
intention to found truth by way of reasoning and logic, 
Socrates ends up with denying reality and Dionysiac truth
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in the name of conceptual truth. Socrates for Nietzsche is 
the "most secretive of ironists," because his assumed 
turning toward truth is nothing more than "a dodge" or "a 
clever bulwark" against Dionysiac truth (BT,, pp. 4-5). 
Socratic irony then is tragic irony as in the case of 
Oedipus, who kills his father unwittingly. Socrates is 
ignorant of the ironic implications of his metaphysics, and 
irony in him lies in his doing exactly what he attempts to 
undo. His irony is not self-reflexive, so that it is 
received by him as anything other than irony. Likewise, 
concepts for Socrates are not self-reflexive, and they are 
taken as truth, not as metaphors. Socratic irony in regard 
to language lies in its blindness to its metaphoricity or 
its ironic nature. Such an absence of self-reflexivity in 
Socratic irony constitutes its difference from Dionysiac 
self-reflexive irony.38 That difference is also between 
philosophy and art, between Dionysiac truth and Socratic 
scientism.
38 Michel Haar explains Nietzsche's will to power in 
terms of its self-reflexivity: "The Will to Power therefore 
always has to do with itself. It possesses a fundamental 
reflexivity, i.e., it is always overcoming itself, be it 
through action or through reaction. As its origin it 
presents itself to and for itself as a chaotic and 
contradictory diversity of elementary impulses ... Chaos is 
to represent equally the moment when, all values collapsed, 
the Will to Power effects a return to itself, a sort of 
return to point zero" (366-67) . See his "Nietzsche and 
Metaphysical Language."
81
XV
Now it is in order that we confront the question 
raised at the end of our discussion of "Truth and Lying," 
that is, Nietzsche's irresolution between the rational man 
(or concepts, philosophy) and the intuitive man (or 
metaphors, art). His irresolution is, as we remember, due 
to a hermeneutical consideration, the problem of 
understanding. Even though Nietzsche is inclined toward 
praising metaphors and condemning concepts, he is unable to 
embrace the following consequence, the impossibility of 
understanding. In our discussion of The Birth of Tragedy 
we have considered the same problem from a mythopoetic (or 
theological) perspective,39 and we can ask now whether 
Nietzsche here makes a substantial affirmation of either 
the intuitive man or the rational man. In his denunciation 
of Socratic scientism and his call for a return to pre- 
Socratic Greek it appears that Nietzsche affirms 
substantially the intuitive man. Nietzsche, in the 1871 
preface, describes Socratism as "the glow of a sun about to 
set," and as "the period of dissolution and weakness." And 
in section 20 Nietzsche declares that "Socratic man has run 
his course," while asking the reader to believe in
39 Nietzsche's account of Greek myth is theological 
insofar as it is supposed to be the absolute origin of his 
mythical discourse.
"Dionysiac life."40 Nietzsche proposes that "all that is 
now called culture, education, civilization will one day 
have to appear before the incorruptible judge, Dionysus" 
{BT, p. 120) . When his denunciations of Socratic culture 
are taken into consideration, Nietzsche's confirmation of 
the intuitive man appears undeniable. However, it is 
exactly at this moment of Nietzsche's resolute endorsement 
of the intuitive man that we are reminded that his 
affirmation is located within a myth, which does not allow 
any further inquiry into it, since it is myth; he could 
affirm it only because he did not need to account for it. 
Myth is and remains iiyth only insofar as it is taken for 
granted as truth, without its truth being questioned.
Dionysiac revelers, intuitive men, are those who are 
desubjectified and thus turned into empty signs in order to 
become metaphors for Dionysus. At the moment of their 
achieving oneness with Dionysus their selves are 
annihilated to the point that they are not themselves any 
more, but art works of Dionysus. Being themselves 
desubjectified art works of Dionysus, they are unable to 
ask the meanings of their beings, and when they happen to
40 As Walter Kaufmann rightly pointed out, Nietzsche's 
repudiation of Socratism does not mean that Nietzsche 
repudiates the personality of Socrates. Socratism 
therefore should not be confused with the historical 
Socrates himself. See his Nietzsche. Philosopher, 
Psychologist. Antichrist, and Werner J. Dannhauser, 
Nietzsche's View of Socrates.
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speak, they speak only in "sheer forbidden metaphors and 
unheard of conceptual compounds" whose meanings lie beyond 
comprehension (TL, p. 256). Their metaphors, which do not 
function within the system of language, are not meant to be 
understood, and their metaphors are even prior to what 
Nietzsche describes as the first metaphor in "Truth and 
Lying," the transportation from a nerve stimulus into an 
image. Then their metaphors are zero metaphors, mere 
sounds without images, music without melody. As such, they 
are prior to the birth of language, and their community is 
the community without or beyond understanding. The 
intuitive man is unable to "learn from experience and falls 
again and again into the same pit into which he fell 
before" (TL, p. 256). It is, therefore, only within the 
context of a Dionysiac myth that Nietzsche can praise the 
intuitive man and condemn the rational man. In that 
community of Dionysiac revelers the hermeneutical question 
of understanding cannot be asked, since it is located where 
such a question is irrelevant. As a result, the reader of 
Nietzsche cannot ask about the meaning of these Dionysiac 
revelers: Nietzsche renders it as the origin of all origins 
and the cause of all causes which, therefore, does not 
allow any further backward investigation, and which are to 
be taken for granted like self-evident truth. In a way 
that the reader of "Truth and Lying" has to decide between
the rational man and the intuitive man, the reader of The 
Birth of Traoedv has no other choice but to either reject 
or accept Nietzsche's Dionysiac community without asking 
what it means. For Nietzsche the meaning is located in the 
body, in the zero metaphor zone, which is unable to speak. 
Then the problem with Nietzsche's confirmation of Dionysiac 
truth is how he can confirm what he cannot think, nor 
imagine, since Dionysus gives rise to nothing at all. 
However, the very nature of myth, as the zero zone of 
meaning, makes such a question irrelevant and 
inappropriate.41
If Nietzsche cannot but address Dionysiac truth only 
through ny'th, his myth is, it should be remembered, also a 
metaphor for Dionysus. For when Dionysus, being itself 
imageless, makes a phenomenal manifestation, it has to take 
Apollonian images and illusion, and its truth becomes "a 
mobile army of metaphors" (TL, p. 250) . If Nietzsche as in 
the case of Archilochus sees a Dionysiac vision of truth, 
it then follows that his vision is only a metaphor clothed 
with an Apollonian image. In his relation to Dionysiac 
truth Nietzsche is destined to be ironic, since his seeing
41 Addressing such a question, Peter Putz in 
"Nietzsche: Art and Intellectual Inquiry" says that 
"Nietzsche goes in search of truths which can only be 
conveyed by myth and by that child of myth, the work of 
art; on the other the truth which is reserved to myth and 
art is dragged before the modern tribunal of the intellect 
and condemned as falsehood" (3) .
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is also unseeing. Such a simultaneous copresence of seeing 
and unseeing at the moment of his gaining a vision of 
Dionysus frustrates any attempt to render it in a proper 
way. Ironic vision of Dionysus therefore has to find its 
expression in metaphor, which has no proper meaning to undo 
its metaphoricity. Otherwise Nietzsche has to choose the 
fate of Hamlet: as Hamlet is unable to act, Nietzsche would 
be sustained within his ironic vision and would deny his 
vision by way of metaphors. Nietzsche's Dionysiac myth, 
being itself a metaphor without its proper meaning, is a 
one-way transference into wandering. And it is in this 
context that Nietzsche, as he says in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, prefers not to be understood, since 
understanding supposes a proper meaning in a metaphor and 
falsely identifies each other. In other words, to 
understand means to be a rational man, in spite of 
Nietzsche's injunction to the contrary. With Nietzsche, 
understanding becomes an act of imprisoning oneself within 
the prison house of the system of conceptual language.
V
Nietzsche's "Truth and Lying" is not a coherent study 
about either language or metaphor, but a condemnation of 
language as a means of expressing truth. For Nietzsche, 
truth is fundamentally ironic, since it cannot say its
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truth properly, so that what it says means something else. 
Metaphor or language is born out of that ironic situation 
of truth and thus is a "solution of God's own tensions"(BT, 
p. 9). As a temporary solution of Dionysus's inner 
contradiction through Apollo, metaphor at the moment of its 
birth is to be deserted by its parents, and therefore is 
doomed to the destiny of a wandering orphan. As Nietzsche 
explains in "Truth and Lying," the metaphoric origin of 
language thus indicates the homelessness and parentlessness 
of language: language wants to say truth, but turns out to 
say something else. Like Dionysiac truth itself, language 
is ironic and is incapable of returning to that which gives 
rise to it. Nietzsche says, however, that this wandering 
life of orphan metaphor comes to an end at the age of 
Socrates, when it is transcended into concepts. Finding 
metaphors as orphans, Socrates chooses for them 
stepparents, concepts, and thus put them into the system of 
a familial and social hierarchy. Such a transcendence of 
metaphors into concepts marks the advent of the system of 
language and metaphysics. Even though metaphors by being 
transformed into concepts are not doomed to endless 
wandering any more, Nietzsche however sees that 
transcendence as nothing but the forgetting their original 
metaphoricity. Nietzsche's condemnation of concepts is due 
to the fact that concepts by forgetting of their origin are
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radically separated from their true parents and are falsely 
identified with their stepparents: metaphoric desire, the 
desire to return home, which is not of course realizable, 
is now forsaken once and for all for the sake of false 
comfort and contentment. As such, Nietzsche sees Socratic 
concepts as anti-Dionysiac, and "a clever bulwark erected 
against the truth."
By finding all language as originally metaphoric and 
seeing concepts as worn-out metaphors, Nietzsche 
radicalizes and universalizes metaphor. Metaphor becomes 
radical, since Nietzsche dispenses with proper meanings, 
and it is universal, since it is equated with language 
itself. Therefore Nietzsche's discussion of metaphor does 
not contribute to its understanding either as one of tropes 
or as language in general. Though many metaphors can be 
identified only from their contexts, to our dismay, 
Nietzsche discusses metaphors only on the level of words, 
while ignoring their semantic context. If we want to find 
his contribution to metaphor, it lies in another direction, 
that is, in his widening the gap between metaphors and 
concepts, and in his privileging the former as a means of 
unsettling and destroying the system of the latter. More 
fundamental than these destructive use of metaphors is his 
exploration of the relation between truth and metaphor or 
between Dionysus and Apollo. As for Nietzsche, whenever
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truth happens, it happens metaphorically and improperly. 
Truth cannot reflect its own truth, so that it has to be 
reflected upon the uneven mirror of metaphor. If the 
discourse of philosophy has relied heavily on metaphors or 
literature,'it is not by mere chance or by a rhetorical 
consideration of illuminating its truth, but due to its 
inner necessity, its inner impossibility of saying truth 
except by way of metaphors: "unless he [man] wants to 
settle for truth in the form of tautology, i.e., for empty 
husks, he will perpetually exchange truths for illusions" 
(TL, p. 248).
CHAPTER TWO 
Hint-words and Metaphor 
in the Later Heidegger
When the people of the world all know 
beauty as beauty, there arises the 
recognition of ugliness. When they all 
know the good as good, there arises the 
recognition of evil.
(from The Natural Wav of Lao Tzu)
Our discussion of Nietzsche in the former chapter evolved 
around the problematic relation between truth and language, 
concept and metaphor, and Dionysus and Apollo. For 
Nietzsche, original truth is not only ironic and 
contradictory, but also is beyond the reach of human 
understanding and language. Between truth and language 
thus lies the double barriers frustrating their happy union 
forever; one barrier is ontological and the other is 
linguistic. This double impossibility of attaining and 
speaking of truth necessitates and occasions the birth of 
metaphorical truth. It is through the mediation of 
metaphor that the gap between original truth and language 
is temporally bridged and man is able to speak of truth; 
man translates nerve stimulus into an image, which again is 
translated into a sound. However, this gain of truth 
through metaphoric transference is not pure gain, since it 
announces the radical break from original truth. The
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mother of metaphor, reality, dies at the very moment it 
gives birth. As such, metaphor (or language in general) 
for Nietzsche is like an orphan. However, this orphan 
metaphor is adopted into an institution, which arranges for 
it a false parent. This moment of institutionalization of 
metaphor marks the advent of conceptual truth. While 
metaphoric truth retains the memory of the death of its 
mother (though not the mother herself), when this memory of 
its tragic birth is completely forgotten, it is transcended 
into concept and is given its place in the total system of 
concepts. This "anthropomorphic truth" now, the system of 
concepts, replaces not only original truth but the 
metaphoric as well. Truth now can be discussed only in 
terms of the system of concepts against which a statement 
has to be judged. When one states "man is a rational 
animal," the statement can be proved false or true only 
after being reflected upon the total system of concepts.
The system of concepts is thus equivalent to the rules of 
the truth game which man has to master and play accordingly 
and properly.
The conceptual truth for Nietzsche is nothing more 
than a double forgetting of original truth. The relation 
of metaphor to unknown reality is consigned to oblivion and 
they are hardened into the system of concepts. From the 
moment that metaphors are safely situated and placed within
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the system, the latter begins to decide and determine the 
former's value and meaning; false parents (concepts) are 
imposed upon orphan metaphors which are now expected to act 
and function as their real children. As a result, culture 
is conceived as nature and conventional truth as original 
truth. The double forgetting thus, as Nietzsche points out 
in "On Truth and Falsity in an Extra-Moral Sense," brings 
about a more serious and dangerous consequence, the 
justification and rationalization of falsity. If Nietzsche 
is concerned with metaphor, it is because he finds in 
metaphor a possibility of reversing and destroying the 
system of conceptual order. That is to say, if the system 
of concepts is founded on the oblivion of their metaphoric 
origin, Nietzsche wants to restore that fabulous origin to 
concepts so that their falsity and conventionality are to 
be exposed. The value of metaphor for Nietzsche lies in 
its destructive relation to the system of concepts, and the 
value is therefore negative. Even though concepts are 
freed away from the conceptual system and are restored to 
their original metaphoricity, they are unable to return to 
their true mother, the reality, since they were born in her 
death pang. Metaphor for Nietzsche thus can be another 
metaphor for negative knowledge.
If there is a problem with Nietzsche's conception of 
metaphor as negative knowledge, it is his total
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indifference to a hermeneutical question of understanding. 
Like Nietzsche, one may commit himself to the task of 
destroying the system of concepts on the ground that it is 
utterly false. However, after that destruction he has to 
confront its consequence and answer the question of how one 
can communicate with metaphors in the absence of a system 
of concepts. Of course, to name such metaphors as 
metaphors is not legitimate, since the disappearance of 
concepts invalidates the very ground of metaphors. Maybe 
Nietzsche's radical polarization between concepts and 
metaphors is not healthy, and prevents us from asking the 
hermeneutical question of understanding. It is in this 
context that in the present chapter I propose to inquire 
into this hermeneutical problem, which has been largely 
ignored in our discussion of Nietzsche. In asking into the 
hermeneutical problem of understanding, I will reconsider 
the question of the system of concepts along with the 
renewing question of what metaphor is and what its relation 
to the system is.
The hermeneutical question of understanding is 
essentially the relation of part and whole. Every word has 
its meaning only in its relation to the linguistic totality 
(or the totality of signification or the worldhood of the
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world in Heidegger's Being and Time)1 without which it 
cannot be a word. Such an inseparable part and whole 
relation constitutes the notion of hermeneutical circle, 
into which one has to enter in order to speak.2 In raising 
the question of such a hermeneutical circle with the help 
of Heidegger's later writings, this chapter aims at 
complementing the semiotic treatment of metaphor in the 
former chapter by considering the relation of metaphor with 
the totality of language. This implies that in 
understanding a poetic or creative metaphor the whole 
system of language, to which it belongs, is to be taken 
into reconsideration and is to be challenged. If every 
word "causes the world of the view of the world which lies 
behind it to appear," it has a potential power to
1 For a excellent study of Heideggerian semiology, see 
Donald Marshall, "The Ontology of the Literary Sign: Notes 
toward a Heideggerian revision of Semiology." See also 
Heidegger's chapter 32, "Understanding and Interpretation," 
in Being and Time, 188-95, hereafter cited as BT. The 
following abbreviations will be used for Heidegger's texts: 
ID for Identity and Difference. OW for On the Wav to 
Language, PL for Poetry. Language, Thought. LH for "Letter 
on Humanism," WC for What is Called Thinking. PG for "The 
Principle of Ground," RP for "Remembrance of the Poet."
2 For a classic statement of the hermeneutical circle 
in terms of part and whole relation, see E. D. Hirsh, 
Validity and Interpretation. 76-77, and Gadamer, Truth and 
Method, 167-73, 260-63. In his essay "Heidegger, 
Kierkegaard, and the Hermeneutical Circle," William Spanos 
makes a distinction between the temporal hermeneutics of 
Heidegger and "the spatial hermeneutics of the metaphysical 
and New Critical of Structuralist standpoint," which 
Heidegger, Spanos maintains, rejects on the ground that it 
leads to a closed totality or a closed circle.
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restructure and reshape the world of language and our 
system of presuppositions.3 Metaphor then is not a local 
problem, but a universal one, whose signification is to 
come to light only in its relation with the totality of 
language.
I
As he defends himself from misunderstanding of the terms 
such as "idle talk," "falling," or "inauthenticity," in 
Being and Time by warning his readers against taking it in 
a censorious sense,4 Heidegger in his later writings, 
especially as in "Letter on Humanism" and "The Nature of 
Language," offers the same word of caution to them to the 
effect that phrases such as "the house of Being" or "words, 
like flowers" should not be taken either figuratively or 
metaphorically (LH, p. 237; OW, p. 100) . That Heidegger
3 Gadamer, Truth and Method. 415-16.
4 For example, Heidegger says that "The expression 
'idle talk' ["Gerede"] is not to be used here in a 
'disparaging' signification" (BT, p. 211). This 
Heidegger's warning against an evaluative signification is 
also applied to the terms like "idle talk" and 
"inauthenticity" (BT, pp. 264-65). Here the question 
regarding Heidegger's warning is how we can take these 
terms without negative implications, since they are difined 
as against their positive equivalents, that is, "genuine 
talk" and "authenticity." Referring to that difficulty of 
understanding such terms, William Richardson explains that 
Heidegger never explicitly defines what he means by 
"authenticity" or "inauthenticity, " though he gives some 
hints for a definition. See Heidegger: Through 
Phenomenology to Thought, 50.
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offers such a word of caution is not surprising, since his 
writings are full of metaphorical or figurative statements, 
which undermine or pun on the conceptual vocabulary of 
philosophy.5 As a matter of fact, his non-traditional use 
of language quite often appears enigmatic and beyond 
comprehension, thereby eliciting complaints against his 
language either from scholars or common readers.6 The 
problem with his later writings and his caution concerning 
them reminds us of the problem of his vocabulary in Being 
and Time: language impels readers in a certain direction 
from which Heidegger warns them. The phrases "the house of 
Being" and "words, like flowers" gravitate toward the 
metaphorical, but Heidegger forces them to turn away from 
that tendency. Inevitably as a consequence, there follows 
a tension or conflict between language (or the totality of 
signification) and Heidegger's use of it.
The tension between a saying and its meaning, between 
vehicle and tenor, has been traditionally considered to 
constitute the essence of the metaphorical. If the 
metaphorical is defined as such, the problem, which arises
5 For Heidegger's use of puns in his later writings, 
see Gerald Bruns, Heidegger's Estrangements. 140-49.
6 For example, James Edie in his response to Joseph 
Kockelmans' article "Ontological Difference", quotes some 
of Heideggerian sentences and remarks that he cannot tell 
"whether or not they are meaningful utterances in his 
natural language" (221) .
96
in regard to Heidegger's two seemingly metaphorical 
statements, is as follows: by rejecting the metaphoricity 
Of his sayings, Heidegger seems to deny any possible 
tension between his sayings and their meanings. However, 
as for readers, Heidegger's rejection of the metaphorical 
happens to strengthen doubly the tension between them, 
since without attributing the two seeming metaphorical 
statements to metaphor readers are more at a loss regarding 
how to understand them. As a result, Heidegger's 
repudiation of metaphor indirectly causes the metaphoricity 
of his sayings to be more metaphorical. Heidegger's 
repudiation of the metaphorical then is paradoxical, and 
cannot be taken as a downright condemnation.7
Such a consideration of the paradoxical nature of 
Heidegger's rejection of metaphor requires us to raise the 
question of metaphor in close conjunction with his writings 
on language. That which is paradoxical may be not only 
Heidegger's rejection of metaphor, but also metaphor 
itself, especially in its relation with philosophical or
7 Since Heidegger's rejection of metaphor is to be 
considered as paradoxical, I do not agree with Gerald 
Casenave, who takes it as a downright condemnation. 
Casenave in “Heidegger and Metaphor" claims that the 
rejection is "due to his falling prey to the same 
misunderstanding which is held by the tradition which he 
criticizes," and takes it his task to correct such a 
misunderstanding (140).
literal discourse.8 In case of Heidegger's (philosopher's) 
rejection of metaphor, the being of metaphor seems to be 
asserted and affirmed only by way of repudiation: only when 
it denies and gives up itself, it gains its essence. Given 
the seemingly paradoxical nature of metaphor, what is to be 
thought again and is to be explained is the question into 
the very being of paradox-producing metaphor. To 
reformulate the question, we might ask why the metaphorical 
is destined to be paradoxical in its relation to the 
literal or philosophical discourse, or why "only within 
metaphysics," to quote again Heidegger's celebrated saying, 
"is there the metaphorical."9
In asking the hermeneutical question of understanding 
of metaphor, I want to inquire into what gives rise to its 
paradoxical nature, especially when metaphor becomes a 
metaphysical concept. And if Heidegger's condemnation of 
metaphor as belonging within metaphysics is to be taken as 
a warning aginst a metaphysical understanding of metaphor, 
his condemnation is rather an invitation into a further 
thinking on the nature of metaphor. This thinking 
invitation is, I propose, also a request to enter into the
8 Ronald Bruzina in “Heidegger on the Metaphor and 
Philosophy" summarizes well the metaphor's "paradoxical 
place in the philosophic account of discourse" that 
"metaphor is both excluded from and grounding for rational 
explication" (185).
9 Ibid., 187.
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possibility of authentic discourse and to learn to 
understand metaphor authentically, not paradoxically. 
Insofar as we take metaphor paradoxically, I would like to 
argue that we fall into inauthenticity, thus blocking our 
way into authentic discourse. Thus the question of 
metaphor is essentially the question of discourse, which in 
turn can be either authentic or inauthentic. In order to 
answer these questions about metaphor and discourse in this 
chapter, I will follow and analyze Heidegger's discussion 
of poetic or authentic discourse in Unterweqs Zur Sprache, 
with a focus on "The Nature of Language," and then later 
inquire into, based on the understanding of authentic 
discourse, the being of metaphor. As such, this chapter is 
composed of the parts. In the first part, I will discuss 
and analyze basic terms, which Heidegger uses for the 
clarification of poetic discourse. Here in explicating 
these terms, I tried to limit myself only to those which 
are essential for the later discussion of metaphor. As a 
result, many important Heideggerian terms, such as 
Gelassenheit and Ereiqnis. have been left without comment. 
However, this chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive 
overview of the later Heidegger's view of language. After 
such a preliminary, I will return to the topic of metaphor, 
and discuss its position as implied in Heidegger's 
conception of language. Since he never deals with metaphor
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explicitly as an independent topic or thesis in any of his 
works, irty discussion of it is mostly a rethinking of it 
along with his thinking of language. In undertaking such a 
task, I will begin my discussion with the renewing question 
of the hermeneutical circle and silence, which Heidegger 
elaborated in Being Time, in order to present it anew in 
the light of the later Heidegger.10 If the problem of 
circle and silence is broached again, it is because without 
their proper consideration any discussion of language and 
metaphor will remain incomplete. As such, if Heidegger's 
discussion of language ends with silence in Being and Time, 
and "any insightful moment ... remains empty and permits no 
authentic disourse, 1,11 now I want to present the later 
Heidegger in terms of how he translates silence into an 
authentic discourse.12
10 Of course, the distinction between the early 
Heidegger and the later Heidegger is in danger of ignoring 
their continuity. However, for the sake of conveniency of 
discussion, I adopted such a distinction as many 
commentators have done. As for Heidegger's remark on the 
distinction, see his Preface to William Richardson, 
Heidegger; Through Phenomenology to Thought, viii-xxiii, 
and also 578-81, and Otto Poggeler, Martin Heidegger's Path 
of Thinking, 138-9.
11 Otto Pdggeler, Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking,
170.
12 When in "A Dialogue on Language" he observes that 
the question of Being and language has determined his path 
of thinking from Being and Time. Heidegger attributes "the 
fundamental flow of the book" to the fact that "[he] 
ventured forth too far early," since "it took nearly 
another ten years before [he] was able to say what [he] was
100
II
Although Heidegger in On the Wav to Language is 
concerned primarily with the being of language, he never 
attempts to discuss or define what language is. Such a 
non-thematic treatment of language stands in striking 
contrast to his analysis of it in Being and Time. While 
the earlier Heidegger seeks to ground the being of language 
in the totality of signification or in the worldhood of the 
world, the later Heidegger is found to forsake any search 
for ground or foundation. Nqt only does he refuse to find 
a ground for the phenomenon of language, he charges such an 
attempt to the science of language or metalinguistics. His 
charge against any scientific analysis of language is, as 
we are soon to be informed, based on his conviction that 
"when we speak of language [as an object for study] we 
remain entangled in a speaking that is persistently 
inadequate" (OW, p.75). For Heidegger, the being of 
language turns away from us as soon as we begin to talk 
about it and address it as the object of analysis.
Heidegger's refusal to speak of or about language 
seems to lead to the very impasse of any thinking of 
language. His refusal no doubt inclines toward the 
impossibility of any systematic approach to language. But 
when it is considered from another perspective, his refusal
thinking" (OW, pp. 7-8).
can be the natural outcome of an attempt to think more 
fundamentally and more authentically of the being of 
language, that is, "thinking without science, without 
philosophy" (OW, p. 61).13 Linguistics or philosophy of 
language provides a certain ground upon which one can 
develop one's understanding of language. Being a ground, 
which allows one to stand, it in return binds one to a 
certain destination implied in itself. Standing on that 
ground, one binds language into that designated 
destination. However, the binding is two-edged; by binding 
language with a ground, one in return is bound to it. As 
such, this dual movement of binding and being bound 
constitutes the essence of the hermeneutical circle. One 
cannot think of language without any presupposition or 
presupposed grounds. Thinking always implies the act of 
entering into a certain circle, whether science or 
philosophy. A circle enables one to understand and take a 
position about language, but at the price of being bound to 
that circle. For instance, Heidegger in Being and Time
13 In discussing some problems in Being and Time, Otto 
Poggeler addresses the issue of ground, method, and circle, 
which concerns us. He asks: “Can a 'hermeneutic' extract 
itself from the course which the occurrence of truth carves 
out in order to develop itself 'methodologically' and thus 
to give the occurrence of truth a fundamentum inconcussum?" 
According to Pdggeler, Heidegger in Being and Time does not 
ask the question of what decides and determines a 
hermeneutical circle on the basis or ground of which he 
analysis of Dasein and Being develops. See Martin 
Heidegger's Path of Thinking, 221.
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bases his analysis of language on the fore-structures, and 
moves it into the totalities of signification and 
intelligibility, and finally into discourse. As a result, 
his discussion of discourse turns out to be bound to the 
fore-structures, and discourse as such tends to become idle 
talk, while authentic discourse remains unspoken and 
silent. Now in On the Wav to Language, Heidegger wants to 
break through that circle of presuppositions, by refusing 
to base his discourse on language on any solid 
foundation.14
Therefore, the other side of Heidegger's rejection of 
philosophy or science of language is his rejection of a 
hermeneutical circle, as he himself says, "the notion of 
the accepted circle does not give us an originary 
experience of the hermeneutical relation" (OW, p. 51).
Here by distinguishing the hermeneutical relation from the 
circle, Heidegger adumbrates that the latter is not 
essential for the former and that the latter is one actual 
case of the former's possibilities. The distinction can be 
taken to imply that a circle can be authentic or 
inauthentic according to its relation to the hermeneutical 
relation. Heidegger's rejection of a circle then is to be
14 Heidegger radicalizes the notion of ground in his 
"The Principle of Ground," where he traces its history in 
Western thinking only in order to unground it and make it 
abysmal.
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limited only to the inauthentic circle. If so, that which 
is to be brought to light is the notion of the 
hermeneutical relation, which Heidegger in his dialogue 
with a Japanese explains in terms of a Greek god, Hermes. 
Hermes is "the divine messenger" who "brings the message of 
destiny" (OW, p. 29). By evoking the Greek god and his 
message, Heidegger attempts to relate hermeneutics not just 
to interpretation, but to man's "bearing of message and 
tidings," which is prior to the former. The being of 
hermeneutics is to be found not in interpretation, but in 
that which gives rise to interpretation. Since 
interpretation, as we have discussed in the previous 
chapter, is in danger of falling into a closed totality, 
one should be more primordially related to its source and 
origin. Whereas interpretation is fundamentally bound to 
language and discourse, Hermes is neither linguistic or 
discursive, thus being nameless or unnameable. As such, 
the hermeneutical relation constitutes a man's relation to 
Hermes, the nameless, whose essence is the former's 
"abandon[ment] of [his] path of thinking to namelessness" 
(OW, p. 29). Heidegger's rejection of a hermeneutical 
circle then should be taken as a shift from the circle of 
presuppositions to that of the nameless or the unknown.
Heidegger's critical attitude to science or philosophy 
of language is a reflection of his radical attempt to think
language more originally than any science or philosophy 
does. Such an attempt can be taken also as an effort to 
disengage metaphor from a metaphysical interpretation. 
Heidegger proposes to leave science or philosophy behind 
only in order to enter into a more fundamental thinking of 
them— which is to radicalize hermeneutics or to radicalize 
metaphor. The movement of hermeneutics is backward, that 
is, from a method, through interpretation itself, then 
finally toward what gives rise to interpretation. If 
science of language is the metaphysics of language, this 
backward stepping [Schritt zuruck] goes "from metaphysics 
into the essence of metaphysics," which has not been 
thought before (ID, p. 44). Since it goes toward the 
unknown and unthought (which is the itinerary of metaphor 
as I will discuss later), this backtracking is also heading 
for an abyss [Abgrund]: "Being [Sein], however, because 
itself the ground, remains without ground" (PG, p. 218). 
Considering the importance of backtracking in Heidegger's 
thinking of language, it seems that the notion of a radical 
hermeneutics is to be attained in conjunction with it.
As Heidegger's analysis of language in terms of the 
totality of signification and the totality of fore­
structures in Being and Time tends to end up with idle 
talk, discourse can move only within the closed totality of 
the signification or the disclosed [Lichtung], thereby the
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circle being closed as in the case of "ther spatial 
hermenetutics of the metaphysical"15: idle talk "prevert[s] 
the act of disclosing [Erschliessen] into an act of closing 
off [Verschliessen] {BT, p. 213).16 The notion of the 
closed totality presupposes the whole of the disclosed, 
which lies there as presence, and as such institutes a 
hermeneutical part and whole relation. This relation is 
spatial and structural. In order to overcome this spatial 
mode of a closed totality, Heidegger discusses an open 
totality in terms of death which is "the possibility of 
absolute impossibility of Dasein" (BT, p. 2 94).17 This 
open totality is inclined toward the unknown and 
unpredictable future. For Heidegger, death tears Dasein 
away from its fascination with the idle talk of "They" and 
the totality of disclosed totality, and frees it into its
15 William Spano, "Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and the 
Hermeneutic Circle."
16 In idle talk, we, Heidegger says, "do not so much 
understand the entities which are talked about; we already 
are listening only to what is said-in-the-talk as such.
What is said-in-the-talk gets understood; but what the talk 
is about is understood only approximately and 
superficially. We have the same thing in view, because it 
is in the same averageness that we have a common 
understanding of what is said" (BT, p. 212). In the 
context of idle talk, everything is spoken already before 
speaking, and everything is understood already before 
understanding.
17 Heidegger continues to say: "Thus death reveals 
itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost. which is 
non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped . . . "  
(italic in the original).
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own futural potentiality. The separating force of death is 
contrasted to the binding force of the world to which 
Dasein belongs. And the Dasein's authentic confrontation 
with death is conceived as a momentum of cutting itself off 
from the inauthentic discourse and opening a possibility of 
authentic discourse. However, Heidegger could not develop 
fully this possibility of authentic discourse within the 
confines of Being and Time, as he failed to write Division 
Three assigned for the temporality of discourse. Now 
thirty-two years after the completion of Being and Time, 
Heidegger, in his work On the Wav to Language (1959), seems 
to find a way toward authentic discourse with the notion of 
backtracking.10
For Heidegger, backtracking is concerned with the 
difference between beginning [Beginn] and origin 
[Anfang] ,19 While the former is historical and epochal,
18 Otto Pdggeler therefore contrasts the early 
Heidegger's "empty and naked nothing," which is experienced 
by being guilty, in Being and Time with the later 
Heidegger's nothing as the shepherd of Being. While the 
former is merely to become free from the world and 
facticity, the latter is to be within "the expanse for what 
is totally other than man and nonetheless needs man, the 
space of the holy." See his Heidegger's Path of Thinking. 
139. 173.
19 See What is called thinking. 152. And for a fine 
analysis of the distinction between Beginn. Anfang. and 
Ur sprung, see Schumann, Heidegger on Being and Acting. 
120-151. Here through this chapter I take Anfang and 
Ursprung under the same heading of origin according to the 
example of What is Called Thinking, where Heidegger does 
not differentiate between Anfang and Ursprung.
the latter, as something that gives rise to the former, is 
that which is concealed in the former's epochal history. 
What provokes thinking in regard to their relation is that 
a beginning takes place only with the oblivion or 
concealment of origin: the origin keeps itself concealed in 
the beginning. While the one determines, the other is that 
which is determined. Being historically and epochally 
determined and situated, a beginning does not know what 
determines and situates itself as such. And if beginning 
is what is given or presence, origin, then, is what is 
giving and presencing. Heidegger's backtracking is a call 
to turn from presence to presencing, from beginning to 
origin, from the determined to the determining. If one, 
being historically determined, finds himself thrown into 
the totality of signification and the worldhood of the 
world, by the act of backtracking he inquires into the 
origin of his thrownness and facticity.
In order for backtracking to be initiated, first of 
all one has to step back from the given totality or 
presence, which binds him. Even though one is given to 
that closed totality, the expectation of death and of 
nothing plays the role of liberator; the unknown future of 
death releases him from the binding grasp of the closed 
totality toward the untotalizable totality; "Death is the 
possibility of absolute impossibility of Dasein" (BT, p.
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294). The moment that he is freed away from the totality, 
he is at the same time shifted from the spatial 
hermeneutics to the temporal hemeneutics. To put it in 
other words, being liberated from the given totality by the 
unknown future of death, Dasein can trace back to the 
essence of what constitutes the totality, into which he has 
been thrown. This in turn opens him toward a possibility 
of authentic discourse which moves in an open and 
untotalizable totality.
Heidegger's rejection of science or philosophy of 
language can be understood in conjunction with 
backtracking. When one begins to think of language, he 
finds himself already with some philosophical or scientific 
notions of language, since he is thrown into the pre­
existing totality of meanings. Therefore, without knowing 
why, one is destined to think about language scientifically 
and philosophically and to interpret metaphor 
metaphysically. Before thinking, he has some ready-made 
answers and concepts about what is to be thought. 
Accordingly, even poetic metaphors are always translated 
into familiar ready-made concepts, thus undermining the 
very being of poetry as I will show later in my discussion 
of Heidegger's reading of Holderline's and George's poems. 
Therefore, in order to enter into authentic discourse, one 
has to abandon all these ready-made concepts, constituted
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by the philosophy or science of language. The presence of 
meanings are thus to be thrown away for the sake of their 
original presencing. Now the question is how this 
originary thinking is to take place.
Heidegger contrasts an experience with language [eine 
Erfahrung mit der Sprache] to science or philosophy of 
language. While the latter is to approach language with 
certain preconceptions and suppositions, the former is to 
"endure . . ., suffer . . ., receive [language] as it 
strikes us and submit to it" (OW, p. 57). In undergoing an 
experiencing with language, one does not approach language 
but, quite on the contrary, is greeted, approached, and 
claimed by it. Here Heidegger's formulation of 
experiencing with language appears to be indistinguishable 
from what he calls science or philosophy of language. 
Whenever one approaches language, it is with certain 
presuppositions, which are not of our own making. One is 
claimed by language for these presuppositions, so that what 
one says is rather spoken by language. Contrary to 
undergoing experience with language, one then is entangled 
within the system of language. This danger of 
misunderstanding Heidegger's call to experience with 
language is also the possibility of Dasein to fall into 
inauthenticity. If the danger is inherent in undergoing an 
experience with language, the problem with it is how one
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can be claimed by language without falling into 
inauthenticity. For Heidegger, that problem is also the 
problem of common language, and as such he prefers silence 
to speaking as in Being and Time. It is only insofar as 
"language does not bring itself to language but holds back" 
that we are able to speak a language. In the same way that 
the beginning is not the origin, speaking is not the 
essence of language. Speaking, especially common speaking, 
may be a lapse into inauthenticity. Heidegger therefore 
finds the essence of language only in silence, only when 
"we cannot find the right word for something that concerns 
us, carries us away, oppresses or encourages us" (OW, p.
59). If we cannot speak, it is because the totality of 
signification (or of the disclosed), which binds us in idle 
talk, does not bind us any more, and we consequently are 
released into somewhere beyond the totality. This release 
is interpreted by Heidegger as directing toward the origin, 
thus the act of backtracking from the common language to 
the being of language: "Silence is the 'logic' of 
philosophy insofar as it asks the basic question from 
another beginning. It seeks the truth of the essencing of 
Being [Sein]--and this truth is the beckoning-suggestive 
concealment (the mystery) of the appropriative event."20
20 While quoting this passage from Heidegger's 
Beitraae zur Philosophie, Otto Pdggeler names as 
"Signetics" rSigetik) the logic of the truth of Being which
Ill
When he asks us to be claimed by language in order to be 
under way toward language, Heidegger therefore has such a 
language of silence in mind, not language as a relational 
system of signs.21
Ill
No matter how much importance Heidegger places on the 
discourse of silence, the problem with it is how silence 
can be spoken as silence. Unless it rings in the speaking 
of language, pure silence is the impossibility and death of 
language. Therefore, even silence has to be spoken, or is 
to be mediated by spoken language. In retrospect,
Heidegger in Being and Time could not step beyond this
makes silent. See Heidegger's Path of Thinking, 223.
21 Here Heidegger's "silence" is not to be confused 
with what he speaks of the unsaid or the hidden riches of 
language. The former is the unsayable and as such is an 
abysmal ground of language in its origin, whereas the 
latter is the implicative dimension or etymological 
richness of language. To put it another way, the former 
(Hermes) is the abysmal ground of the latter 
(hermeneutics). The difference between them is that the 
former is not linguistic at all, so that it has nothing to 
do with language as a system. As such, Gerald Bruns' 
explanation of Heidegger's unsaid, which I quote in order 
to contrast it to "silence," is not the unsayable, though 
he does not distinguish one from the other: "each word 
harbors, not just a meaning (a particularity of sense), but 
the sounds of every other word in the language, so that (if 
one were listening) one could not sound a word without 
hearing at the same time an infinitely reverberating 
vocabulary." See Heidegger's Estrangement. 142.
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discourse of silence, and every discourse turned out to be 
either idle talk or silence. As such, he did not yet find 
the way to authentic discourse, which would bring silence 
into language.22 Now in On the Wav to Language, he 
abandons his former polarity of idle talk and silence, and 
moves into poetic discourse in order to find the ringing of 
silence. It is to poets that Heidegger looks to find the 
words which somehow bring silence into spoken language. 
Poetry may be a journey into the region of silence or the 
death of common language to which the poet has to go in 
order to write.23 Therefore, he proposes to read Stefen 
George's poem "The Word." If the early Heidegger 
considered language from the perspective of philosophy in 
Being and Time, the later Heidegger discusses it from a
22 However, we should not ignore Heidegger's effort in 
Being and Time to bring silence to language. Ricoeur 
mentions about Heidegger's "labor of language," which 
"gives Being and Time a greatness that no subsequent work 
will eclipse." By labor of language, Ricoeur means "the 
effort to articulate in an appropriate manner the 
hermeneutic phenomenology that ontology enlists in its own 
behalf." See his Time and Narrative, vol. 3, 63, and also 
Erasmus Schdfer, "Heidegger's Language: Metalogical Forms 
of Thought and Grammatical Specialities."
23 Karsten Harries in "Language and Silence:
Heidegger's Dialogue with George Trakl" finds the place of 
poetry in between "idle talk and silence." As he 
reformulates that relation between silence and poetry, 
poetry "is a recovery of silence in the midst of idle talk" 
(164) .
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totally different perspective of poetry. Now philosophy is 
thought and interpreted in terms of poetry.24
However, Heidegger's turning away from philosophy 
toward poetry does not mean that he forsakes the 
philosophical language for the sake of the poetical or that 
he distinguishes ontically one from the other. In his 
proposing a reading of George's poem, he therefore attempts 
to find a certain connection and continuity between them, 
lest they are presented as totally different modes of 
language which have their independent assigned places in 
the system of language. Thus what concerns Heidegger is 
the question of how the transition from the scientific 
language to the poetic is to be effected. If one has to 
undergo an experience with language, it is because it will 
transform his relation to language; what is wrong is not 
the language itself, but our relation to it. This 
transformation is the transformation of scientific and 
assertive language into what is called by some
24 Heidegger's notion of poetry is not poetry as a 
genre of literature, or as verse as prose. He does not 
privilege poetry as a genre against other genres of 
writing, such as discursive or fictional writings. 
Heidegger tends to go beyond such distinctions, as the 
following observation indicates; "What is needed in the 
present world crisis is less philosophy, but more 
attentiveness in thinking; less literature, but more 
cultivation of the letter" (LH, p. 242).
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"hermeneutical" or poetic language.25 If one is to 
transform his relation to language, he has to unburden the 
commonness attached to it and restore it to its original 
possibilities, which Heidegger calls Saying [Sage].26 This 
unburdening and releasing process for Heidegger is 
backtracking, that is, to trace the scientifically and 
metaphysically destined history of being of language.
In order to find the original being of language and 
extract it from the common metaphysical language, Heidegger 
makes a distinction between word [Wort] and terms 
[Worter],27 Terms are like dictionary entries: their 
meanings are already disclosed within the totality of 
terms. As such, Heidegger compares terms to "buckets and 
kegs from which we scoop a content that is there" (130) .
25 Theodore Kisiel in "The Language of the Event: The 
Event of Language" defines hermeneutical language as "the 
language which orients itself "'primal tidings' of the 
aboriginal event, which 'speaks' silently, by withholding 
itself" (96) . This hermeneutical language is what 
Heidegger describes as man's "bearing of message and 
tidings," as we have discussed earlier.
26 For a discussion of Saying, see John Sallis,
"Toward a Showing of Language," and his another essay, 
"Language and Reversal."
27 As David White suggests, the translation of das 
Wort as word can be misleading, since it has not only a 
designation of a single word, but also has "the 
connotation of a phrase, a proposition, or even a set of 
propositions." Though saying seems to be a more 
appropriate translation for das Wort, he reserves it for 
Heidegger's another term Saqen. See Heidegger and Language 
of Poetry. 22-23.
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What is to be spoken is already given there, and therefore 
all speaking tends to be idle talk. Quite contrary to the 
disclosed totality of meanings in terms, words lead into 
disclosing: "Words are wellsprings that are found and dug 
up in the telling, wellsprings that must be found and dug 
up again and again, that easily cave in, but that at times 
also well up when least expected" (130). While meanings in 
terms are there already as ready-made present-at-hand, 
meanings in words have to be found and dug up. The nature 
of words is not presence, but presencing [Anwesen], not 
entity, but act or movement, not noun but verb. When the 
gathered water, after the act of welling up comes to an 
end, stays like a standing reserve, it tends to stagnate 
and rot. This staying lies there, while stagnating, and is 
finally to be exhausted by use. Heidegger calls this 
staying water "terms." The continuity between words and 
terms is unmistakable; the latter are the used-up and 
derivative mode of the former.
The relation of terms as derivative and used-up mode 
of words is also true of that of common language and 
poetry. While he conceives poetry as "the water that at 
times flows backward toward the source" (WC, p. 11), 
Heidegger finds that "everyday language is a forgotten and 
therefore used-up poem" (PL, p. 208). Common language, 
while used and employed time and time again, happens to
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forget its origin, poetry. Then common language is a 
fallen mode of poetry, and a destined site of poetry sent 
by the history of metaphysics. The wellspring of poetry 
was blocked by metaphysics, and thus poetry turned into 
common language, which coincided with the transformation of 
presencing into presence. Therefore, even in Being and 
Time. Heidegger proposes to liberate language from grammar 
and logic of metaphysics, so that language can be open 
toward its source.26 His proposal to liberate language 
from the limitation of metaphysics is another expression to 
think backward toward the source and origin. Now the 
question to be asked is how language can be liberated from 
metaphysics and how language can restore its original 
poetry.
The task of restoring the forgotten poetry in common 
language for Heidegger is no less than to undergo an
28 Heidegger says that "Grammar sought its foundations 
in the 'logic' of this logos. But this logic was based 
upon the ontology of the present-at-hand" (OW, p. 209)
Otto POggeler offers a very fine explanation of the 
inseparable relation of the ontology of the present-at- 
hand, traditional logic, and metaphysical language. As he 
summarizes, the logic of the present-at-hand "allows one to 
think logically about only those aspects of objects which 
can always be brought before thinking as constantly 
present-at-hand; constantly, it does not allow time and 
history into Being itself" (219). POggeler opposes this 
logic of present-at-hand to "hermeneutical logic," which 
understands Being historically and temporally. See Martin 
Heidegger's Path of Thinking, 218-227. And for more 
discussion of the relation of grammar, logic, and 
metaphysics, see Reiner Schurmann, Heidegger. 275-281.
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authentic experience with language. However, the way 
toward original language is troublesome and is often 
interrupted. He always finds himself doing something other 
than experiencing with language, and sometimes has to 
remind himself that "in fact we would already have 
forgotten the whole point: to undergo an experience with 
language" (OW, p. 63). Or he at his best does no more than 
"sum up the experience the poet [Stefan George] has 
undergone with the word, instead of entering into the 
experience itself" (OW, p. 67). To undergo an experience 
is thus to be deferred. Since he thinks he is not on the 
way to language, he proposes to give the title "The Nature 
of Language" a question mark, because the title is too 
audacious and assertive. But as soon as a question mark is 
given to the original title, he finds that even the meaning 
of nature as well as that of language remains in the dark. 
The transformation of the title finally happens to "make 
the title disappear" (OW, p. 77). While he changes the 
title of the essay and confesses his inability to enter 
into an experience of language, he nevertheless happens to 
recognize that even his inability and confusion is already 
"borne up by the grant of what is to come into question," 
that is, language (OW, p. 75). Even though he failed to 
explain what an experience with language is, he finds 
himself already on the way to language by the grant of
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language itself. The essence of language withholds and 
does not render itself into any thematic assertion or 
statements, so that Heidegger's inability to speak about 
language is conceived as an indication that he undergoes an 
experience with language, though without knowing how or 
why.
If language withholds its nature, any discourse of and 
about language tends to be illegitimate, not excluding 
Heidegger's essays on language. Since language holds back 
its nature, discourse about language cannot have any claim 
to truth in a metaphysical sense. Despite the fact that 
language withholds while disclosing, science or philosophy 
of language says as if it is all disclosing. Whenever one 
talks about language, he has to acknowledge that his 
discourse is possible because language withholds itself. 
When this withholding nature of language is forgotten, it 
becomes metaphysical. We propose and assert with language. 
That which is put into question by the conception that 
language withholds its nature is the very nature of 
assertion or literal language. The question is how is it 
possible that a sentence means what it says if language 
holds back its nature. What a sentence proposes to 
disclose is only partially realized, since all disclosure 
is always accompanied by withholding. Therefore, the 
meaning of a sentence never coincides with itself, which is
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the problem of metaphor. There is always an unknowable 
withholding in any sentence, which interrupts the co­
happening of saying with meaning. Discourse moves on the 
horizon of gap and difference: what it proposes to say is 
never brought to fulfillment. Here discourse is 
essentially metaphoric.
Since discourse does not coincide with itself, 
Heidegger's final title, "The being of language— the 
language of being," which he suggests after many 
transformations, is characterized as imposition 
[Zumutung] .29 The gap between what the title says and what 
it means is pointed out by the term "imposition," which 
emphatically reveals the audacious and imposing character 
of assertion or proposition, which claims to mean what it 
says. If all assertion is mere imposition, there arises 
the profound difficulty of discourse: if discourse cannot
29 About imposition, Reiner Schurmann says: "The 
'ordinarily' held convergence between language and being is 
an imposition, a mere corollary to the position of man at 
the center of the knowable. Such 'bending together' (con- 
vergere) thus turns out to be the violent act par 
excellence from which Western civilization was born." See 
Heidegger. 275-76. Because of such violence inherent 
within any discourse, in the end of his essay "Time and 
Being" Heidegger tends to think that discourse functions as 
an obstacle to what it attempts to say if we are not aware 
of that danger: "Our task is unceasingly to overcome the 
obstacles that tend to render such saying [saying of 
Appropriation] inadequate. The saying of Appropriation in 
the form of a lecture remains itself an obstacle of this 
kind. The lecture has spoken merely in propositional 
statements" (italics added) (24).
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mean what it says, how then is it to be materialized and 
interpreted? However, as Heidegger says, in order to avoid 
such a difficulty, we cannot and should not "shun the 
trouble and the risk of speaking about language" (50). 
Though at the risk of audacity and imposition, language 
nevertheless has to be ventured. As for assertion, it has 
taken such trouble and risk in a way to objectify language, 
it thus forgets its withholding nature. Therefore, what is 
to be sought is to venture into speaking, but in a 
different way from assertion, so that the withholding 
nature of language is to be preserved.
Throughout "The Nature of Language," and "A Dialogue 
on Language," Heidegger's effort to find a mode of 
discourse which is open to the withholding nature of 
language leads him to take language as not as signs or 
assertions, but as hints [Winken], which is, as I will 
argue later, the essence of metaphor. While he 
distinguishes hints from signs, he defines the latter as 
having its "habitat in metaphysics" (OW, p. 2 6). Given the 
relational system of signs, the meaning of a word is 
present within that system. Language is intralinguistic.
In opposition to the structuralistic tendency to see words 
as signs, and in order to overcome it, Heidegger proposes 
to take words as hints, guiding words, or escorts (OW, p. 
95). If signs present their meanings as something present-
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at-hand in the given totality of signification, hints do 
not have answers to what they are supposed to say. When 
words are conceived as hints, their meanings are absent at 
the present moment so that the speaker of them is related 
to their meanings in a way of waiting. If signs have their 
structural foundation upon presence, hints are based on 
presencing [Anwesen] and absencing [Abwesen]. As such, the 
structure of hints is that of difference, gap, and 
deferral.30 "The being of language, the language of 
being," Heidegger's new title to "The Nature of Language," 
is constituted of such a differential and deferral 
structure. Though Heidegger names the title as such, its 
meaning is still to arrive, and what it imposes is not what 
it means. If this deferral and differential structure is 
taken out of account, Heidegger's language would fall into 
metaphysics, and his discourse would turn language into a 
mere ob j ect.
30 Here I am fully aware of a possible objection to my 
description of a saying in sign language, which is rendered 
to coincide with its meaning. Even the meaning of a sign 
is not present, and has to wait until all meanings of the 
other signs are brought into light, since signs are 
structured by the system of difference. However, what I 
propose to prove is that this gap between a sign and its 
meaning is constituted within the totality of 
signification, which has its foundation upon the ontology 
of present-at-hand. Thus, the gap in signs can be said to 
be something to be overcome and to be bridged. But seen 
from the perspective of language in hints, the gap is 
essential and authentic.
The difference between signs and hints is not merely 
linguistic, but has temporal and spatial implications. If 
in language as signs saying is hypothetically expected to 
coincide with meaning, the word is already what it 
designates and proposes. Ideally speaking, to say is to 
have possession of what it signifies. But this 
simultaneous (hypothetical) co-presence of saying and the 
signified is possible only when language is conceived as 
the system of representation. Since representation 
represents what is representable, that is, something 
constantly present-at-hand, the other of the represented is 
left out, and does not enter into consideration. Here what 
is left out is presencing and absenting, which in turn 
constitutes authentic temporality and spatiality.31 
Therefore the space and time of representation is oriented 
toward presence. It is because of this presence centered 
space and time that a saying in language as signs can 
coincide with its meaning. The direction to which 
Heidegger turns his attention by his proposal to see words 
as hints is toward this left-out dimension of 
representational language. While a saying in 
representation is incapable of reaching beyond presence,
31 After briefly discussing the traditional 
metaphysical conception of time and space in the end of 
"The Nature of Language," Heidegger contrasts it with his 
own. See OW, pp. 102-03.
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and thus falls back upon itself, the same saying, if taken 
as hints, instigates an act of turning away from presence 
toward presencing and absencing. In that act of turning 
away and toward, space and time, whose distance has been 
brought near to the degree of their annihilation as a 
result of representation, have to be restored to their own 
proper space and time, where what is named by words 
dwell.32 The act of turning then is crossing across and 
journeying in the space and time. Being given into that 
act of turning and crossing, the meaning of saying is 
destined to be delayed and deferred.
Since hints have to cross the space and time toward 
what they propose to mean, Heidegger renders them as that 
which is in need of "the widest sphere in which to swing" 
(OW, p. 27 ).33 The movement of hints is like a to and fro 
movement between a word and what is named by it. The
32 In his essay "The Thing" Heidegger discusses the 
"abolition of all distances" as a result of man's 
representational thinking, which results in the 
annihilation of things." See PL, pp. 165-86.
33 From now on, when I refer to this region of space 
and time, I will use the word time-space, which Heidegger 
coins in order to show the unity between them. Time-space 
is also called "temporal space" [Seitraum] in his 
"Remembrance of the Poet." As William Richardson points 
out, "this domain is not, of course, 'space' but rather 
that dimension out of which even space and time themselves 
come-to-presence." See his Heidegger. 6. Bruns sees this 
non-spatial space as an event or a taking place [Erignis], 
which is "temporalized as a worlding and a thinging." See 
Heidegger's Estrangement, 93.
movement is on the horizon of appearing and presencing but 
also hiding and absencing. Heidegger thus calls the 
movement of hints enigmatic, since "they beckon to us, [but 
at the same time] they beckon away" (italics in original) 
(OW, p. 26): "the hint is the message of the veiling that 
opens up" (OW, p. 44). This dual moment of veiling and 
opening-up is well summarized by the term "the spiritual 
pointer" or "spiritual index finger," which Heidegger 
borrows from Jean Paul's writing. One points at something 
by his finger in order to turn another's attention to what 
is pointed at. If the other is to follow the meaning of 
the directed finger, he has to turn to it only in order to 
turn away from it immediately. Instead of the finger 
presenting and bringing a designated thing to the one who 
attends to it, it merely indicates toward and hints at the 
thing which is not ready-to-hand. Therefore, one who is to 
follow the message of the finger has to leave it behind for 
reaching beyond what it indicates. This act of reaching 
beyond is the act of crossing the wide space between the 
finger and the thing indicated by it. However, in the very 
nature of the message of the finger there lies a danger 
that the finger itself can be taken as the message. The 
danger is that instead of instigating a journey into its 
direction, the finger may bind men to itself so that it 
becomes self-reflexive. Wherever hints are taken as signs,
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there lies the danger. Because of this danger, Heidegger, 
it seems, warns readers against taking the phrase "house of 
Being," which he uses for hinting at the nature of language 
in "Letter on Humanism," as a concept of the nature of 
language. If the phrase is conceived as a concept, not as 
a hint, it comes to designate "a shelter erected earlier 
somewhere or other, in which Being, like a portable object, 
can be stored away" (OW, p. 26). As such, the phrase 
"house of Being" does not instigate a to and fro movement, 
and becomes nothing more than the finger which returns to 
itself--therefore Heidegger has to give up that phrase.
Heidegger's proposal to take words as hints, which 
initiates a journey (which I will call the itinerary of 
metaphor) into what is named by them, is one of the results 
of his attempt at backtracking thinking. If the essence of 
backtracking is to turn away from the beginning toward the 
origin, and from presence toward presencing and absencing, 
words as hints seem to provide a way toward such 
backtracking. As common language is used-up poetry, words 
as signs are those words which withdraw into themselves 
after losing their outreaching movements toward what are 
named by them. In order to restore this to and fro 
movement between words and things, one then has to change 
his relation to language so that language itself can speak. 
If language speaks, it speaks in a way of deferral and
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difference: its meaning does not coincide with its 
speaking. This language of deferral and difference is 
hint-words as distinguished from the language of presence 
in sign-words.34 The meaning of hint-words lies in the 
future— which reflects Heidegger's giving a priority to 
future against present as in Being and Time. The sign- 
words serve only as a momentum for returning by way of 
hint-words to what gives rise to them.
If hint words move in the wide sphere where things 
withdraw and appear, this movement is not a mere wandering. 
This sphere is not an empty space from one end of which to 
the other end words have to cross, but time-space in which 
words follow the trace [Spur] of things. As Heidegger says 
about the fourfold in "What are Poets for," poets, by 
singing of gods in their poems, begin to follow the trace 
of retreating gods, while staying on their tracks (PL, p. 
94). In the same way that poets trace the tracks of the 
fugitive gods, hint-words move on the trace of what they 
name. If words are taken as hints, it is because the 
trails of things are not yet completely raised, and because 
words still are capable of outreaching toward things.
Along with the trails of things is language on the way 
toward these things. As such, in time-space "what
34 For the sake of brevity, I coined the words "sign- 
words" and "hint-words," each referring to "words as signs" 
and "word as hints" respectively.
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withdraws from us, draws us along by its very withdrawal 
(WC, p. 9). In this context, signs in their nature are 
hints, and man, as Heidegger puts it, is a sign that draws 
toward what withdraws.
Now the relation between the spoken and silence can be 
explained in terms of hint-words' to-and-fro movement in 
time-space. If the spoken, as Heidegger says, stems from 
the unspoken, it is because the spoken is not spoken yet 
(OW, p. 120) , and because what it says is not yet what it 
means. In order that the spoken is to be actually spoken, 
it has to cross the wide sphere of time-space to which it 
is addressed. The speaking is a bidding or calling of 
something absent to show [Sagen] itself, not a commanding 
of something present to respond to it.35 Then the 
difference of what a word says and what it means, or 
briefly metaphor, constitutes the difference between 
speaking and silence; metaphor has its space between the 
spoken and silence. In a way that backtracking is a
35 "Mortal speech is a calling that names, a bidding 
which, out of the simple onefold of the difference, bids 
thing and world to come. What is purely bidden [heiSen] in 
mortal speech is what is spoken in the poem" (PL, p. 208) .
In his essay on Heidegger "The Problem of Language," 
which deserves a careful study, Volkmann-Schluck explains 
such a bidding nature of language in terms of mythical 
truth, or the Greek epic poets' appeal to the Muses. 
According to his explanation, epic poets are attendants of 
Muses, and when the former speaks, "the actual speakers are 
not the poets, but the Muses, daughters of the highest god" 
(123) .
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movement along the trails from words to things, it is at 
the same time a tracing movement from speaking toward 
silence. Things do not speak. Instead, they, being 
themselves Stillness [Stille], use or appropriate the 
speaking of man in order to be sounded (PL, p. 2 08). 
Therefore, man in speaking metaphorically responds to the 
stillness, and is able to move in time-space toward it.
The difference between saying and meaning or between 
speaking and silence is not only linguistic, but 
ontological, which implies that metaphor is not merely 
rhetorical, but ontological. It is linguistic, since it 
marks the distinction between words and terms, hints and 
signs, and poetry and common language. Difference in this 
linguistic dimension constitutes an etymological 
backtracking, a stepping backward from the fallen mode of 
language to its poetic possibilities.36 But this 
linguistic difference is rooted in a fundamental and 
ontological difference. The dif-ference is ontological, 
because it is derived from the very nature of language (or 
of Being), which withdraws at the very moment of
36 While observing Heidegger's etymological concern, 
in his essay "La Mots et Les Roses” Jean Greisch comments 
that Heidegger privileges "la diachronie au profit du 
systeme." However, Jean Greisch distinguishes Heidegger's 
etymological backtracking from "un 6tymologisme grossier" 
in a way resembling the latter's distinction of the origin 
from the beginning: "Pour retrouver 1'origine, it faut 
s'int6resser a 1'histoire des mots, mais 1'origine pour le 
philosophe ne coincide pas avec le commencement1 (449) .
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disclosing. Difference for Heidegger is, therefore, Unter- 
Schied, scission, or division, which prevails in the midst 
of and in the between of world and thing, and Being and 
beings. In his essay "Language, 1 Heidegger speaks of dif­
ference by its Greek term, diaphora; "the unifying element 
of the diaphora, the carrying out that carries through," to 
which we will return later for our discussion of metaphor 
(OW, p. 2 02). By emphasizing the unity of the difference, 
he warns us from taking it as a separation of things from 
world, or of beings from Being. If difference is 
understood as a separation of them and joining them 
together again, it would mean that we would fall into a 
metaphysical interpretation. Because of this metaphysical 
danger, Heidegger, after The Essence of Reason, begins to 
abandon his notion of the ontological difference, through 
which Dasein and Being were analyzed in Being and Time, 
lest the unity of dif-ference be destroyed.37
IV
Heidegger's conception of language, difference, and 
Being in our foregoing discussion is what he attains as a 
result of his thinking dialogue with George's poem "The
37 For the discussion of Heidegger's ontological 
difference, see Poggeler, Martin Heidegger's Path of 
Thinking, 117-131, and Joseph Kockelmans, "Ontological 
Difference, Hermeneutics, and Language."
Word." By entering into such a dialogue, he is admitted 
into listening to the speaking of language, which takes 
place in the poem. Since the poet already "putTs] into 
language the experience he undergoes with language," 
Heidegger in thinking follows the trace of that poetic 
experience {OW, p. 59). As the poet, by undergoing an
experience, has transformed his relation with language, so
does Heidegger. But they speak of this transformation in a 
different way: while the poet sings in a poem, Heidegger 
says in discourse. Something striking in Heidegger's 
conducting a dialogue with the poem of the poet is the 
reversal of the traditional order of relation between them.
Contrary to the traditional order that poetry approached
philosophy for its justification, now the latter in 
Heidegger is going toward the former. Formerly, since 
poetry is essentially figurative, thus lacking clarity and 
distinctiveness, it had to be judged and evaluated by the 
literal language or the standard of philosophy in order 
that its value was to be socially accepted and recognized. 
Philosophy has been the judge of poetry. However, now with 
Heidegger, who warns himself against "reduc[ing] poetry to 
the servant's role as documentary proof for our thinking," 
philosophy seeks its own evaluation by the saying of 
poetry, and is willing to be appropriated by the latter
131
(OW, p. 63).38 The language of philosophy now enters into 
a dialogue with the language of poetry.
Heidegger's question of the relation between poetry 
and thinking dominates the whole essay. When he raises the 
question, it is because the relation, though so often 
discussed and mentioned as to become "a vacuous clich£," 
has not been thought nor treated properly (PW, p. 81). If 
poetry has been ancillary to philosophy, it is the 
historical destination of Western metaphysics. Thus being 
determined by metaphysics, the real essence of the relation 
has not been thought yet. Therefore, what Heidegger 
proposes in his reading of George's poem is to backtrack 
such destinal history and then to obtain their original 
relation. This backtracking journey of Heidegger's 
thinking is guided by the figurative language of poetry.
As such, Heidegger's revaluation of the traditional order 
between philosophy and poetry implies also a radical 
reevaluation of the nature and relation of the literal and
38 Heidegger often warns against any interpretation of 
poetry which does not efface itself in front of poetry: "in 
order that what has been purely written of in the poem may 
stand forth a little clearer, the explanatory speech must 
break up each time both itself and what it has attempted. 
The final, but at the same time the most difficult step of 
every exposition consists in vanishing away together with 
its explanations in the face of the pure existence of the 
poem" (RM, pp. 234-35). In a very provoking essay 
"Thinking and Poetizing in Heidegger," Henri Birault 
comments on this paradoxical relation of explanation (which 
speaks only in order to vanish away) to poetry.
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the metaphorical. If the metaphorical in the tradition, 
has been judged by its possible return to the literal, 
Heidegger's reversal seems to suggest a certain way to 
account for the being of metaphor without forcing it to the 
literal. To this question of the relation between them, 
our foregoing discussion of Heidegger's distinction between 
words and terms, or hints and signs, seems to suggest many 
possible answers. Now in this second part of the chapter,
I will attempt to answer that question by reading George's 
poem along with Heidegger, by focusing on the latter's 
hermeneutical relation to the poem's metaphorical language. 
In my rereading Heidegger's reading of the poem, I will try 
to see how his distinctions effect his relation to 
metaphor, without the clarification of which our question 
cannot be answered.
In proposing a thinking experience with George's poem, 
Heidegger first differentiates his practice of reading from 
any philosophical one. Since philosophy tends to "force 
the vibration of the poetic saying into the rigid groove of 
a univocal statement," Heidegger asks us to keep away from 
such an dangerous inclination (OW, p. 64). However, this 
seeming depreciation of philosophy does not lead to a 
rejection of philosophical discourse. For it has its own 
particular value and justification different from poetic
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discourse. As such, the distinction between the
philosophical and the poetical is the reflection of the
distinction between sign-words and hint-words. After such
a differentiating warning, Heidegger quotes George's poem
and begins to enter into a thinking dialogue with it.
George's poem "The Word" reads:
Wonder or dream from distant land 
I carried to my country's strand
And waited till the twilit norn 
Had found the name within her bourn--
Then I could grasp it close and strong 
It blooms and shines now the front along...
Once I returned from happy sail,
I had a prize so rich and frail,
She sought for long and tidings told:
"No like of this these depths enfold."
And straight it vanished from my hand,
The treasure never graced my land...
So I renounced and sadly see:
Where word breaks off no thing may be.39
39 Das Wort
Wunder von ferne Oder traum 
Bracht ich an meines Iandes saum
Und harrte bid die graue norn 
Den namen fand in ihrem born--
Drauf konnt ichs greifen dicht und stark 
Nun bluht und gianzt es durch die mark...
Einst langt ich an nach guter fahrt 
Mit einem kleinod reich und zart
Sie suchte lang und gab mir kund:
"So schl&ft hier nichts auf tiefem grund"
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Heidegger's reading of the poem is concerned primarily with 
the last two lines, especially the last one. Therefore, as 
soon as he takes the poem into consideration, he skips all 
proceeding lines and begins to inquire into the meanings of 
the last line, as if all the other lines were crystallized 
into the last one. His reading, which does not claim to be 
scientific, proposes to understand and interpret the other 
lines only in the light of the last one. Here one might 
raise an objection to Heidegger's reading with the question 
of how he can understand the last line without 
understanding the previous lines. Though this objection, 
being based on the circular nature of understanding, is 
valid, it is also problematic, since it again gives rise to 
another related question of where to begin. One is 
destined to begin with only one of the lines, which 
constitute the whole poem: they cannot be discussed 
simultaneously all together. Granted such a nature of a 
circle, Heidegger's practice of reading the poem with the 
last line is not so problematic as it appears. The 
implication of that practice should be found somewhere
Worauf es meiner hand entrann
Und nie mein land den schatz gewann...
So lernt ich traurig den verzicht:
Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht.
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else. If he can begin with any of the lines of the poem, 
Heidegger's particular beginning from the end indicates the 
direction where his experience of the poem is moving. His 
primary concern of the essay leads him to spotlight and 
focus the last two lines while the rest seems to remain in 
the background. As his new title to the essay "The being 
of language--the language of being" suggests, his concern 
is with the relation of word with thing, and his following 
focusing on the last line with the central words "word" and 
"thing" is quite natural.
Since he intends to "bring us face to face with a 
possibility of undergoing a thinking experience with 
language," Heidegger takes the last two lines as the key 
and guide lines (or as metaphor as I will discuss later), 
and proposes a reading in that fashion. If the key lines 
are the last two lines, Heidegger's key words, in addition 
to "word" and "thing" in the last line, include one more 
word "name" in the fourth line. As such, his reading of 
the poem evolves around these guiding lines and words, 
which in turn are supposed to bring to light the meanings 
of the whole poem. To put it in terms of a hermeneutical 
circle, a part (these key words and lines) is supposed to 
explain the whole. If there is such a circle in 
Heidegger's guiding lines and words in their relation to 
the whole poem, it is so in a strange manner. Heidegger
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appears to take the rest of the poem as almost self-evident 
so that their meanings do not reguire such highlightened 
attention as given to the guiding words. While he 
enumerates in detail dictionary meanings of these guiding 
lines and wdrds as a preliminary for their possible 
clarification, Heidegger summarizes the rest of the poem in 
a way that their meanings are not in question.
Nonetheless, the key lines and words remain in the dark, 
like a deep abyss in the whole structure of the poem. If 
he checks dictionary meanings of these key lines, Heidegger 
does so only in order to show that the former do not 
provide any clue to the latter. Therefore, the key lines 
and words are more problematic and more enigmatic then any 
other lines or words. And if they are central words and 
lines in the poem, the center is abysmal and dark.40
If we are particularly concerned with his key words 
and lines, it is because they, though Heidegger does not 
say explicitly, are no other than hint-words, as opposed to 
sign-words of the other words and lines, and because his 
reading shows a process of how one is differentiated from
40 In his reading of Heidegger's reading of George's 
poem "The Word," Robert Bernasconi speaks of Heidegger's 
two different, but compatible readings of the last two 
lines of the poem. Seen from the context of our foregoing 
discussion of sign-words and hint-words, the first reading 
seems to be made on the dimension of sign-words, while the 
second on that of hint-words. See his The Question of 
Language in Heidegger's History of Being, 49-64.
the other. First of all, Heidegger's key words and lines 
indicate to the direction where his thinking is moving. As 
such, his proposal to undergo a thinking experience with 
language leads him to choose and decide these key words. 
This implies that though all words (sign-words) in the poem 
are capable of becoming key words (hint-words), only a few 
of them are appointed as such. The difference between 
hint-words and sign-words then is not something inherent 
within the nature of these words: the difference depends on
the way of reading. The unbroken continuity between hint-
words and sign-words is broken only on the level of 
reading. It is therefore on the horizon of reading that 
hint-words are differentiated from sign-words. And this 
differentiating act of reading is partly due to the very 
nature of a circle, that is, a part and whole relation.
The whole, which reading itself cannot grasp, is always 
constructed by a part's relation to the projected whole on 
which reading is going on. And the part chosen by the act 
of reading becomes a leading guide, which in turn
instigates a journey into the whole.
Heidegger's proposal to transform sign-words into 
hint-words in the act of backtracking thinking therefore 
does not mean a wholesale transformation. If all words in 
George's poem are taken as hint-words, the poem itself 
would turn out to be chaotic, and thus cannot initiate a
thinking experience. In a way that seeing involves focus 
and background in Husserl's phenomenology, reading is 
moving on the horizon of problematic hint-words which are 
given in the context of surrounding unproblematic sign- 
words. The latter ground the former, and allow it to swing 
to and fro. Thus the hint-words are grounded on the sign- 
words, not only in that the latter provide context to the 
former, but also in that the former themselves are the 
latter. However, though grounded on the surrounding sign- 
words whose meanings appear to be self-evident, hint-words 
function in a way of destructing that pre-given ground. 
Hint-words move into the silence of time-space, and 
therefore what they say cannot be what they mean. As such, 
this part (hint-words), though given in a hermeneutic 
circular structure, does not return to the projected whole 
of the sign-words which ground it. Hint-words carry the 
other surrounding sign-words into their journey into their 
original relation with things.
To undergo an experience with language is to follow 
the movement of hint-words, which in turn follow the trace 
of the withdrawing things. Heidegger's essay itself is a 
demonstration of how patiently and thoughtfully he follows 
in the path of these hint-words. In thinking of "word, 1 
"thing," or "name," he quite often leaves the poem as a 
whole behind and strands himself in the realm of the
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mysterious relation between them. However, this seeming
turning away from the poem in order to turn to the guiding
hint-words appears to be rather a more essential turning
back to the poem itself. It is because the poem itself for
Heidegger is constituted of nothing other than "the
mysteriousness of that relation [of word to thing], which
reveals itself as mystery ..." (OW, p. 79). In order to
experience the mystery of the relation, that is, in order
to return to the meaning of the poem as a whole, one, it
seems, has to leave the poem for guiding words, as the poet
has to renounce his former relation to language for the
sake of experiencing the being of language. Heidegger
explains this dialectic of leaving and returning in terms
of the nature of way [Weg]:
it [way] leads us only to where we already are. The 
'only' here does not mean a limitation, but rather 
points to this way's pure simplicity. The way allows 
us to reach what concerns us, in that domain where we 
are already staying. Why then, one may ask, still 
find a way that at the same time we are not there, 
because we ourselves have not yet properly reached 
what concerns our being, not even approached it. The 
way that lets us reach where we already are, 
differing from all other ways, calls for an escort 
that runs far ahead. That escort is implied in the 
key words ... (OW, p. 93).
When one reads the poem, he, instead of listening to the
speaking of language, finds only common meanings in it.
Though one is already in the saying of the poem, he is so
in an inappropriate way. However, it does not mean that
the speaking of language in the poem totally ceases to
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speak, since that speaking leaves some trace behind it. In 
order to restore oneself to the speaking of language, one 
has to follow that trace of withdrawing language along with 
the guide of hint-words. This is no other than a returning 
to the essence of the poem.41
If language is not nothing nor a thing, but a wide 
swinging between the two extremes, it then can be either a 
vacuity of common language or a genuine saying. Heidegger 
in Being and Time contrasts authentic discourse (discourse 
of conscience) to inauthentic discourse (idle talk). 
According to Being and Time, Heidegger's authentic 
discourse is totally silent, while its opposite is a 
continuous talk. Since between the two lies no bridge to 
connect the abyss and authentic discourse is the death of 
inauthentic discourse, Heidegger could not develop any 
further the possibility of speaking authentic discourse.
41 Here I do not want to raise a question about the 
legitimacy of Heidegger's reading strategy. His reading 
seems not to be faithful to the poem itself as a whole, and 
reads too much into it to the extent that the poem is 
estranged from itself. But it should be remembered that 
Heidegger's goal of reading is not to read correctly, but 
to read essentially, as he distinguises what is correct 
[Richtiges] from what is essential [Wesenhafte] (98). 
Therefore, Heidegger's reading of George's poem can be said 
to resembles with Kant's reading of Plato, which "would 
have to get a straight F," but "has creatively transformed 
Plato's doctrine of ideas" (WC, p. 77). For a fine 
analysis of the "marginal character" of Heidegger's 
reading, see John Sallis, Soacinas of Reason and 
Imagination: in Texts of Kant, Fichete, Hegel, fn. 2, 163-
64.
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But now in Heidegger's conception of language in On the Wav 
to Language, the seeming abyss between authentic and 
inauthentic discourse is bridged by guide words, and the 
former is allows to find its voice. This shift in 
Heidegger's conception of language is partially due to his 
growing interest with poetry, and due to the following 
insight into a discourse radically other than that of 
scientific or philosophical language. This authentic 
discourse is poetic discourse, which instigates a journey 
into the Stillness of things, silence or death of common 
language (within the context of Being and Time): "As 
language falls apart, contact with being is 
reestablished."42 In a way that one expects death or 
nothingness only in order authentically to return to the 
world to which one is thrown, one leaves behind the 
commonly understood meanings of words in the poem and along 
with the guide of hint-words enters into the region of the
42 Karsten Harries, "Metaphor and Transcendence," in 
On Metaphor, 88. In discussing this dual moments of the 
falling apart of language and the advent of being, Harries 
relies on Hugo von Hofmannsthal's essay "Lord Chandon 
Letter," which describes such moments by a metaphor of "a 
half-filled pitcher," "an epiphany of transcendence." 
Harries goes on to say that "The pursuit of presence has to 
make the poet's progress a journey towards silence," and 
quotes Mallarm6: "poem should be silent, white" (76) . Such 
a poetic desire for silence and stillness is found even in 
T. S. Eliot's Burnt Norton; "Only by the form, the 
pattern,/ Can words or music reach/ The stillness, as a 
Chinese jar still/ Moves perpetually in its stillness"
(121) .
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mysterious relation between words and things, but only in 
order to return to the poem.
Heidegger's turning away from the sign-words and 
turning toward hint-words underlies the distinction between 
assertion [Aussage] and Saying [Sage] . The 1 Aus1 in 
Aussage, as signifying the outward movement from the 
inside, or completing or concluding of certain state of 
affairs, implies a historical determination of Sage. As 
1 Aus1 signifies a one actualization of diverse 
potentialities of something, Aussage for Heidegger is a 
metaphysical destination of Sage in the Western history of 
thinking. This destined movement of Sage into Aussage 
coincides with the historical transformation of to ti estin 
into "nature" or essentia and finally as the concept, or 
with the historical destination of Aletheia into logos, 
reason, representation or will. As such, Sage as showing 
in early Greek thinking has come to the metaphysically 
determined destination, Aussage as assertion or sign-words. 
Assertion is, therefore, a metaphysical conception of 
language, thus being grammatical and logical. If all these 
historically determined paths of Aletheia. to ti estin, or 
Sage are taken into consideration, Heidegger's attempt at 
backward thinking is no doubt an attempt to go beyond logic 
and grammar so that language can disengage itself from the
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metaphysical subjugation of assertion. Therefore, when he 
discusses metaphor, Heidegger first has to situate it in 
the context of metaphysics before finding its authentic 
dimension of Saying and hint-words.
Heidegger in "The Nature of Language" finds the 
metaphysical foundation of metaphor in Aristotle's 
conception of language in On Interpretation. As Heidegger 
briefly formulates, Aristotle sees that "the sounds are 
signs of mental experiences, and these are the signs of 
things" (OW, p. 97). Here the linguistic structure of 
signs is based on mental representation of things so that 
when one speaks it (the sensuous side of language) is 
mediated by mental representation (the non-sensuous spirit 
of language). Heidegger finds this division of the sensuous 
and the non-sensuous to be metaphysical, and the division 
as such does not do justice to the unity between the two.43 
Heidegger demonstrates his objection to that division with 
the melody and rhythm of language, which reminds of "the 
way of speaking" in Being and Time: "It is just as much a 
property of language to sound and ring and vibrate, to
43 As one of the reasons for the unity of the sensuous 
and the non-sensuous, Heidegger in Per Satz vom Grund as 
well as in Being and Time (207) points out the fact that we 
always hear words as words, not as pure physical sound, 
even when we fail to understand them. As for Per Satz vom 
Grund, See Ronald Bruzina's translation in his "Heidegger 
on Metaphor and Philosophy," 187, and also Jean Greisch's 
discussion of it in ”Les Mots et Les Roses," 440.
hover and tremble, as it is for the spoken words of 
language to carry a meaning” (OW, p. 98). Since the melody 
and rhythm of speaking as in song is also part of its 
content, the rigorous distinction of the sensuous and the 
non-sensuous cannot be sustained. Heidegger's critic of 
that metaphysical distinction, however, is not to be taken 
as a total repudiation of the distinction. It has its own 
validity and right: "the tradition remains rich in truth" 
(OW, p. 96). Here what Heidegger suggests in that 
criticism is that the distinction, though valid in itself, 
is not original, but something destined by metaphysics and 
thus contained within it. It is in this context that for 
the task of backtracking thinking that distinction is to be 
overcome.
The task of overcoming the metaphysical distinction 
between the sensuous and the non-sensuous demands a 
thoroughgoing rethinking of the literal language, which is 
logical and grammatical. For Heidegger, this rethinking is 
essentially the problem of spatiality. If the dual 
distinction of the sensuous and non-sensuous is based on 
the distinction between the visible and the invisible, and 
the outside and the inside, it gives rise to further 
divisions, when it is applied to space. According to the 
metaphysical notion of space, “the measurement of the 
lengths...are always taken according to a yardstick by
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which, along which, the number of units in the measured 
stretch is counted out" (OW, p. 102). Here the unit of a 
visible and sensuous yardstick measures the accordingly 
visible and sensuous space, which is therefore measurable, 
and then besides whether things are near or far away. This 
measurement by yardstick in turn gives rise to the 
compartmentalization of space into different regions where 
gods, man, animals or plants have their assigned dwellings. 
The unmeasurably separated distance lies between the earth 
and the heaven or the sky, as the distance between the 
divinity and the mortal. This compartmentalized space is 
also the space of logical order and grammar. In the same 
way that the sensuous is not the non-sensuous, the earth is 
not the sky, nor men gods. In the compartmentalized space, 
the earth is hopelessly separated away from the sky and men 
from gods. Whereas gods belong to the category of the 
divinity, men belong to another category of the mortal. 
Within the metaphysical order, discourse has to be in 
agreement with such categorical differentiation.44 If
44 Ronald Bruzina rightly observers that the 
metaphorical transferance presupposes "basic Aristotelian 
distinctions (e.g., the categories and the ultimate genera 
of substance, not to mention most importantly the division 
of his treatise according to orders of subject matter, such 
as logic, physics, study of the soul, study of being, 
etc.)." See "Heidegger on the Metaphor and Philosophy,"
194.
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discourse breaks this order, it is designated by
metaphysics as metaphorical.
With this preliminary discussion of metaphysical
space, now I will return to Heidegger's reading of a
certain passage of Hdlderline's poem "Bread and Wine,"
which elicits the former's comment on metaphor. As George
does in "The Word," Hdlderline in this poem is, at least
according to Heidegger, concerned with the relation between
words and things. The poem "Bread and Wine" accordingly
contains within itself guiding key words "name" and "word"
as in "The Word."
Such is man; when the wealth is there, and no 
less than a god in 
Person tends him with gifts, blind he remains, 
unaware.
First he must suffer; but now he names his most 
treasured
possession,
Now for it words like flowers leaping alive he 
must find.45
In a similar way that resembles his reading of George's 
poem, Heidegger here focuses on the last metaphorical 
line.46 While he seeks a way to understand that metaphor, 
he quotes a comment on the same line by Gottfried Benn:
45
So ist der Mensch; wenn da ist das Gut, und es sorget mit
Gaaben
Selber ein Gott fur ihn, kennet und sieht er es night. 
Tragen muS er, zuvor; nun aber nennt er sein Liebstes, 
Nun, nun mussen dafur Worte, wie Blumen, entstehn.
46 Heidegger treats simile as metaphor
"This 'like' [wie] is always a break in the vision, it 
adduces [es holt haran], it compares, it is not a primary 
statement . . ., " it is a flagging of the tension of language 
[ein Nachlassen der sprachlichen Spannung], a weakness 
[Schwache] of creative transformation" (OW, p. 100}.
Though he quotes Benn's comment in order to distinguish his 
interpretation of metaphor from Benn's, Heidegger does not 
intend to put into question the validity of Benn's. Benn's 
interpretation for Heidegger occupies its right position 
within the metaphysical order. As for Benn, he takes the 
metaphysical spatial order for granted, and defines 
metaphor accordingly. Since words do not belong to the 
same spatial order with flowers, their combination is by 
way of metaphor. The different regions, though separated 
unbridgeably from one another, are mediated by a figurative 
convention and thus are brought together only 
metaphorically. As such, the last line for Benn cannot be 
taken as a primary statement--which implies the fact that 
the distinction between the metaphorical and the literal 
brings about another distinction between the secondary and 
the primary statement. According to Benn's interpretation, 
the poet, when he is unable to move from one region to 
another, calls for for aid from Hermes, who crosses 
different regions. Like the ancient Greek god Hermes, the 
function of metaphor for Benn lies in breaking and crossing
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the different regions in the compartmentalized space. 
However, this interpretation of metaphor presupposes the 
metaphysical concept of space, to which Heidegger's 
criticism of Benn is directed.
Benn's' interpretation of metaphor is valid only on the 
horizon of sign-words, assertion, and metaphysics. While 
admitting this interpretation, Heidegger proposes to turn 
our attention to another horizon of language. If hint- 
words are a to and fro swinging movement between words and 
things, they, as discussed before, move in non-metaphysical 
space, that is, time-space. For Heidegger, this non- 
metaphysical space, which can never be measured by the unit 
of the yardstick, is the space of the fourfold. If 
Heidegger wants to go beyond the rigid distinction between 
the sensuous and the non-sensuous, it is because they, 
though are separated, are still held in unity, which 
metaphysics forgets in its tendency for differentiation.
In the likewise manner, the seeming separation of the 
earth, the sky, the divinity, and the mortals (in our 
representational and metaphysical thinking) is still held 
in unity. Accordingly, if Hermes crosses different 
regions, it is due to the unity of the fourfold. The 
crossing of Hermes is not by breaking the boundaries of the 
compartmentalized space, but by finding and traveling 
within their unity. When metaphor is considered in this
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context of the fourfold, "a 'break in the vision' [is] but 
the awakening of the largest views; nothing is 'adduced' 
here, but on the contrary the word is given back into the 
keeping of the source of its being...no lack here of a 
'primary statement' [but] its inception" (OW, p. 100).47 
Thus metaphor for Heidegger carries metaphysics beyond 
itself into the mysterious space of the fourfold, as hint- 
words carry sign-words into the unknown region of things.
Heidegger's non-metaphysical interpretation of 
metaphor is not only proposed for his reading of 
Hblderlin's poem, but also for our reading of his 
discourse. It is needless to say that his discourse is 
woven with the matrix of metaphor. Before he discusses 
metaphor, Heidegger, for instance, describes the relation 
of mouth, the body, and the earth in a way that it verges 
on poetry:
But the mouth is not merely a kind of organ of the 
body understood as an organism--body and mouth are 
part of the earth's flow and growth in which we 
mortals flourish, and from which we receive the 
soundness of our roots...Language is the flower of 
the mouth. In language the earth blossoms toward the 
bloom of the sky (OW, pp. 98-99).
Here Heidegger's language is no doubt a blatant violation
of the logic of metaphysics, and thus is non-sensical from
47 Jean Greisch gives a fine analysis of these 
Heidegger's characterizations of Holderlin's metaphor, and 
remarks that they are the very non-metaphysical being of 
metaphor ("Les Mots et Les Roses," 443-44).
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the logical point of view. All the differentiated order to 
things are broken and all seem to put into a chaotic 
melting pot, which annihilates all individuality. Language 
is rendered to be the flower of the mouth, which in return 
blooms like flowers. By undoing the differentiated order 
between language, flower, and mouth, this sentence seems to 
reduce all into one: language=the flower=the mouth. This 
equation transforms all words into a grand system of 
tautology.48 In the unity of the fourfold, all words are
48 By the grand system of tautology I mean a mystic 
thinking that all differentiated sublunary phenomena of the 
world can be reduced into One, God, or Unity. Since all 
phenomena are supposed to participate to this Oneness, the 
former without exception share a certain degree of the 
latter, which thus serves as a common denominator for the 
former. If these various phenomena are conceived from the 
perspective of this Oneness, their difference comes to 
disappear and they are transformed into the same.
One of the most dramatic manifestations of this grand 
system of tautology is Buddhism's doctrine of 
transmigration. According to that doctrine, every thing, 
including man, is put into the circle of transmigration so 
that the differentiated present order of the world is only 
temporary. In his forer lives, a man, for instance, might 
have been a tree, a rabbit, flower, an ant,... ad infinum: 
theoretically speaking, he can be everything: "When we 
scrutinise our daily experiences, we realise that we have 
here everything we could experience by going through an 
indefinitely long period of transmigration. Every shade of 
feeling we have while on earth finds its counterpart 
somewhere in the heavens or in the hells or in some 
intermediate realms . . . .1 Accordingly, in the doctrine of 
Buddhism all are conceived as brothers and sisters. They 
are one, and all their present differentiated forms do not 
have much sifnificance. See Daisetz T. Suzuki, Mysticism: 
Christian and Buddhist, 88.
In suggesting a certain relation between Heidegger's 
thinking of the fourfold and the grand system of tautology, 
I am not identifying them. I just want to indicate some 
danger inherent in Heidegger's thinking of fourfold. At
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unified into one word. And if all are one, we are free to 
say anything without falling into the danger of 
contradiction. This is an absolute metaphorical freedom.
No doubt, Heidegger's language as in the above quotation 
cannot escape from such a danger of a grand system of 
tautology, which seems to be the inevitable consequence of 
the fourfold. By going back to the state of language 
before differentiation, Heidegger seems to destroy the 
system of language and then to render communication 
impossible. Considering the metaphoric nature of his 
discourse, this in turn is the problem of metaphor too. 
Since metaphor is not bound to logic and grammar of 
language, it may be free to say anything without any 
constraint; it can unbind all rules of language and thus 
move in the oneness of all words. Therefore, the problem
this point, it may be observed that this danger is the 
danger inherent within the Romantic poets' and New Critics' 
conception of metaphor, metaphor as the unifying and 
totalizing function of poetry. As Murray Krieger explains 
in A Reopening of Closure, metaphor for New Critics was 
"the mystifying movement beyond difference," which 
"absorbes the others as it dissolves all distinctions into 
the world (and the world of language) ... as identity"
(59). With the advent of deconstruction in America, such a 
danger of metaphoric annihilation of all difference has 
been undermined by de Man's rhetorical deconstruction of 
metaphor which converts a unifying metaphor into a 
disruptive metonymy: "the rhetorically self-conscious 
reading puts into question the authority of metaphor as a 
paradigm of poetic language...metaphor becomes a blind 
metonymy." See his Allegories of Reading, 102.
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of how to understand Heidegger's discourse is also the 
problem of how to interpret metaphor.
However, the danger of Heidegger's language to fall 
into a grand system of tautology is real only when it is 
conceived from the metaphysical perspective. Heidegger 
takes pains to defend himself from such a possible 
misunderstanding. First of all, the "is" in the sentence 
"Language is the flower of the mouth" is not the "is" of 
assertion. While "is" of assertion is an equation of the 
two, thus erasing their difference, Heidegger's "is" is not 
that of equation or identity, but of sameness: "In identity 
difference disappears. In the Same difference appears"
(ID, p. 38). "Is" is a hint-word, not a sign-word. "Is" 
therefore implies an openness of one to another while they 
preserve their own difference. To put it in terms of 
spatiality, "is" indicates a neighborhood or nearness 
between those which are connected by it, but not an 
annihilation of their distance.49 In conjunction with such 
a neighborhood between things that are connected by "is," 
Heidegger proposes to reconsider the nature of metaphor, 
and to save it from its traditional subjugation to 
metaphysics. This proposal is also a measure to defend his
49 See On the Wav to language. 102-106, and "The 
Thing," in Poetry. Language. Thought.
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metaphorical discourse from reducing it into an absurd 
oneness or to the preexisting order of metaphysics.
Therefore, when Heidegger condemns metaphor, this 
condemnation is meant only for a metaphysical 
interpretation of metaphor: "It would mean that we stay 
bogged down in metaphysics if we were to take the name 
Hdlderlin gives here to "words, like flowers" as being a 
metaphor" (OW, p. 100). As we have discussed already, the 
metaphysical space is defined in terms of yardstick 
measurement, and is thus divided into many different 
regions. This metaphysically ordered space gives rise to a 
categorical distinction, such as that of the sensuous and 
the non-sensuous or that of the mortals and the divinity. 
From the perspective of metaphysics, metaphor ignores and 
destroys these spatial distinctions and categories, since 
it does not obey the rules and principles governing the 
space. In order to protect itself from such a threat, 
metaphysics, according to our discussion of the closed 
totality and metaphor in the previous chapter, has to 
appropriate even metaphor into itself, whose task is 
accomplished by way of interpretation. If metaphor in 
Greek is a movement to cross and transfer, thus a movement 
from the metaphysical order to a non-metaphysical, that 
stepping beyond or crossing movement of metaphor then has 
to be controlled and put back within metaphysics. In the
metaphoric phrase "words, like flowers," for example, the 
former is non-sensuous, but the latter is sensuous. And 
the words belong to the region of humanity whereas flowers 
to that of the earth or the plants. According to the order 
of metaphysics, "words" therefore cannot be brought 
together with "flowers"; the latter is carried over into 
another different region, which is not compatible with it. 
Hence this misplaced word "flowers" has to be brought back 
to its original region of the earth and the plants.
However, this sending back of "flowers" into its original 
region leaves behind it a void in the phrase "words, like 
flowers." To replace this void is called an interpretation 
of metaphor; the void is filled with some non-sensuous word 
corresponding to the non-sensuousness of "words." If 
metaphor carries over some words beyond metaphysical order, 
metaphysics carries it back by way of interpretation. As 
such, metaphor is, as Heidegger says, "bogged down in 
metaphysics."
The metaphysical interpretation of metaphor as 
described by Heidegger is made on the horizon of sign- 
words. As in George's or Hdlderline's metaphor, some words 
are taken out of their linguistic and relational context of 
signification, and become hint-words in order to travel 
into their original relation with things named by them,
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which dwell in nearness to one another in time-space.50 
Without freeing away from the system of language, words 
cannot initiate such a wondering journey. All genuine 
poems thus invite us into that journey. However, if poems 
are perceived within metaphysics, their hint-words, guiding 
us into the original region of the forefold, are turned 
back into sign-words again, so that the journey, though 
initiated once, aborts. All words fall back upon the 
system of linguistic relations, and lose their original 
relation to things. As such, Heidegger warns us against a 
metaphysical interpretation of metaphors, since it blocks 
our openness toward the fourfold, and the mysterious 
relation of things and words. Heidegger's warning against 
metaphysics is also a warning against taking metaphor as a 
rhetorical figure. If metaphor is taken as such, it 
necessarily implies an interpretation to unveil it to find 
its proper meaning. However, metaphor, being much more 
than a rhetorical figure, is hint-words, which initiate our 
journey into the fourfold— which of course does not mean 
that all hint-words are metaphors.
50 The distinction between sign-words and hint-words 
cannot be reduced to that of denotation and connotation. 
Within the context of Heidegger's delineation of words as 
hints, hint-words, I think, encompass both denotation and 
connotation which is the extension of the former.
Heidegger's reading of poems such as George's or 
H61derlin's can be taken as examples of his reading of 
metaphor.. If a metaphysical interpretation of metaphor 
reduces its meaning into a logical statement, Heidegger 
resists such a temptation, and takes the whole poem as 
hint-words, which guide him into a thinking poetic journey 
into the unknown. As such, he always warns himself against 
the possibility of undoing poems by interpretations. In a 
poem as well as in metaphor, meaning is not present, so 
that a reading or interpretation is a waiting journey into 
its meaning. Therefore, the meanings of metaphor and 
poetry cannot be found within the system of language. The 
latter is rather a springboard that throws the former into 
a journey into the language's original relation with 
things. This act of launching is based on the fact that 
language is a system of signification and relation, without 
which language is not language. Thus, Heidegger's reading 
of poetry always starts with checking the dictionary 
meanings of sign-words, and only later leaves them for more 
original meanings. As we cannot think of hint-words 
without sign-words being presupposed, we cannot think of 
the metaphorical without the presupposition of the literal. 
The literal is, therefore, not the Other of the 
metaphorical. In a similar way that common language is the 
worn-out poem, the literal is used-up metaphors. However,
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this does not mean that the metaphorical is more primordial 
than the literal; on the contrary, they coexist.51 If the 
literal is taken as worn-out metaphor, the former is the 
oblivion of metaphor's more radical possibilities. And if 
they have to coexist despite their differentiation, it is 
because language always withdraws with the moment of 
unconcealment. The literal is the unconcealment of 
language, while the metaphorical is its withdrawing. In 
terms of Heidegger's bipartite distinction of the being of 
works of art in "The Origin of the Work of Art," the 
literal is the world and the metaphorical is the earth.52 
Here the unconcealment of language is an invitation into 
its withdrawing, as the literal is the invitation into the 
metaphorical. To put it in terms of Being and Time, if the 
literal is the Dasein's fallen mode of being and idle talk,
51 My discussion of the literal as the forgetting of 
the metaphorical is not to be confused with a metaphorical 
etymologism as Nietzsche's coin metaphor implies. What I 
wish to prove is that the literal is not the residue of the 
metaporical which undergoes a historical decay; metaphor 
does not historically precede the literal. It seems that a 
naive etymologism easily falls into a romantic conception 
of pristine language, as well represented in Ralph Waldo 
Emerson's essay "The Poet": "The etymologist finds the 
deadest word to have been once a brilliant picture.
Language is fossil poetry...language is made up of 
images,..., which have long ceased to remind us of their 
poetic origin. But the poet names the thing because he 
sees it ...." See Emerson's Essays. 275-76.
52 Gerald Bruns explains such an earth and world 
dimension of art in terms of Orphic and Hermetic character. 
See Heidegger's Estrangements, 35-42.
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the metaphorical may be its ecstatic possibility of death; 
metaphor swings between idle talk and silence. Heidegger's 
reading of poems therefore always lead us into this radical 
possibility of impossibility, into the unknown region of 
the fourfold.
If the metaphorical is constantly in danger of falling 
into silence and nothing, it is because it destroyes the 
established order within metaphysics. If the literal is 
moving within the metaphysical order, the metaphorical by 
such a destruction constitutes a returning to the essence 
of metaphysics and of the literal. The movement of the way 
for Heidegger lies in leaving only in order to return to 
where one is already. Heidegger's reading of poems and 
metaphor shows such a dual moments of way-making movement 
and backtracking thinking. If metaphor suspends the pre­
existing order of language, it goes toward a more 
fundamental possibility of language, which is the Stillness 
and silence. While the literal is bound to the present 
totality of signification, the metaphorical as hint-words 
disentangle themselves from totality and moves toward its 
nullification in order to find its real essence.
Therefore, the being of metaphor as hint-words is centered 
on Heideggerian ecstatic temporality. Seen from that 
context, the present (the sign-words) serves only as a 
point of departure for the future and the having-been (the
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hint-words initiating the backtracking movement). The 
present functions as an invitation to the future and the 
having-been, and for it to be valid it has to filled by 
what is other than itself. In the likewise manner, the 
literal as sign-words are conceived as the form to contain 
the metaphorical as hint-words. As the metaphysical 
spatiality was overcome by the guide of hint-words and 
metaphor in our foregoing analysis of the non-metaphysical 
space, the presence-centered metaphysics now is replaced by 
the ecstatic unity of temporality with its priority of the 
future and the having-been.
From the perspective of the non-metaphysical 
spatiality and temporality as rendered by Heidegger, the 
relation of the metaphorical and the literal is also to be 
considered. If language is both unconcealment and 
concealment in that Heideggerian time-space, language is 
both literal and metaphorical. Whereever there is 
language, literal and metaphorical take place 
simultaneously— which is the truth of language. Therefore, 
if they are separated from one another, it results in 
thwarting the happening of truth; being separated into the 
opposite poles of the literal (language as a relational 
system) and the metaphorical (language as a non-system), 
language is either all unconcealment or all concealment. 
Metaphysics for Heidegger is such a violent separation of
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the co-happening of concealment and unconcealment of truth 
of Being, which in turn results in the separation of the 
literal and the metaphorical. Within metaphysics, the 
mysterious unity or neighborhood between them is totally 
forgotten, and the metaphorical is subjugated into the 
literal. Language as such is understood and interpreted in 
terms of the literal and logical language paradigm, with 
the consequence that language is brought too near to man so 
that its withdrawing nature falls into oblivion.
Metaphysics is one particular misdirected interpretation of 
the inseparable unity of the literal and the metaphorical.
If metaphysics gives order and hierarchy between the 
literal and the metaphorical, it then follows that the 
former is a particular historical destination of the 
latter. When they are interpreted metaphysically, one of 
them appears to be subjugated to the other so that the 
former becomes ancillary. However, that order is assigned 
by metaphysics, and their original non-metaphysical 
relation can be found in the notion of Heideggerian dif­
ference, as Heidegger discusses in his essay "Language."
In order to account for the nature of the inseparable unity 
between world and thing or (between literal and 
metaphorical), Heidegger uses a Greek term, diaphora: "The 
intimacy of the dif-ference is the unifying element of the 
diaphora. the carrying out that carries through... The dif-
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ference carries out world in its wordling, carries out 
things in their thinging. Thus carrying them out, it 
carries them toward one another" (OW, p. 202) .53 This
diaphora is a unifying word of the metaphorical concealment 
and the literal unconcealment.54 While it gives rise to 
their differentiation, it also unifies them in their 
intimacy. Whereever there is language, there always 
happens the difference between the metaphorical and the 
literal.
In this respect, the traditional order between 
metaphysics and metaphor, as well summarized by Heidegger's 
brief remark that metaphor is contained within metaphysics, 
can be reversed. This is to say, metaphysics, as one 
particular system of language, is one historical
53 In the same text Heidegger defines dif-ference also 
in terms of Ereignis. dimension, and pain [Schmerz] or 
Kiss. Though they are important in understanding 
Heidegger's thinking of language, I avoided their 
discussion here lest this chapter be too complex. However, 
it should be observed that by multiplying terms for dif­
ference, he implies that there is no proper language for 
dif-ference as there is no proper word for Being. Dif­
ference along with other terms describing them are guiding 
hint-words.
54 I agree with Andras Sandor's analysis of the 
relation between metaphor and diaphora. In his essay 
"Metaphor or Diaphor," Sandor makes the following 
observation: "Language is neither literal nor metaphoric; 
it is diaphoric. Only speech can establish literals and 
metaphors, or rather only people can establish them in 
discourse." And he goes on to say that "Strictly speaking 
there is no meaning prior to the division into literal and 
figurative" (119, 120) .
destination of the original dif-ference between the literal 
and the metaphorical. While metaphor is a crossing and 
going-beyond movement, it takes a special form and 
direction in metaphysics (crossing over the physics in 
Greek). This metaphysical determination of metaphor, 
though it has its root in metaphora, goes back to its 
origin and interprets the latter in its own terms, thus the 
temporal order of before and after being destroyed. As 
such, the multidirectional going-beyond and crossing 
movement of metaphor is confined in a synecdochical way 
within the crossing movement between the sensuous and the 
non-sensuous; the whole is interpreted in terms of a part 
and not the other way around. Because of this 
synecdochical representation of the difference between the 
literal and the metaphorical by metaphysics, the nature of 
the difference itself has never been seriously questioned 
in the history of Western thinking. The essence of 
metaphor, it can be said, has been seen from the wrong end 
of a telescope.55 Though metaphysics is less original than
ss This metaphor of a telescope has a theological 
implication, which is, I think, true of Heidegger's 
writings. One end of the telescope is the region of 
divinity, while the other that of humanity. As seen in his 
"Letter on Humanism," Heidegger is not humanistic in its 
traditional sense. If man has been seen from the 
perspective of humanity, he proposes to consider man from 
the opposite perspective, that is, of Being or of God (in 
terms of theology). Such a reversal is also his notion of 
backtracking thinking, which he applies to metaphysics. 
Backtracking goes to the origin of metaphysics, and sees
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metaphor, the former has been taken as more original than 
the latter, and instead of the former being interpreted in 
terms of the latter, the contrary interpretation has 
dominated the history of metaphor and metaphysics. Such a 
history has determined also the relation between philosophy 
and literature. What Heidegger proposes in his overcoming 
metaphysics is, therefore, to destruct this metaphysical 
order and to think and interpret metaphysics in terms of 
poetry and metaphor.
V
Now before closing this chapter, I will briefly 
summarize it by mapping out the itinerary of metaphor as 
implied by Heidegger's writings on poetry. Fundamentally, 
this itinerary is the movement of the hermeneutical circle 
and way [Weg], that is, to return to where one is already. 
In his essay on Hdlderlin "Remembrance of the Poet," 
Heidegger explains it in terms of leaving home and 
returning home, the dual movements which constitute and 
give rise to the being of poetry. Heidegger's other essay 
on Trakl's poetic work, entitled "Language in the Poem," 
discusses the same circular movement in a way that suits
the metaphysical destination of Being from the perspective 
of the origin.
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our purpose better, though he does not mention metaphor 
explicitly.
Heidegger begins "Language in the Poem" with one line 
of Trakl's poems "Something strange is the soul on the 
earth," and inquires into the meaning of the soul's 
journey. What is implied in that line is the enigmatic 
relation of the soul to the earth: the soul no doubt 
belongs to the earth, but in a way that does not belong to 
it.56 Though the soul is within the earth, the former is a 
stranger to the latter. As such, the earth, though 
contains the soul in itself, cannot define or determine the 
nature of the soul. Such a strange relation of the soul to 
the earth is due to the fact that the earth has been 
disintegrating and decomposing, thus moving far away from 
its original nature. One example of the earth's 
disintegration is human kind: "the curse of the decomposing 
kind is that the old human kinship has been struck apart by 
discord among sexes, tribes and races" (OW, p. 170).
Though the human kind was held in unity in the origin, they 
now are born differentiated and determined sexually, 
racially, and linguistically so that their unity is 
forgotten. Therefore, the soul remains as a stranger to
56 This is another expression of the Heidegger's 
conception of Dasein's authentic being in the world as 
uncanniness [Unheimlichkeit] in Being and Time.
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that historical tendency of differentiation, and instead 
aims at the original unity of the human kind.
Those who follow the path of the soul, strangers,
therefore, have to part from loved ones who belong to the
earth too inseparably, and then have to "loosen [their]
bonds and slowly slip away" (OW, p. 171). As Heidegger
explains by Trakl's poem, the wondering stranger is "he who
is apart" (OW, p. 172). Being separated and freed away
from the earth, the stranger can move into the earliness
before the earth's decomposition, and can unfold true
undifferentiated nature of human beings, with a vision of
another beginning. According to Heidegger, such an act of
backtracking and a vision of another beginning constitutes
the very being of Trakl's poetic work:
It speaks by answering to that journey upon which the 
stranger is leading on ahead. The path he has taken 
leads away from the old degenerate generation. It 
escorts him to go under in the earliness of the 
unborn generation that is kept in store. The 
language of the poetry whose site is in apartness 
[Abgeschiedenheit] answers to the home-coming of 
unborn mankind into the quite beginning of its 
stiller nature (OW, p. 191).
In the context of Heidegger's essay "Language in the Poem," 
the soul is metaphor, whereas the earth is the literal 
language.57 Metaphor is related to the literal in a
57 If translated in terms of "Origin of the Work of 
Art," the soul in "Language in the Poem" means "earth," and 
the earth means "world."
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strange way so that the former is both within and without 
the latter. Metaphor is therefore a stranger to the 
literal, and sets itself apart from the latter in order to 
free and separate away from the latter.58 However, this 
separation does not mean an absolute turning away from the 
literal, since the separation is made only in order to 
return to the essence of the latter. If it were not for 
such an separation, metaphor would not move into the 
essence of the literal. The necessity of going back to the 
beginning essence is because of the historical and 
metaphysical destination of the literal; in a similar way 
that man is broken into sexes, tribes and races, the 
literal have been differentiated, systematized, and 
categorized too much and loses its original relation with 
things named by them and the neighborhood of things where 
words move.
The consequence of such a categorical differentiation 
is that the unity of the forefold as well as the unity of 
human kind are forgotten. Being differentiated away, the 
literal forgets that which gives rise to that 
differentiation and that which is differentiating.59
58 In his The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger in 
the same way speaks of such a severing of the work of art 
from humanity (PL, p. 66).
59 This again is the forgetting of dif-ference in the 
literal language, that is, its being different from itself. 
As William Richardson explains, "dif-ference says
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Therefore, within the literal, a man is either American or 
German, either male or female, either black or white. In 
that differentiating system of language, what is really to 
be thought, man as a whole or as a unity, is not thought 
any more. Due to that tendency toward differentiation, it 
is considered to be wrong to say that the American are the 
German, the male are the female, or the black are the 
white. Being separated into sexes, races and tribes, only 
the separated consequence dominates language and thinking 
so that any saying or thinking to the contrary is 
considered to be false.
However, in opposition to that literal tendency, 
metaphor, as stranger to the literal, goes back to the 
origin of the literal and brings back original message to 
the literal for the sake of another beginning of it. When 
that original message is brought, it speaks in a way that 
the literal judges as false. What is judged to be false by 
the literal is what constitutes the original message: the 
American are the German, the male are the female, and the 
white are the black. In judging these sayings false, the 
literal as given in the system of language are unable to 
see that they have their own validity, if seen from the
differentiation, which implies both differentiating and 
differentiated ... [both] the moment of differentiating 
and the moment when the differentiated issue forth as such 
(italic in the original)." See Richardson, Heidegger. 579.
context of the original neighborhood of mankind. Of 
course, it does not mean that the origin can be expressed 
in terms of metaphor: metaphor is on the way toward the 
origin, but is never to be identified with the origin, 
which remains unsayable. As such, the tendency of 
metaphor, quite against that of the literal, is toward the 
death of language or Stillness [Stille]. By going back
to that unsayable origin and then by returning to the 
literal, metaphor prepares another beginning of the 
literal. Metaphor is something strange to the literal, 
since the former can gain the latter only by its wondering 
in apart from the latter. Because of this strangeness of 
metaphor, Heidegger speaks of poetic images as "visible 
inclusion of the alien in the sight of the familiar."60 In 
later works, especially in his book Gelassenheit, Heidegger 
discusses such a metaphorical wondering journey into the 
alien in terms of Galassenheit (letting-be), that is, to 
let oneself be appropriated by the claim of metaphor to 
initiate a journey into the unknown relation with things in 
time-space.61 As Heidegger says already in What is Called
60 And Heidegger continues to say that "The poetic 
saying of images gathers the brightness and sound of the 
heavenly appearances into one with the darkness and silence 
of what is alien. By such sights the god surprises us"
(PL, p. 226).
61 Gelassenheit has been translated into English under 
the title Discourse on Thinking, by John Anderson and Hans 
Freund.
Thinking, man is a sign-word, which already inclines toward 
hint-words, and thus being on the way toward the unknown.
As man in speaking draws toward what withdraws (metaphor), 
he thus follows the traces of withdrawing Being.
CHAPTER THREE 
Derrida and Differance 
Metaphor and Metaphysics
Desiring the exhilarations of changes:
The motive for metaphor, shrinking from 
The weight of primary noon,
The A B C of being,
(Wallace Stevens, "The Motive for Metaphor")
With the careful and reserved opening hypothesis that "it 
may be that universal history is the history of a handful 
of metaphors, 1 in his short essay "The Fearful Sphere of 
Pascal," Jorge Borges proposes to trace this history, the 
history of metaphors of Being, God, or Nature.1 Among the 
handful of metaphors Borges examines, that have determined 
universal history, or to put it in a Heideggerian term, the 
history of Western metaphysics, is the history of the 
"sphere" metaphor. Since the sphere is "the most perfect 
and most uniform figure," as Borges demonstrates it becomes 
a metaphor par excellence to represent Being, God, or 
Nature. At issue here is not the meaning of this metaphor, 
but its force or value which, since its emergence six 
centuries before Christ or even before, has bound all 
descendent thinkers to itself as if it were the very 
divinity itself to attract speculative thinking to its own
1 Labyrinths, 189.
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center. From Parmenides and Plato, through Dante and 
Giordano Bruno, to Pascal, these thinkers could not but 
think of God and Nature with this spatial metaphor, while 
refining and elaborating it. In tracing this curious 
repetition of the same metaphor in the history of Western 
thinking, Borges thus has to conclude his essay that "It 
may be that universal history is the history of the 
different intonations given to a handful of metaphors."2
In his essay on Emmanuel Levinas Jacques Derrida 
quotes Borges' pronouncement on metaphor and universal 
history, and adds his own exegetic intonation to it by way 
of questioning: "Who will ever dominate it [metaphor], who 
will ever pronounce its meaning without first being 
pronounced by it? What language will ever escape it?"3 
For Derrida, if all thinkers from the nascence of 
metaphysics and literature have been bound to some central 
metaphors, it is not because of their intellectual weakness 
of thinking and reasoning, but because of the very nature 
of language. The seemingly simple fact that one uses 
language or thinks with it, it appears, presupposes that 
one enters into certain metaphoricity and is lost there so
2 Ibid., 192.
3 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 92, hereinafter 
cited as WD in the text. The following abbreviations will 
be used for Derrida's texts: MP for Margins of Philosophy;
P for Positions; OG for Of Grammatoloqy; D for 
Dissemination; RT for "The Retrait of Metaphor."
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that he is unable to disengage himself from it insofar as 
he remains within language or he remains human--if humanity 
is defined in terms of capacity for language. The series 
of questions that we would like to ask along with Borges 
and Derrida are: Why do we have to metaphorize God or Being 
spatially in order to think about it, and why do we have to 
employ such specific metaphors like the sphere or the sun, 
and how much do we know or "dominate" the meaning of 
metaphor when we speak metaphorically, and finally what is 
the relation between metaphor and metaphysics?
The questions enumerated above are rhetorical to the 
extent that they can by no means be answered definitely 
and we know at the very moment of asking them that any 
attempt to answer them is destined to be self-defeating to 
the extent that metaphor cannot be dominated. To speak of 
metaphor is always circular in that there is no position 
outside language and therefore a certain degree of 
metaphoricity is always implicated in language and in the 
very act of our question. However, this aporia in the 
discussion of metaphor does not prevent discourse from 
actually taking place; even in the absence of knowledge of 
metaphor we always speak and write about metaphor. This 
can be applied also to Borges' statement about metaphor and 
universal history. Has there ever been universal history? 
Does Borges know what he means by metaphor when he talks
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about it? Despite the disconcerting fact that metaphor 
cannot be dominated, it is always dominated fortunately or 
fortuitously to the extent that it takes place. If the 
aporia of the discourse is transgressed, there may be a 
certain economy behind this transgression, which 
incessantly transforms the aporia into an occasion for 
discursive proliferation. Every different intonation given 
to the sphere metaphor in Borges' essay can be said to be 
an instance that this aporia only contributes to the 
creation of another discourse. An aproia is already a 
transgression.
In asking the seemingly unanswerable questions about 
the relation between metaphor and metaphysics, I want to 
inquire into how economically the aporia of discourse is 
transformed into discourse. This question of economy will 
I elaborate in terms of Derrida's "differance" or "vouloir- 
dire" which enables us to "say the contrary without 
contradiction."4 But the notion of econony will be 
clarified later only when this chapter is fully under way. 
As a point of departure, the present chapter will begin 
with reiterating Heidegger's famous short statement on 
metaphor: “only within metaphysics is there the
4 Derrida says elsewhere: "by the economy of 
differance, they [supplements] confirm the interdict they 
transgress, get around a danger, and reserve an 
expenditure (OG, p. 165)
174
metaphorical" (from Per Satz vom Grund. published in 1957). 
As Borges traces the history of the same sphere metaphor 
with different intonations, I will examine different 
intonations given first by Derrida and then by Ricoeur to 
Heidegger's sentence in order to contextualize and properly 
situate my discussion of the proposed topic.
As with the case of Borges' sentence, the meaning of 
both metaphysics and the metaphorical in Heidegger's is far 
from being clear, since it immediately provokes two 
questions regarding whether there have ever been 
metaphysics and the metaphorical as to deserve their 
distinctive and independent names. However, in spite of or 
thanks to its problematic nature, Heidegger's statement 
generates a series of different intonations on the relation 
between metaphor and metaphysics. Among these different 
intonations, two stand out as especially conspicuous and 
are related to each other in a way of critical responses. 
One of them is Derrida's essay "White Mythology: Metaphor 
in the Text of Philosophy," which was originally published 
in 1971. The other is Ricoeur's examination of both the 
Heidegger's sentence and Derrida's essay in The Rule of 
Metaphor(1975), in a chapter "Metaphor and philosophical 
discourse." Here Ricoeur accuses Derrida of misreading of 
Heidegger, that is, mistaking "Heidegger's restrained
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criticism" for "unbounded 7deconstruction'" {RM, p. 284).5 
Ricoeur's accusation of Derrida motivated the latter to 
defend himself and clarify his reading of Heidegger by 
writing another essay, "The Retrait of Metaphor." The 
different readings of Heidegger by Ricoeur and Derrida are, 
I think, inevitable and already expected from the very 
nature of Heidegger's statement. And it seems that any 
discourse on the relation between metaphor and metaphysics 
tends to be put into a system of displacement and 
replacement, without coming to the center of the question. 
My discussion of Derrida and Ricoeur is therefore not only 
a discussion of their differing notions on metaphor, but 
also a discussion of some problems or economy in the very 
core of their discourse, without which they cannot hope to 
write and speak.
I. From Heidegger to Derrida 
The difference between 
thinking and poetizing
Heidegger condemns metaphysics as the ontology of presence, 
because he conceives metaphysics as the oblivion of the
5 Hereafter Ricoeur's The Rule of Metaphor will be 
cited in the text as RM.
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difference between presencing and present, between being 
and becoming. In order to revive this forgotten 
difference, in. his early writings Heidegger has been 
continuously occupied with the question of ontological 
difference, the difference between Being and beings. Even 
though he later abandons the notion of ontological 
difference, it is only in order to think the difference 
more profoundly and more originally. His later writings 
therefore are directed at a radical re-thinking of 
difference itself, accompanied by his question of the 
nature of language. If thinking always goes hand in hand 
with language, Heidegger's persisting question into 
language and poetry is not surprising, since otherwise the 
difference cannot be thought at all. More fundamental than 
ontological difference seems to be the difference between 
thinking and Being, Being and language, thinking and 
poetizing, and philosophy and literature. In this regard 
the question that we will ask along with Heidegger is: What 
is difference? and another question, which seems to be 
indistinguishable from the former question or perhaps 
identical with it, is what is Being?
In his essay "Language" Heidegger attempts to 
articulate the meaning of difference by using many other 
identical terms such as diaphora, dimension, Ereicmis,
Riss, or Stille. This fertile production of diverse terms
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on the one hand proves the importance of difference, but on 
the other it witnesses the difficulty of thinking that 
notion. Difference for Heidegger is the very locus where 
Being and beings are brought into words and appearance and 
where philosophy and literature are differentiated. Thus 
Heidegger says in "...Poetically Man Dwells":
Poetry and thinking meet each other in one and the 
same only when, and only as long as, they remain 
distinctly in the distinctness of their nature. The 
same never coincides with the equal, not even in the 
empty indifferent oneness of what is merely identical 
... The same ... is the belonging together of what 
differs, through a gathering by way of the 
difference. We can only say "the same" if we think 
difference. It is in the carrying out and settling 
of differences that the gathering nature of sameness 
comes to light. The same banishes all zeal always to 
level what is different into the equal or identical.6
Heidegger here repeats his distinction between sameness and
identity, elaborated in Identity and Difference, to the
effect that difference is irreducible to identity.
However, difference does not belong to the order of
separation or of a mediating relation created out of the
initial separation. The difference between poetry and
thinking being undefinable and subtle, they remain
different despite or thanks to their oneness. As William
Richardson explains, difference may be thought in terms of
two moments of "differentiating and differentiated," "the
moment of differentiating and the moment when the
6 Heidegger, Poetry. Language. Thought. 219.
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differentiated issue forth as such."7 For Heidegger, 
metaphysics is the fascination with the second movement 
(present) while forgetting the first movement (presencing), 
with the consequence that difference between them is not 
thought any more and that difference is reduced to 
identity. Being incapable of thinking difference, 
metaphysics transforms movement into entity, verb into 
noun, non-concept into concept. At the core of the most 
challenging task to go beyond or to think more originally 
of metaphysics is the question of difference, which is 
another way of asking about the truth of Being.
One of the serious consequences of the forgetting of 
difference is the separation of philosophy from poetry, the 
event which might coincide with the commencement of 
metaphysics. According to Heidegger, even though poetry 
and philosophy are inseparable and are held in unity in 
their difference, metaphysics as the oblivion of their 
subtle relation produced a deep chasm between them and 
ended up with separating words from beings. As the result 
of that separation, the question of Being becomes the 
proper realm of philosophy, while poetry concerns itself
7 Richardson, Heidegger, 579. And he goes on to 
explain: "The differentiating must be conceived as unity, 
as one-ness, and the differentiated as necessarily two, or 
as the author will say later, as two-ness. The whole 
process of difference consists in this tension, this muted 
adhesion between unity and duality which is the scission as 
such."
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merely with words: merely because philosophy, itself being 
extralinguistic, can dispense with language, thus poetry 
being reduced into the matter of rhetoric or expression. 
Therefore, the transformation of difference into separation 
brings about another consequence of hierarchical 
evaluation, that is, the simultaneous overvaluation of 
philosophy and devaluation of literature.
Heidegger's calling attention to the difference 
between literature and philosophy can be understood as an 
attempt to save the former from its subordination to the 
latter and to restore them to their original relation.
This attempt is a serious challenge to the traditional 
autonomy of speculative philosophy, which grounds itself 
upon the non-linguistic transcendental realm of the 
thinking and knowing mind: the mind is supposed to depend 
on nothing but itself, with its own intrinsic principles 
and rules not vulnerable to language. Heidegger's 
destruction of the autonomy of philosophy, however, is not 
to be confused with a total destruction of the difference 
between philosophy and literature— which may be a rebellion 
against the history of metaphysics. As seen in the above 
quoted passage from "...Poetically Nan Dwells...," nothing 
can be farther from Heidegger's intention to undo the 
difference between them, for it will do violence to both.
In questioning the difference between literature and
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philosophy, Heidegger thinks of them in terms of Being, 
which holds them in unity despite their genetic difference 
and prevents their metaphysical separation by functioning 
as a center: "Thinking attends to the lighting of Being in 
that it puts its saying of Being into language as the home 
of eksistence. "e What Heidegger has in mind is the happy 
union between literature and philosophy, and saying and 
thinking, in the sense that they are ultimately united by 
Being.
If Heidegger's happy union between philosophy and 
literature is taken into consideration, his condemnation of 
metaphor as belonging to metaphysics is, as I have 
discussed in the last chapter, not a real condemnation but 
a warning against and an indication of a constant danger 
existing on the part of philosophy to dominate literature. 
There is always a certain danger of violating their union 
and subordinating one to the other--the actualization of 
which is the history of Western metaphysics as the 
forgetting of the difference between presencing and 
present. Metaphor at the core of literature can turn upon 
itself in order to destroy its proper domain, literature 
itself. While metaphor belongs to literature, it can be 
transported into another country, philosophy, only in order 
to be seduced by the latter and to become a spy with a
8 Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 239.
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mission to betray the former. Metaphor is located in the 
dangerous border between philosophy and literature.
Another danger of metaphor may be its migration as a spy to 
the kingdom of philosophy in order to subvert, plague, and 
metaphorize the whole kingdom of philosophy.
From the moment that we put into question the 
Heideggerian happy union of difference and bracket off 
Being as a center, we begin to enter into Derrida's "system 
beyond Being."9 My explication of Heidegger's critique of 
metaphor has been made in order to see how ridically 
Derrida transforms Heideggerian questions, which Derrida 
reiterates, such as the notion of difference and the 
relation between literature and philosophy. Derrida asks 
these same questions from a different context and gives 
different intonations to them. In following some threads of 
thought common to both Heidegger and Derrida, I do not hope 
that I can develop Heidegger's thoughts into a more 
advanced form, the very possibility of which would falsely 
presuppose that Derrida's philosophy is an attempt to
9 In charactering Derrida's philosophy (if we can call 
it so), Gaschd names it "A System beyond Being," which is 
also a title of chapter 9 of his The Tain of the Mirror.
As for the discussion of the movement from Heidegger to 
Derrida, see Gasche's essay "Joining the Text: From 
Heidegger to Derrida." While dealing with Derrida's 
translation of Heidegger's term "Entzug” as "retrait” in 
his "The Retrait of Metaphor," Gasche inquires how Derrida 
replaces Heidegger's question of Being with that of text, 
thereby undermining and risking the very word of Being.
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refine or develop his master's. If Derrida can render some 
help in asking these questions again, it is by way of 
resituating them in a context other than Being; his 
questions are not ontological, but, we might say, 
grammatological.
To think of difference without the regulating and 
harmonizing center of Being and to conceive of Being as 
text is Derrida's transformation of Heidegger's fundamental 
ontology into generalized or general writing.10 Though not 
rejecting the Heideggerian question of difference in terms 
of the truth of Being, Derrida carefully suggests that 
"perhaps difference is older than Being itself, " if "Being, 
according to the Greek forgetting [of difference]...has 
never meant anything except beings" (MP, p. 67).
Difference may be more primordial than Being so that the 
former is devoid of a center to hold difference in unity. 
Here Derrida, rather than asserting the primordiality of 
difference over Being, is attempting to read the 
implication of the question of Being, which cannot even be 
thought without difference. As Derrida continues to say, 
what is to be thought is to ask:
10 «The disappearance of that face [noesis, or Being] 
is the movement of differance which violently opens 
writing, or, if one prefers, which opens itself to writing 
and which writing opens for itself...the disppearance...is 
thus the precondition of discourse, taken this time as a 
moment and not as a principle of generalized writing" 
(italic in the original) (D, pp. 167-68).
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There may be a difference still more unthought than 
the difference between Being and beings. We 
certainly can go further toward naming it in our 
language. Beyond Being and beings, this difference, 
ceaselessly differing from and deferring (itself), 
would trace (itself) (by itself)--this differance 
would be the first and lat trace if one still could 
speak, here, of origin and end (MP, p. 67).
According to Derrida, the Heideggerian question of Being 
depends on differance for its possibility, and Being then 
is rather the effect of this differance. Unlike 
Heidegger's difference, differance remains as difference 
without unity, "ceaselessly differing from and deferring 
(itself)." Thus distinguishing his differance from 
Heidegger's difference, Derrida underscores the structural 
impossibility of reducing difference into oneness. For 
Derrida, Heidegger's difference tends to be metaphysical in 
spite of the latter's attempt to avoid it.11 Derrida's 
notion of differance thus can be measured against the 
metaphysical inclination of Heideggerian difference toward 
Hegelian Aufhebung which lifts difference into "the self- 
presence of an onto-theological or onto-teleological 
synthesis" (P, p. 44).
Insofar as Derrida's differance is the deconstruction 
of the self-presence, it poses a fundamental question to 
the meaning of the Heideggerian question of Being and
11 See Gasch6, The Tain of the Mirror, 194-205, esp. 
203, and Derrida's Positions, 9-10.
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difference. What does it mean and signify to ask about 
Being and difference, if they cannot be thought as 
themselves, and what if there is no truth of Being? Even 
though Heidegger conceives thinking of Being as abysmal and 
without any safe ground, he never doubts that such an 
abysmal thinking is to follow the trace of Being and is 
therefore still within the neighborhood of Being. Thus 
thinking for Heidegger is always thinking of Being, even 
granted that Being never comes to light. To the degree 
that thinking is to follow the trace of disappearing Being, 
it knows what it thinks, even though it can never hope to 
thematize and render it logically. If Derrida "attempt[s] 
to locate in Heidegger's text...the signs of a belonging to 
metaphysics," he seems to have in mind such a desire toward 
the truth of Being, Heidegger's nostalgia for pre-Socratic 
philosophy and another beginning. In discourse as well as 
in thinking and speaking, presence for Derrida is immediacy 
of meaning, "the myth of consciousness," that is, the 
speaker knowing exactly what he speaks as self-presence 
(OG, p. 166). If one wants to avoid idle talk, one has to 
know the content of what he is speaking and writing. To go 
back to Heidegger's thinking of Being and difference, 
Heidegger is supposed to know the meaning of his thinking, 
and the question arising here is how it is possible to
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think and know Being and difference if they cannot even be 
thought, since they are not beings.
For Heidegger, the essence of language, which is never 
linguistic, is to enter into experience with it while 
listening to its "ring of stillness."12 Only when we 
change our relation to language and learn to be attentive 
to its silent call to Being, the inadequacy of language as 
a system of signs is overcome and beings are brought into 
words. But again what we have to ask along with Derrida 
is: what if language as a system of signs is not supported 
by the silent center of Being, and if beings are not 
brought to words and to appearance any more? What if 
thinking of Being is only play of words without a center to 
suspend their endless play? For instance, let's consider 
Heidegger's diverse definitions of difference in his essay 
"Language." The question is that of the difficulty of 
thinking of difference, which becomes more serious and more 
grave because it is not difference as signified lexically. 
Lacking a proper word for difference in language, Heidegger 
has to supplement it with many other terms, such as 
diaphora, intimacy in the separation, dimension, Ereignis, 
or Riss. Since none of them does justice to what is to be 
thought, one term is replaced by another, which is then 
replaced by another, and so on, as if these totality of
12 Heidegger, Poetry. Language. Thought. 207.
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supplements and replacements finally succeed in presenting
difference from diverse angles. As I have discussed in the
last chapter, language for Heidegger does not name Being;
it only indicates and hints at Being. Language in
Heideggerian semantics does not mean what it says, with the
imperative that its meaning has to be supplemented by the
truth of Being. In Heideggerian ontology the chain of
supplements and replacements is suspended and is given its
meaning from Being. But Derrida gives an ironical turn to
Heidegger's ontology and finds in the latter's diverse
terms for difference only differance. The chain of
supplements is neither to be totalized, nor to be
dominated, since language does not have a center.
If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not 
because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered 
by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because 
the nature of the field--that is, language and a 
finite language--excludes totalization. This field 
is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of 
infinite substitutions only because it is finite, 
that is to say, because instead of being too large, 
there is something missing from it: a center which 
arrests and grounds the play of substitutions (WD, p.
289) .
The truth and falsity of discourse is replaced by Derrida 
by the play or effect of language. Not being supported by 
a center of Being, discourse becomes the play of 
substitutions; without knowing what it says, it is forced 
to dominate its field by the multiplied substitutions and 
to postpone the impossible emergence of meaning by such
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repetitive substitutions. If there is play instead of 
truth, what then happens to Heidegger's thinking of Being 
and difference?
II. Metaphor
If because of the very structure of language meaning 
cannot be present with saying, the problem of metaphor 
appears to be intrinsic to language. In the system of 
differance the meaning of discourse is continuously 
deferred and differed and metaphor is always present. 
Metaphor as such becomes a persisting concern with Derrida. 
However, Derrida's interest with metaphor is not simply 
because of its negativity, but because of its positive role 
in discourse, as his many essays indicate. If metaphor is 
intrinsic to language, it is also an unavoidable necessity 
in discourse. As Derrida's reading of Heidegger reveals, 
how can Being be thought without ontic metaphors, since 
Being is nothing outside beings? Without having anything 
to provide concrete material for thinking, to question 
Being is abysmal and verges almost on nonsense, and the 
questioner is threatened by the possibility of losing his 
subjectivity, not knowing what he is thinking about.13
13 See Levinas, Totality and Infinity. 142-43.
From this abysmal thinking of nothing to think, one is 
saved by metaphor to think something. Since Being is 
nothing outside ontic beings, Derrida maintains that "it is 
impossible to avoid the ontic metaphor in order to 
articulate Being in language, in order to let Being 
circulate in language" (WD, p. 136). Being, maybe the most 
fundamental concept in the history of Western philosophy, 
can be thought only metaphorically. If that is the case, 
metaphor is the very condition and possibility of ontology 
and metaphysics. Metaphor names a gap between saying and 
meaning and threatens the ideal of presence as the 
disruption of presence. However, in spite of its seeming 
intervention into the transparency of discourse, metaphor 
also comes to the aid of discourse for its realization 
wherever presence is lost or impossible. Metaphor then has 
a strange relation to philosophy, designating both the 
impossibility and the possibility of philosophy.
This strange relation between metaphor and philosophy 
is what Derrida is concerned with in his essays on 
metaphor, such as "White Mythology" and "The Retreat of 
Metaphor." Nevertheless, we cannot hope to expect from 
Derrida any answer to that strange relation.14 As Gasche
14 John Llewelyn comments on Derrida's question of 
metaphor: "What is a metaphor? By now we have learned not 
to expect from Derrida ... an answer to such questions 
which catalogues sufficient and necessary conditions." See 
his Derrida on the Threshold of Sense. 76.
rightly points out, these essays are not attempts to 
develop some coherent theses or concepts about metaphor, 
but questioning inquiries of the difference between 
metaphor and concept.15 If we want to inquire further into
this strange relation, we, therefore, have to read some
implications Derrida's writings involve and develop some 
hints his writings suggest. In developing Derridian 
perspective on metaphor, I will examine his distinction 
between vouloir-dire (commonly translated as "meaning") and 
dire (saying), the distinction which he makes in Of 
Grammatolocrv and Speech and Phenomena and keeps on 
employing in other essays. The importance of that
distinction in my discussion of metaphor will be
immediately perceptible, since metaphor is basically the 
problem of the difference between saying and meaning. The 
importance of that distinction will increase since through 
that distinction Derrida, as I hope to demonstrate, defines 
the meaning of metaphysics.
15 Gasch6, The Tain of the Mirror, 307. Richard Rorty 
characterizes Derrida's philosophical writings in general 
by saying that "Derrida, then, has little to tell us about 
language, but a great deal to tell us about philosophy." 
See his essay "Philosophy as a Kind of Writing," 144. 
Concerning Derrida's attitude toward the problem of 
metaphor, see also E. T. Gendlin, "Monlogical Moves and 
Nature Metaphors." Here Gendlin concludes that Derrida 
denies-and-still-retains the old concept of metaphor, now 
contradicting itself" (390) .
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Derrida's complicated reading of Rousseau's work in Of
Grammatoloov evolves around some contradictions within the
latter's discourse through the analysis of which Derrida
explicates his notion of the logic of supplement as opposed
to the traditional logic of identity. As Derrida's reading
brings to light, Rousseau's text unfolds itself within the
system of metaphysical valorization of presence against
absence, nature against culture, origin against supplement,
speech against writing, and so on. For Rousseau, the
second terms of opposition are dangerous to the first terms
since the former can undermine and corrupt the latter and
thus the natural hierarchy between them can be totally
destroyed. In order to preserve the natural hierarchy, it
is vital and imperative that the second terms are to remain
only as supplements to the first and to be limited within
their non-essential redundant territory. Derrida's careful
reading of Rousseau's text, however, reveals that the first
original terms can be affirmed only by simultaneously
affirming the secondary terms--which the logic of identity
does not permit. Derrida goes on to explain how the two
contradictory possibilities are attained:
What are the two contradictory possibilities that 
Rousseau wishes to retain simultaneously? And how 
does he do it? He wishes on the one hand to affirm, 
by giving it a positive value, everything of which 
articulation is the principle or everything with 
which it constructs a system (passion, language, 
society, man, etc). But he intends to affirm 
simultaneously all that is canceled by articulation
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(accent, life, energy, passion yet again, and so on)
(OG, pp. 245-46).
Such a simultaneous affirmation of the two is what Rousseau 
wishes to say. Since that contradictory unity is not 
permitted by the logic of identity, the unity is realized 
by desire: as in the dream, desire can satisfy 
incompatibles and contradictions, as Derrida explains by 
referring to Freud's analysis of the dream.16 However, 
Rousseau, since he is caught within the logic of identity, 
happens to "say what he does not wish to say, describes 
what he does not wish to conclude: that the positive (is) 
the negative, life (is) death, presence (is) absence ..." 
(OG, p. 246). In the daylight of logic the dream of desire 
is suddenly dissipated and violated. At the moment of 
awakening Rousseau has to acknowledge the impossibility of 
the dream.
The conflict between wishing-to-say and saying in 
Rousseau is also the conflict between desire and language 
or discourse. According to Derrida's reading, Rousseau 
wishes to say the contrary of what his saying functions in 
discourse. What Rousseau wants to say is pure and full 
presence and nature where supplements are "nothing because 
[they] are added to a full presence to which [they] are 
exterior" (OG, p. 167) . But his desire to say pure
16 OG, p. 245
presence is invalidated by the discursive reality of his 
saying. Contrary to his desire for pure origin and 
presence, his saying as discourse reveals that there is 
only "an originary differance that is neither absence nor 
presence, neither negative nor positive" (OG, p. 167). 
Because of this discursive implication or of the logic of 
supplements, Derrida keeps on asking "What does Rousseau 
say without saying, see without seeing?" (OG, p. 215). 
Rousseau, it seems, does not want to confront the 
consequence of his desire's discourse, since otherwise the 
latter would be undone as soon as it is constituted. Or as 
de Man contends in his reading of the same work, Rousseau 
knows that his desire is not literally true and his 
knowledge thus "makes it unavoidable that the texts should 
be written in the form of a fictionally diachronic 
narrative, or, if one prefers to call it so, of an 
allegory."17 Whatever the case may be, there lies an 
undeniable conflict between intention and meaning, desire 
and meaning, and speech and meaning. Thus with Derrida it 
is essential to ask "(what is) meaning to say" (P, p. 14).
Why does one intend and desire to say the opposite of 
what his saying signifies? Why does Rousseau wish to grasp 
and present the impossible presence even at the risk of
17 De Man, Blindness and Insight. 135.
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consistency of his discourse? What is the source and 
origin of this impossible desire for presence? While 
demonstrating the contradictions within Rousseau's texts, 
Derrida maintains that such contradictions are not only one 
particular case of Rousseau, but universal cases common to 
philosophers; and he goes on to propose that "we must 
locate all the signs of its [Rousseau's text] to the 
metaphysics of presence, from Plato to Hegel, rhythmed by 
the articulation of presence upon self-presence" (OG, p. 
246). According to Derrida, Rousseau's wish to say 
something impossible to say has been constituted by the 
history of the Western metaphysics of presence. From such 
metaphysics of presence one cannot hope to escape, since 
language itself is metaphysical. As Derrida explains, even 
everyday language "carries with it not only a considerable 
number of presuppositions of all types, but also 
presuppositions inseparable from metaphysics" (P, p. 19).
As a strange mixture of presuppositions both metaphysical 
and non-metaphysical, language encourages us to aspire for 
presence, but without allowing it to be realised. The 
presuppositions of all types within language thus cannot be 
dominated or determined by one single metaphysical 
presupposition. Language as the system of difference does
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not allow any metaphysical totalization.18 Therefore, even
though one's desire for presence is born out of language
and its metaphysical system of presuppositions, desire
cannot dominate them and has to remain only as an
impossible desire. Metaphysics for Derrida is this
impossible desire for presence, "the desire for living
speech" (OG, pp. 56-57), and “the iryth of consciousness"
(OG, p. 166). If it is applied to speech and meaning, this
metaphysical desire is the desire for the transparency of
meaning in saying, an unequivocality without shadow, a
"univocal and in principle universally translatable
discourse" :19
When I speak, not only am I conscious of being 
present of what I think, but I am conscious also of 
keeping as close as possible to my thought, or to the 
"concept," ... that seems to depend upon my pure and 
free spontaneity, requiring the use of no instrument, 
no accessory, no force taken from the world (P, p.
22) .
In the ideal situation of speaking language, as Derrida 
continues to say, is supposed to "erase itself or to become 
transparent, in order to allow the concept to present
18 Derrida says: "languages are diacritical realities; 
each element within them is in itself less important than 
the gap that distinguishes it from other elements... the 
sum is impossible to totalize but yet it is not exceeded by 
the infinite richness of a content of meaning or intention" 
(D, p. 251).
19 wiphg Original Discussion of DiffFrance" in Derrida 
and Differance, 88.
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itself as what it is, referring to nothing other than its 
presence." If language functions by the system of 
difference, the desire for presence is to suppress its 
differential play and to liberate intentionality from its 
fetters. If desire is born out of language, at the very 
moment of its birth it wants to forget and erase this 
memory so that desire can be preserved and affirmed without 
being checked and prohibited by this ignominious birth.
Being constituted by its exclusion of the other and 
the play of difference in language, the wish-to-say is the 
ideal language of philosophy, which is supposed to know 
exactly what it says. However, since the supposed outside 
and other have been always and already within the inside, 
the desire to say is undermined and undone by what it says. 
In his essay on Husserl "La forme et le vouloir-dire," 
Derrida is more thematically concerned with the relation 
between wish-to-say and meaning, which he reformulates as 
the problem of inferiority and exteriority. The question 
that Derrida wants to ask in this essay is about "the 
status of language in [Husserl's] Ideas,“20 especially
20 As early as in 1892, Gottlob Frege posed such a 
Derridian question regarding the status of language. Frege 
dealt with such a problem in terms of "an awkwardness of 
language" as in the following: "As regards the sentence 
'this rose is red': The grammatical predicate 'is red' 
belongs to the subject 'this rose.' Here the words 'The 
grammatical predicate "is red"' are not a grammatical 
predicate but a subject. By the very act of explicitly 
calling it predicate, we deprive it of this property." See
196
regarding the latter's determination of "the living present 
as the ultimate, universal, absolute form of transcendental 
experience in general" (MP, p. 158). The form is conceived 
by Husserl as the self-transparent meaning or the content 
of pure intention which is independent of language and thus 
is never affected by discourse. If the content of meaning 
is absolutely independent of language, it then follows that 
language is either mere redundancy or mere decoration.
This Husserlian notion of language is based on one of the 
traditional views of language as expression (vouloir- 
dire) .21
Discourse will be able only to repeat or to reproduce 
a content of sense which does not await discourse in 
order to be what it is. If things are thus, 
discourse will only transport to the exterior a sense 
that is constituted before it and without 
it...Discourse is expressive in its essence, because 
it consists in transporting to the outside, in 
exteriorizing a content of interior thought (italics 
in original) (MP, p. 163).
For Husserl, this pure interiority as the form of 
transcendental experience can be expressed and exteriorized 
by "the properly logical functioning of discourse" (MP, p.
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. 46n.
21 For an excellent critique of this expression 
paradigm of language, see V. N. Volosinov, Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language, especially a chapter entitled "Two 
trends of Thought in Philosophy of Language, 45-63.
160).22 The telos of language as a means of exteriorizing 
the given inferiority lies in transporting inner logic to 
the exterior. If language is thus determined as logical, 
the purpose of philosophical discourse would be to keep 
itself within the limits of logical language after reducing 
"the considerable mass of whatever is not purely logical in 
language to an extrinsic value" (italic in original) (MP, 
p. 160). As already noted in our discussion of Derrida's 
reading of Rousseau, there is no such pure inferiority and 
pure form of experience independent of languages described 
by Husserl. However, since Derrida fully addressed that 
problem in Speech and Phenomenon, his interest in "Form and 
Meaning" is somewhere else; his concern is with the status 
of language in philosophical discourse. The question that 
we want to ask along with Derrida is whether or not 
Husserl's discourse can satisfy his standard of purely 
logical and literal language or, to put it another way, 
whether or not his discourse can avoid illogic and 
metaphorical language.
22 One of the best definition of logical language is 
made by Philip Wheelwright. "Language that is closed by 
stipulation— which is to say by definition, combined with a 
rigid adherence to the law of identity--may be called 
logical language. It is deliberate steno-language, as 
opposed to the accidental steno-language that enters into 
common speech" (38) . As for the definition of steno- 
language, see Metaphor and Reality. 16, 33.
Derrida's question regarding the status of language in 
Husserl's discourse on logical language and intentionality 
is one similar to his questioning of Heidegger's language 
of Being. As for Heidegger, "Being, which is nothing, is 
not a being, cannot be said, cannot say itself, except in 
the ontic metaphor" (MP, p. 131). Since literal and 
logical language is incapable of saying or naming Being, 
out of its inner necessity Being has to
borrow ontic metaphors to give a hint at what it is. In 
the same manner, despite his attempt to say literally and 
logically the structure of transcendental experience and 
expressivity, Husserl ends up with saying that only 
metaphorically, thus revealing the fundamental gap between 
what he wants to say and what he actually says. In the 
absence of logical language to say what he wants to say, 
Husserl is forced to employ the metaphor of "stratum," 
though with distrust. His wish to exclude metaphor from 
his philosophical discourse is thus frustrated by the 
unavoidable inclusion of the metaphor. As Derrida 
succinctly puts it, Husserl's "discourse on the logic of 
the discourse is entangled in a play of metaphors" (MP, p. 
160). In spite of this inevitable inclusion of metaphor, 
Husserl tends to consider metaphor as a mere accident which 
can be dispensed with as easily as it is employed.
However, against Husserl's wish we might be tempted to ask
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whether or not thought invites metaphor for its sake since 
otherwise it has nothing to think. Or to put it another 
way, how much thinking of Being and intentionality has to 
depend on metaphor, if we cannot subordinate the latter to 
a mere function of the former?
As Derrida's analysis brings to light, Rousseau's and 
Husserl's discourse does not say what they wish to say. 
Their saying (discourse) always is entangled by the voice 
of the other which they thematically exclude. But this 
supposed other turns out to constitute the very core of the 
self. Thus without ruining the self and its desire, the 
other, which is found always and already within the self, 
cannot be radically excluded. Husserl's consciousness's 
own method for the knowledge of consciousness itself is 
already a fiction insofar as consciousness is not pure. 
Without this certain degree of fictionality, discourse 
cannot come into being; the desire to say exactly what it 
wants to say is to be mediated and undermined by the other 
elements alien to the desire. For Husserl, this desire is 
to say literally and logically. But we have seen how this 
desire is to undergo a transformation in order to adapt 
itself to the reality of discourse. No matter whether 
desire is literal or metaphorical, whose categories we may 
not apply to desire, it begins to say something other than 
it wants to say, and curiously only by doing so desire
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remains as desire. If desire is neither reality nor need, 
it remains as desire only if its object is unattainable. 
Only when desire has its other in itself and thus delaying 
its fulfillment infinitely, desire survives and asserts 
itself infinitely. To put it in a Derridian term, desire 
is differance, differing from itself and deferring itself 
to be realized. Thus the wish to say and name presence is 
given into the structure of differance.
If the wish-to-say is structured like differance, it 
realizes itself in discourse by taking the logic of 
supplements, not that of identity. In Rousseau, his wishes 
are caught in contradiction; he wishes to affirm 
articulation, but he also wishes simultaneously to affirm 
what is canceled by articulation. In the similar way, he 
wants to affirm not only presence and life, but absence and 
death as well. According to the logic of identity, 
Rousseau's desire is constituted by the two conflicting 
wishes, thus structurally prohibiting their realization, 
since to attain one means automatically the loss of the 
other. However, these contradictory wishes are the 
contradiction not of full terms, but of terms which are to 
be supplemented; what is canceled by articulation is to be 
added in order to complete and to compensate for a lack in 
articulation. The two seemingly contradictory wishes are 
rather of a nature of compensation and completion of the
lack of each other, and they find their dwelling place in 
the space of desire by the logic of supplements. Derrida 
therefore considers the concept of supplement as an 
economical one, which "allow[s] us to say the contrary at 
the same time without contradiction" (OG, p. 179). The 
relation between presence and absence, nature and culture, 
and life and death, is not that of contradiction to be 
finally synthesized, but that of the contrary without 
synthesis. According to this logic of the supplement, 
presence is absence, nature is culture, and life is death, 
to the extent that the first term is in need of the other 
for its completion.23 Thus the space of supplement lies in 
between total absence and total presence, between whose two 
extreme poles Rousseau's desire is hovering endlessly 
without reconciliation. Since presence is mediated by 
absence, Rousseau can desire presence without a fear of its 
absolute plentitude which might kill him. As such Rousseau 
secures a certain freedom from or for presence; without 
committing the risk of being consumed by presence, desire 
can say and name it. As Derrida puts it, "its [i.e., the 
supplement is or desire is] economy exposes and protects us 
at the same time according to the play of forces and of the 
difference of forces" (OG, p. 155).
23 "Rousseau neutralizes oppositions by erasing them; 
and he erases them by affirming contradictory values at the 
same time" (OG, p. 189).
This strange logic of the supplement, through which 
two contrary terms are allowed to dwell together, is found 
also in Husserl's discourse in regard to logical language 
and metaphor. Husserl's wish to say logically the 
structure of transcendental experience and expressivity is 
to be supplemented by a non-logical metaphor. Otherwise, 
his desire to say and name presence cannot hope to enter 
into discourse and is to be threatened with extinction.
Thus the wish for logical language is to be undermined from 
the beginning by its own necessity. That is to say, his 
logical wish survives only by differing from itself, only 
by adopting non-logical metaphor within itself which it 
wants to exclude. This unexpected inclusion of metaphor 
allows his logical wish not only to be preserved but also 
to assert itself by resisting the power of metaphor.
Logical language seems to find its space only by excluding 
and dispelling the primitive metaphor from the territory of 
discourse. "If the metaphor of the stratum does not 
correspond to the structure one seeks to describe, how," 
Derrida asks, "could it have been used so long?" (MP, p. 
159). Against its wish, logical language has to employ 
metaphor only in order to suppress and limit its power so 
that the former finds its discursive space in the excluded 
and controlled space of the latter. Husserl's discourse is 
thus deeply entangled within the logic of the supplement,
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and his desire to say and name presence survives by 
occupying the middle point between logical language and 
non-logical language.
The relation of logical language with metaphor is that
of suppression and vigilance. Philosophy with its ideal of
pure logical language has to severely limit and exclude
literature within itself so that the former attains its
ideal by the limitation and exclusion of the latter.
However, because literature is too deeply within philosophy
to the degree that their boundary does not exist, the
latter's suppression of the former is to be continuously
postponed. There is no end to the vigilance of philosophy.
Insofar as philosophy's vigilance is to continue endlessly,
it is always with literature within itself and pure logic
is always involved with metaphor. Thus metaphor is not
mere rhetoric, but the very possibility of language as well
as the possibility of the philosopher's pure logic:
Before being a rhetorical procedure within language, 
metaphor would be the emergence of language itself.
And philosophy is only this language; in the best of 
cases, and in an unaccustomed sense of the 
expression, philosophy can only speak it, state the 
metaphor itself, which amounts to thinking the 
metaphor within the silent horizon of the 
nonmetaphor: Being (WD, p. 112).
Being is thought only through ontic metaphor, as the
structure of transcendental experience is thought only in
terms of the metaphor of stratum. This unwelcome emergence
of metaphor thus has to be suppressed so that the thought
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of Being and noematic experience does not fall into 
metaphor. The thought of philosophy is never identical 
with the metaphor of literature. Between them lies a 
certain Derridian differance; each territory is defined 
only by way of its difference from the other, and since the 
history of definition is never to end, their territories 
{their meanings) are never clearly demarcated. Because they 
are unable to define each other with resolution, the 
history of definition is only to be delayed, with the 
consequent result that there is no proper territory of 
either philosophy or literature, or either logical language 
or metaphor.
Without a clear demarcation dividing one from the 
other, there is only difference between philosophy and 
literature. The lack of the demarcation does not, however, 
mean that their original and proper territories are 
forgotten or bleared away by some mistake or violence: 
there have never been fixed and proper territories between 
them. Contrary to the illusion of original and proper 
territories, their present varying territories came into 
being only because of their differance— differance opening 
space between them. This original differance prohibits any 
thinking of their relation in terms of real violence. Even 
though philosophy is found to be invaded by literature and 
has to suppress the false intruder, philosophy does not
have any original claim to its supposed present territory, 
which is considered to be invaded by literature.
Literature does not intrude into the territory of 
philosophy, since the former has always been within the 
latter. The struggle between philosophy and literature is 
thus a conflict without any real violence. If "a speech 
produced without the least violence would determine 
nothing, would say nothing, would offer nothing to the 
other" (WD, p. 147), that violence is original violence, 
intrinsic and propitious to speech itself, so that the 
meaning of violence as an injuring or damaging force is 
canceled off. By this original violence of literature, 
philosophy benefits from its violator. "A Being without 
violence," as Derrida says, "would be a Being which would 
occur outside the existent; nothing, nonhistory, 
nonoccurrence, nonphenomenality" (WD, p. 147). If Being 
cannot occur without violence, Being then is already 
violence--to be more correct, non-violent violence.
If Being is in need of ontic metaphor to be spoken, 
philosophy needs equally to repress this ontic metaphor by 
philosophy. If the desire to say and name presence and 
Being has to rely on metaphor, this same desire at the same 
time has to suppress metaphor. Although Being is spoken by 
metaphor, the former is not identical with the latter as 
Being is never to be identified with being. There is
always an unsurxnountable abyss between Being and metaphor, 
and between philosophy and literature, without which they 
cannot be thought and spoken as such. However, because of 
this fundamental difference and abyss between them, 
metaphor, as soon as it is spoken, is to be repressed and 
kept within a limit imposed by philosophy. If philosophy 
cannot think and say Being and presence with its own terms, 
it is allowed to do so by repressing metaphor, by saying 
"no" to metaphor and thereby expecting "yes" to Being and 
presence; metaphor is born only to be negated.24 In a 
certain way, Being and presence are thus the effect of 
philosophy's negation of metaphor, the effect enveloped 
within philosophy's metaphysical desire. Then metaphysical 
desire simultaneously creates metaphors and abandons them 
in an endless chain of supplements. Desire is destined to 
say Being only by metaphor, and the same desire is also 
destined to discard metaphor in order to be more deeply 
appropriated into the truth of Being--which is of course 
another gesture of falling back upon metaphor.
24 This negation is not a Hegelian negation as 
Aufhebuna. Contrary to Hegel's negation of metaphor for 
the sake of idealization and conceptualization, the 
negation of metaphor here is nothing other than affirming 
another metaphor or negation without idealization. For 
Derrida's criticism of Hegelian negation and contradiction, 
see Gasche, The Tain of Mirror, 87-95.
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III. Derrida and Ricoeur 
on Metaphor and Metaphysics
The subtle and strange difference between philosophy 
and literature is for Heidegger a form of unity within 
difference, but for Derrida an irreducible differance. If 
unity holds them together, this unity for Derrida is a 
violent unity created out of the discursive necessity of 
metaphysical desire. Since this desire averts from the 
logic of identity, philosophy and literature, though they 
seem to contradict each other, are safely contained within 
the logic of the supplement. In Derrida's re-thinking of 
difference in terms of differance, the unifying role of 
Being in Heidegger is replaced by that of desire. As 
Derrida mentions in Of Grammatolocrv. the unity of desire is 
the unity of the contrary. Thus in his reading of Husserl 
in "Form and meaning," Derrida conceives the relation of 
metaphor and logical language as a supplementary relation; 
metaphor realizes logical language to come into being by 
way of its self-effacement or by the latter's suppression 
of the former. To the proportion that metaphor is directed 
toward meaning and has a negative relation to the proper, 
metaphor, according to Gasch6's comment on Derrida, is "by 
nature a metaphysical concept."25 Metaphor belongs to
25 Gasch6, The Tain of the Mirror. 293.
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metaphysics but with a fundamentally irreducible 
difference. The question is therefore the matter of 
degree, not of kind, that is, how much metaphor is 
metaphysical and how much metaphor plays the role of a 
metaphysical concept. And if metaphor is not irreducible 
to metaphysics, then how much is metaphor capable of 
upsetting the metaphysics of presence? In attempting to 
face these questions, it seems in order to clarify the 
questions by considering them from a non-Heideggerian and 
non-Derridian perspective, from a perspective offered by 
Ricoeur in his critique of Heidegger and Derrida in The 
Rule of Metaphor. Along with Ricoeur I will re-open the 
question hermeneutically, neither ontologically nor 
grammatologically, of difference between philosophy and 
literature, in order to see how Ricoeur reformulates the 
same question and how Derrida answers to Ricoeur.
In considering Ricoeur's critique of Heidegger's 
condemnation of metaphor as belonging within metaphysics, 
we are not interested with how Ricoeur successfully defends 
metaphor against Heidegger's thesis.26 At issue are the 
questionable meaning of metaphysics and its relation to
26 Derrida summarizes Ricoeur's defense of metaphor 
against Heidegger's attack as in the following: "The 
metaphoricity of Heidegger's text would overflow what he 
says thematically, in the mode of simplificatory 
denunciation, of the so-called 'metaphysical' concept of 
metaphor" (RT, p. 20).
metaphor. For Ricoeur, Heidegger's definition of 
metaphysics is "forced beyond any justification," like a 
"Procrustean bed," because what is named by Heidegger as 
metaphysics is anything but metaphysics (RM, p. 2 83). 
Heidegger confuses, consequently, metaphysics with 
representative thought, and with the theory of language as 
expression. And that confusion is willful and is motivated 
by vengefulness; "This inclosure of the previous history of 
Western thought within the unity of 'the' metaphysical 
seems to me to express a sort of vengefulness ... along
with a will to power that seems inseparable" (RM, p. 311).
If we accept Ricoeur's reading of Heidegger, we can 
rephrase Heidegger's original statement into another one 
though at the risk of considerably undermining the force of 
the original: The metaphorical (within the traditional 
concept of metaphor as a mere rhetoric and decoration) 
exists only within representative thought or within one 
branch of Western philosophy. Thus distinguishing his 
metaphysics from Heideggerian definition, Ricoeur redefines 
metaphysics as speculative discourse, "the condition of the
possibility of the conceptual" as distinct from the
metaphorical (RM, p. 300). Here I underline the word 
"possibility" in order to relieve him from any misleading 
implication that "they can be clearly and absolutely
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distinguished from each other."27 When Ricoeur speaks of 
the distinction, it is neither in a sense of the forgetting 
of the difference between them, nor in a sense of radical 
separation with the clear-cut boundary between them. And 
in proposing the distinction between the speculative and 
the metaphorical, or between philosophy and literature, 
Ricoeur's attempt seems to be focused on avoiding their 
undifferentiated identification, rather than on asserting 
their teleologically or epistemologically independent modes 
of discourse.
Even though Ricoeur does not, like Heidegger and
Derrida, assert a clear and absolute separation of
philosophy from literature, Ricoeur's conception of the
difference between them cannot be seen as another
expression of Heideggerian difference or Derridian
differance. For more clarification of this point, a useful
starting point may be Ricoeur's description of the
"possibility1 and "necessity" of speculative discourse,
that is, metaphysics, which is defined against and is
opposed to the metaphorical.
It can be shown that, on the one hand, speculative 
discourse has its condition of possibility in the 
semantic dynamism of metaphorical utterance, and 
that, on the other hand, speculative discourse has 
its necessity in itself, in putting the resources of 
conceptual articulation to work. These are resources 
that doubtless belong to the mind itself, that are
27 Gasch6, The Tain of the Mirror. 51.
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the mind itself reflecting upon itself. In other 
words, the speculative fulfills the semantic 
exigencies put to it by the metaphorical only when it 
establishes a break marking the irreducible 
difference between.the two modes of discourse (italic 
in the original) (RM, p. 296).
To say that concept has its "possibility" in metaphor is
another way of affirming their speculative continuity.
Though they seem to be opposed to each other, their
opposition is a matter of degree, resembling the
distribution of light ranging from daylight to darkness.
If light is continuous but is divided into light and
darkness according to its amount of distribution, metaphor
and concept have their unbroken continuity because they
participate in speculative possibility. This continuum is,
however, to be broken out of speculative "necessity," since
the conceptual has to "establish a break" from the
metaphorical. Otherwise, there would be no philosophy.
The necessity is also the necessity for philosophy. Here
the act of establishing a break between the continuity of
the metaphorical and the conceptual is not a real violence,
because the former demands, according to Ricoeur, such a
break in order to resolve its unstable tension and thus to
satisfy its "semantic exigencies." The metaphorical does
not say what it wants to say, so that there always remains
an unsatisfied desire waiting for the conceptual for its
fulfillment. The metaphorical is thus to be carried away
into the conceptual.
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The continuity of the conceptual and the metaphorical
for Ricoeur is also the continuous relation of the
foundation and the founding, and the ground and the
grounding. The metaphorical with its shade of darkness is
like the unexplored territory with its abundant
potentialities, which can be appropriated into the
conceptual as soon as the work of grounding and founding
comes to an end. When the conceptual explodes into the
metaphorical, the former applies its already-established
primary notions and principles to the latter in order to
decide how much it can be conceptualized. Then the
paradigm of philosophers in their relation to literature
would be an ancient hero fighting against the force of
darkness to subdue and subordinate it to that of light.
When the philosopher fights on two fronts, against 
the seduction of the ineffable and against the power 
of 'ordinary speech' (Sprechen), in order to arrive 
as a 'saying' (Sagen) that would be the triumph 
neither of inarticulateness nor of the signs 
available to the speaker and manipulated by him--is 
he not in a situation comparable to that of the 
thinker of Antiquity of the Middle Ages, seeking his 
path between the powerlessness of a discourse given 
over to the dissemination of meanings and the mastery 
of univocity through the logic of genera? (RM, p.
310) .
What the metaphorical is to the dissemination of meanings 
is what the conceptual is to univocity. The task of 
philosophy lies in dominating and then subduing the 
unstable and dynamic meanings of metaphor to conceptual 
univocity. As Ricoeur puts it in Aristotelian terms, to
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create metaphor is to "apprehend the 'same' within and in 
spite of 'difference' (RM, p. 296). If metaphor is 
conceptual, it is a concept with the irreducible difference 
or light with shadow. Thus the gain of meanings in 
metaphor is "not carried to the concept, to the extent that 
it remains caught in the conflict of 'same' and 
'difference,' although it constitutes the rough outline and 
the demand for an instruction through the concept" (RM, p. 
297). Poets present their crude metaphors to the scrutiny 
of philosophers who have to judge their validity.
"Metaphor," Ricoeur says, "is living by virtue of the fact 
that it introduces the spark of imagination into a 
'thinking more' at the conceptual level" {RM, p. 303).
According to Ricoeur's delineation of the relation 
between the metaphorical and the conceptual, the former is 
always on the way toward the latter and as such metaphor is 
always philosophical even before being reduced into 
concept. To put it in Heideggerian terms, the metaphorical 
is pre-ontological, pre-philosophical, pre-predicative, and 
pre-scientific. Metaphor might have inaugurated 
philosophy, but as soon as the latter is born it is to be 
dominated by the latter. And metaphor is always the 
philosopher's metaphor indicating the unknown territory of 
philosophy; it is by means of metaphor that philosophy 
expands its kingdom. To the extent that metaphor is always
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and already philosophical, Ricoeur's distinction between 
the poet's metaphor and the philosopher's cannot be 
maintained, since there is no poet's metaphor at all.28 
All metaphor is pre-conceptual and all difference is ready 
to be reduced into sameness.
If Heidegger's and Derrida's difference between 
philosophy and literature is never to be reduced into the 
same, Ricoeur sees yet in the difference a possibility for 
sameness. This possibility for Ricoeur is no doubt only 
uni-directional, that is, an ascendance from metaphor to 
concept and from literature to philosophy. In his 
hermeneutical thought, the descendence of philosophy into 
literature is unthinkable--which would result in the death 
of philosophy and of knowledge: "In the horizon opened up 
by the speculative, 'same' grounds 'similar' and not the 
inverse" (RM, p. 301). Thus Ricoeur's thinking of metaphor 
is regulated and determined by a manifestly philosophical 
consideration of the possibility of speculative discourse 
as independent of metaphor. This hierarchical valorization 
of philosophy over literature does not allow them to be 
conceived in terms of Heideggerian or Derridian difference
28 Ricoeur introduces this distinction when he 
discusses Heidegger's notion of Ereignis: "Even if Ereignis 
is called a metaphor, it is a philosopher's metaphor, in 
the sense in which the analogy of being can, strictly 
speaking, be termed a metaphor, but one which always 
remains distinct from a poet's metaphor" (RM, p. 310).
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without hierarchy. Derrida's rhetorical question therefore 
can be applied to Ricoeur: "Are not all metaphors, strictly 
speaking, concepts, and is there any sense in setting 
metaphor against concept?" (italic in the original) (MP, p. 
2 64). Even though Ricoeur criticizes Derrida's "White 
Mythology" in The Rule of Metaphor.29 the former only 
confirms the latter's verdict that metaphor is a 
philosophical concept.30
Since metaphor is already and always philosophical, 
Ricoeur finds in metaphor the necessary condition and 
justification for the speculative discourse and 
metaphysics. In his thinking of the difference between 
metaphor and metaphysics, Ricoeur replaces Heidegger's 
unity of Being by the unity of metaphysics. Even the 
comparative darkness of metaphor (the same within and in 
spite of difference) is penetrated by the seeing
29 Ricoeur's whole criticism of Derrida in The Rule of 
Metaphor. I think, is based on a misreading. "The efficacy 
of worn-out metaphor" and "the deep-seated unity of 
metaphorical and analogical transfer of visible being to 
intelligible being" (RM, p. 285), the two assertions which 
Ricoeur discerns as Derrida's, are what Derrida attempts to 
criticize in "White Mythology." If Ricoeur successfully 
demonstrates the falsehood of these assertions, his 
demonstration has no bearing on Derrida. For Derrida's 
defense of his position against Ricoeur, see “The Retrait 
of Metaphor," 12-16.
30 As with Derrida's other comments, this is not his 
own position, but the result of his reading of Aristotle 
and Hegel in "White Mythology."
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enlightening eyes of metaphysics (the same); "metaphysics 
... seizes the metaphorical process in order to make it 
work to the benefit of .metaphysics" (RM, p. 294-95). While 
Heidegger's Being is revealing and withdrawing at once, 
Ricoeur's metaphysics presupposes the center of pure light 
without any shadow, concept without any metaphor. This 
presupposition is drawn by Ricoeur from the philosophical 
possibility of metaphor and at the same time from the 
strong necessity of philosophy for univocity and concept.
Is his proposal for the speculative discourse only an 
axiological and moral necessity punctuated by the 
metaphysical desire of vouloir-dire? Is he, like Rousseau 
and Husserl, destined to say something other than what he 
wants to say? In other words, how would Ricoeur answer the 
Derridian question of the status of discourse on metaphor?
While discussing the possibility of speculative 
discourse as distinct from the metaphorical, Ricoeur asks 
the Derridian question to himself whether or not his 
discourse belongs to the metaphorical order or whether 
there is any standpoint outside language.31 To this self-
31 Let me quote in full Ricoeur's question: "It will 
be objected, before proceeding any farther, that it is not 
possible to speak of a relation like this because there is 
no standpoint outside language and because it is and has 
always been in language that men claim to speak about 
language" (italic in the original) (RM, p. 304).
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styled Derridian question, Ricoeur answers positively, 
because:
language possesses the reflective capacity to place 
itself at a distance and to consider itself, as such 
and in its entirety, as related to the totality of 
what is. Language designates itself and its other 
... it is the knowledge that accompanies the 
referential function itself, the knowledge of its 
being-related to being. This reflective knowledge 
allows language to know that it is installed in being 
(RM. 304).
Here Ricoeur speaks of "split reference" in language, that 
is, words referring to "being and not being" at once.32 
When Husserl, for example, names metaphorically "stratum" 
for the structure of transcendental experience, he is not 
strictly bound to the word "stratum," since he has in mind 
the referential content of what he wants to say. Although 
the word "stratum" belongs undoubtedly to the linguistic 
order, it retains at the same time a certain relation with 
the Husserlian structure of experience. To the extent that 
this "stratum" is and is not, Husserl is released from the 
bondage of language and can speak of what he wants to say. 
Not only "stratum" is a word in the totality of language, 
but also it has "its being-related to being" "in the 
totality of what is."
Ricoeur's standpoint outside language is, it seems, 
nothing other than another expression of Derrida's vouloir-
32 See "The Case against Reference" in Chapter 7 of 
The Rule of Metaphor, 224.
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dire.33 When one speaks, one is always destined to say 
other than what he wants to say. The gap between vouloir- 
dire and dire is freedom on the one hand, and absence on 
the other. The term vouloir-dire has a split reference in 
itself. Because of this split reference, Rousseau, as seen 
in the foregoing analysis, could say the contrary without 
contradiction, and Heidegger could name Being by way of 
ontic metaphors. The simultaneous presence of "is" and "is 
not" also names the unattainable and unrealizable structure 
of desire in wish-to-say. In wishing to say something,
"is" is endlessly postponed to appear as such in the 
linguistic structure of "is not"; Husserl wants to say the 
structure of experience with the metaphor of stratum, but 
he ends up refining metaphor or limiting its force. Thus 
the freedom to say Being, presence, and speculative 
discourse also implies the impossibility of attaining the 
goal. Ricoeur's standpoint outside language is already 
deeply entangled within the inside of language, and his 
split reference only names a metaphysical desire with its 
intrinsic impossibility of fulfillment. If there is any 
"totality of what is" in language, it is the totality of
33 And Ricoeur's split reference is another expression 
of Derrida's general reference without referent. "There is 
no simple reference...But it is a difference without 
reference, or rather a reference without a referent, 
without any first or last unit, a ghost that is the phantom 
of no flesh" (D, p. 206).
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desire: in the absence of being "what is left is only the 
writing of dreams, a fiction that ... mimicry without 
imitation, without verisimilitude, without truth or falsity 
..." (D, p. 211). And if language is related to being, it
is always through the medium of desire.34
If Ricoeur's speculative discourse is punctuated by 
desire, the possibility of concept is also governed by the 
structure of desire that unifies the contrary without 
contradiction. As discussed above, Ricoeur sees that the 
concept establishes univocity by marking a break from the 
polysemy or dissemination of metaphor. Even though this 
break is justified by Ricoeur on the ground of the 
speculative continuity to which even metaphor participates 
with less degree of conceptuality, it becomes violence as 
soon as Ricoeur's hierarchy is reversed or is put into 
question. If his hierarchy is the result of metaphysical 
desire to dominate metaphor by philosophy, the question 
arises in regard to the justice of concept to mark a break 
from metaphor. Even granted that the speculative discourse 
penetrates into the metaphorical as light does toward 
darkness, the act of separation still presupposes an 
exclusion of the other, no matter how insignificant and
34 Gasch6 comments on the same quoted passage of 
Ricoeur's that the totality is either "a formal synthesis 
similar to the Kantian 'I think,' or "a totality comparable 
to the Hegelian Absolute." See The Tain of Mirror. 51.
trivial the distribution of the other may be. Without such 
an exclusion of the other, concept cannot be born. Concept 
is not something given, but is something produced and 
fabricated out of the conceptual necessity. Without this 
necessity being satisfied even by means of violence, 
discourse as well as philosophy do not come into being. 
"Each time that polysemia is irreducible, when no unity of 
meaning is even promised to it, one," Derrida says, "is 
outside language." (MP. 248). Thus the univocity of 
concept or the sameness without difference found philosophy 
and discourse to be what they are; the possibility of 
concept is the very possibility of metaphysics. But that 
foundation, since based on the violent break from 
metaphoricity, is "the place of unease, of the regulated 
incoherence within conceptuality" (OG, p. 237-8) .
Ricoeur's comment on Heidegger's reduction of Western 
thought into the unity of the metaphysical is revealing and 
suggestive in that the former discerns in the latter, to 
our surprise, not only a vengefulness, but also a symptom 
of "a will to power." Why is Heidegger's definition of 
metaphysics to be considered on the horizon of symptom? 
Isn't it that all metaphysics tends to be the expression of 
a will to power or a sort of vengefulness against the other 
such as literature and metaphor? The question about
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metaphysics complicates itself, when we consider the status 
of discourse about metaphysics. As we have discussed 
already, metaphysics names a desire for or a wish to say 
presence and Being, rather than a system of their truth.
If metaphysics is based on this unattainable desire, there 
cannot be any unity of metaphysics comparable to the 
Heideggerian definition. Whenever Derrida speaks of 
metaphysics, he, therefore, does so with a certain 
reservation, as in the following: "I have never believed in 
the existence or in the consistency of something like 
metaphysics itself" (RT, p. 14). If there is no 
homogeneous unity of metaphysics, isn't it that every 
utterance made about metaphysics is ingrained with a 
certain amount of will to power and vengefulness? And 
isn't it that all discourse on metaphysics tends to be 
metaphorical if there is no univocity or concept of its 
meaning? These questions remind us of Borges' closing 
statement of his essay "The Fearful Sphere of Pascal" that 
"the universal history is the history of the different 
intonations given a handful of metaphors." We wonder if 
the history of metaphysics is the history of the different 
intonations on the metaphor of presence or Being.
Derrida in "White Mythology" maintains that the 
history of Western philosophy has been dominated by the 
metaphor of the sun, the universal heliotrope, from Plato
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up to Husserl and Heidegger.35 Insofar as metaphysics is 
determined by this heliotrope, metaphysical desire seeks to 
subdue and dominate it, of course without success. If 
there is a philosophical concept of metaphor, and if 
metaphor has been always philosophical, this concept is 
born out of such a profound philosophical necessity to 
reduce the other into its same. To the extent that the 
field of philosophical discourse is marked by its fight 
against the metaphorical, the history of metaphysics is 
also the history of metaphor. This metaphysical history of 
the concept of metaphor, Derrida says, "yields knowledge, 
demands from the epistemologist construction, 
rectifications, critical rules of importation and 
exportation" (MP, p. 264). From a Heideggerian 
perspective, what metaphor is to metaphysics is what beings 
or becoming are to Being. Metaphysics for Heidegger marks 
the Platonic separation of Being from becoming or appearing 
and reducing the latter into the former.36 In Aristotelian 
phusis, appearance and becoming always signifies 
"generating what grows," participating to Being in the
35 In The Myth of Metaphor, Colin Turbayne speaks of 
our choice between different metaphysical metaphors. But 
if the metaphor of sun determines the thought of Being, we 
wonder whether there is any room for choice between 
different metaphors, which may be varying intonations for a 
single metaphor. See his book, 65.
36 See Heidegger, "Sketches for a History of Being as 
Metaphysics,1 in The End of Philosophy.
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universal schema of organic unity, so that the Platonic 
separation is approved and justified teleologically and 
universally.37 Without such a separation either of 
metaphysics from metaphor or of Being from becoming, how 
can philosophy hope to be philosophy?38 Due to this 
fundamental necessity of philosophy, "the movement of 
metaphor," Derrida comments in "White Mythology," "is 
nothing more than a movement of idealization," "under the 
master category of dialectical idealism, to wit, the relive 
(Aufhebung) " (MP, p. 226) .39
If Being, Ideas, or presence is thinkable only in 
terms of ontic metaphors, metaphysics is born out of these 
indispensable metaphors and is to be circumscribed by them 
even in its wishful growth into a science. The 
metaphysical desire to say and name Being qua Being,
37 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor. 308, and see a 
chapter in the same book entitled "Metaphor and the 
equivocalness of Being: Aristotle," 259-72.
38 Nietzsche says in Untimely Meditations: "Imagine 
the extremest possible example of a man who was thus 
condemned to see everywhere a state of becoming: such a man 
would no longer believe in his own being, would no longer 
believe in himself, would see everything flowing asunder in 
moving points and would lose himself in the stream of 
becoming ..." (62).
39 To this Derrida's comment on Hegel Ricoeur adds his 
own: "Where Hegel saw an innovation of meaning, Derrida 
sees only the wearing away of metaphor and a drift towards 
idealization resulting from the dissimulation of this 
metaphorical origin." (RM. 286).
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Derrida's vouloir-dire, is thus to realize itself only to 
the extent that it speaks of something else, that is, 
beings. The gap open between wish-to-say and saying, 
however, is not to be taken as an eternal and irremediable 
loss--if so, metaphysical desire would be extinguished. To 
the extent that metaphor is a philosophical concept, this 
loss is determined by philosophy as a temporary and 
provisional one to be redeemed sooner or later in Being's 
self-revelation.40 As a mere supplement to Being during 
its self-withdrawal, ontic metaphors prevail only in order 
to disappear like darkness as soon as Being discloses 
itself in its bright daylight. Metaphysics from Plato to 
Hegel has been constituted by this desire for presence 
which transforms emergence of metaphors as a temporary loss 
of meanings. Even though philosophers have been destined 
to say Being only metaphorically, they were always ready 
either to dispose of this recurring metaphor or to 
transform it into the trace or sign of Being.
Insofar as metaphor is indispensable for the discourse 
of metaphysics and is conceived as a temporary loss of 
presence and Being, metaphysics becomes a battle ground to 
fight against the force of metaphor. Even granted that 
metaphysics has to employ metaphor in order to say Being, 
metaphor is not to subsist in its materiality as if it were
40 See Derrida's "White Mythology," 270.
real Being; instead, it is to erase and efface itself in 
order to bring Being in its place.41 If metaphor is always 
to be translated, this translation is dominated by that 
metaphysical desire for presence. Within metaphysics, 
metaphor is in danger of becoming a mere shadow or 
reflection of Ideas, which is to be translated into its 
original as soon as it is recognized. In Hegel's 
Aufhebung. metaphor, for example, is in expectation of 
idealization in the history of spirit's self-realization. 
Metaphor is thus Ideas whose arrival is only to be delayed 
but is supposed to be sure to come. If this is the case, 
there would be nothing strange in the destination of 
philosophical metaphor finally to undo itself or to replace 
itself by Ideas: if metaphor is in complicity with 
metaphysics, how can it be otherwise then to be 
transcendent and to wait for its self-cancellation on the 
arrival of Ideas? But as Derrida's differance demonstrates 
emphatically, the arrival of Ideas is to be delayed 
endlessly, and the desire for presence remains only as 
desire. Saying and meaning in metaphor do never coincide.
41 For Derrida, the ideal of language as self-presence 
and transparency of the interiority in the exteriority is 
prohibited by the materiality of language— which is also 
the problem of translation: "the materiality of a wor 
cannot be translated or carried over into another language. 
Materiality is precisely that which translation 
relinquishes. To relinquish materiality: such is the 
driving force of translation" (WD, p. 210).
Even though metaphor means to name the human desire for 
transcendence and to bring presence into nearness, metaphor 
does not really say so and thus prohibits any Hegelian 
negation of difference.
CONCLUSION
If metaphor is not a mere trope, but a locus of truth's 
entering into language, the question of metaphor is also 
the question regarding the nature of truth. Without the 
preliminary clarification of truth, the question of 
metaphor cannot help but remain in the dark. As such, my 
discussion of metaphor in the texts of Nietzsche,
Heidegger, and Derrida has always involved the question of 
how truth is defined and characterized in their texts.
For Nietzsche, truth is the correspondence or 
coincidence of thought or descriptive knowledge with the 
thing-in-itself. This conception of truth contains in 
itself the structural impossibility of attaining truth. 
Insofar as language is not thing-in-itself and does not 
possess any objective reality, it does not coincide with 
the happening of Dionysiac truth. Truth cannot be spoken 
properly. In the absence of proper or literal 
representation of truth, all sayings become metaphoric: 
they "mean to say" truth without really saying it. This 
metaphoric truth is fundamentally ironic, that is, always 
and endlessly replacing improper sayings with other 
improper sayings, since Dionysus does not endure Apollonian 
false appearances and thus destroys them at the moment of
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their birth. As an indispensable alternative to the absent 
proper saying of truth, metaphor has only temporary value.
After criticizing such a correspondence notion of 
truth, Heidegger proposes to conceive truth as aletheia, 
the co-happening of concealment and unconcealment. Truth 
is not something static and present to be represented by 
language in their corresponding conformity. For Heidegger, 
truth is of the nature of verb, rather than of noun, and 
withdraws itself at the very moment of its revelation. If 
truth cannot be represented properly and correctly, there 
is nothing (no presence) to be represented, and truth 
declines to come to the full light. Thus truth can only be 
indicated and hinted at by way of metaphor and hint-words. 
The absence of proper words for truth is due not to the 
inadequacy of language but to the very nature of truth. 
Contrary to the Nietzschean depreciation of language as 
metaphoric, metaphor is the place where truth happens in 
its simultaneous concealment and unconcealment. Thus in 
Heidegger's conception of truth as aletheia, the negative 
tone and value involved in "truth is only metaphorical" is 
lifted away.
Derrida's statement that metaphor has always been a 
philosophical concept can be a reflection on metaphor's 
heavy dependence on the notion of truth for its value. 
Within the context of truth as correspondence, metaphor
implies an original loss of presence and is punctuated by 
its nostalgic and metaphysical aspiration. As our 
discussion of Nietzsche's essay "On Truth and Lying" 
reveals, the metaphor for metaphor in general is the 
metaphor of an orphan whose mother dies at her birthpangs. 
Retaining the memory of the absent Dionysiac truth which 
has never been present, metaphor aspires to return to and 
to repossess the lost presence. To the extent of its 
aspiration for presence, metaphor is metaphysical and 
transcendental. Metaphysics is a systematic effort to put 
an end to the wandering of the orphan metaphor by 
translating it back to its true mother, concept. But for 
Nietzsche as a strong critigue of metaphysics, metaphysics' 
conceptual translation of metaphor is no less than the 
committing of another error: contrary to its attempt to 
find the true mother for metaphor, metaphysics only ends up 
with matching it with a stepmother. Concept is an 
institutional forgetting of the lost origin of metaphor.
Through the notions of differance and writing Derrida 
demonstrates powerfully how Nietzschean wandering metaphor 
is prohibited from being united with its true mother. As 
not only a system of difference, but a system of deferral 
as well, language delays endlessly the wandering journey of 
metaphor and replaces metaphor with another metaphor 
without reducing it to a concept. Structurally speaking,
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the metaphysical aspiration inherent within metaphor is 
incapable of attaining its goal, and it therefore names 
only a desire for presence (vouloir-dire). Here what 
requires special attention in the relation between 
metaphysics and metaphor is the other side of this 
structural impossibility of metaphysical desire.
Metaphysics always attains its goal metaphorically, though 
not literally. As a trope saying one thing but meaning 
another, metaphor justifies and authenticates metaphysical 
desire; though metaphysics uses only orphan metaphors, it 
always means to say their true parents, presence. Because 
of this profound complicity between metaphysics and 
metaphor and their strange mutual dependence, Derrida 
always tends to locate places of metaphor in his reading of 
philosophical texts.
In his reading of Heidegger, Derrida detects ontic 
metaphors in Heidegger's ontology, amounting to a violence 
involved in the saying of Being. But isn't it a misreading 
of Heidegger to view him from a Nietzschean perspective of 
truth as correspondence? If there were any stable presence 
or Kantian thing-in-itself to be represented by way of 
conformity, the ontic metaphors, as Nietzsche confirms, 
would no doubt be improper modes of saying truth, since 
truth is supposed to be spoken properly. But for 
Heidegger, truth, far from being some objective content to
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be represented, is a dynamic happening of conflict between 
revelation and withdrawal or between the earth and the 
world. In its nature and.origin truth does not allow any 
"proper" sayings. This absence of proper sayings in 
Heidegger's aletheia is due neither to the loss of presence 
nor to the necessary violence involved in saying truth. If 
there is violence in Heidegger's ontic metaphors, this is 
an original violence, not a linguistic one; that is, the 
violence in the very nature of truth as the conflict 
between opening and closing. From a Heideggerian 
perspective, metaphor is an ontological journey in the 
space-time between the opening and closing of truth of 
Being.
If truth is conceived as Heideggerian aletheia. 
metaphor is neither an alternative to ideal proper words, 
nor a nostalgic aspiration for the lost presence. For 
Heidegger, the traditional priority given to literal and 
logical language goes hand in hand with the history of 
metaphysics as the ontology of presence. In this ontology 
of presence the presencinq and absencinq of Being is 
completely forgotten and Being is rendered as Ideas or 
presence, thereby giving rise to the logical and conceptual 
language paradigm (language as assertions). Violence in 
language adheres to concepts and assertions, since aletheia 
is stabilized and immobilized into static contents. If
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such an immobilizing tendency of logical language is 
considered, what is urgently demanded is to mobilize or 
metaphorize language so that the presencinq and absencinq 
of Being is to be restored into language. Metaphor is the 
locus wherein beings are on the way toward Being, while 
concepts falsely identify themselves with Being. In 
Heideggerian ontology the space of language is the in- 
between of beings and Being, and ontic metaphors travel in 
the space of the ontological difference.
Derrida's notion of play beyond truth or falsity, as 
well as his notion of differance beyond Being, contributes 
to a thinking of metaphor without its ontological and 
aletheological foundation. With Derrida, metaphor wanders 
not in the space-time, as Heidegger speaks of it, but in 
the system of differance devoid of a center to affirm and 
support its ontological legitimacy. To the extent that 
there is no discourse immune to rhetorical and figural 
plays, Derrida affirms metaphor, since it cannot be 
avoided. This affirmation however is not substantial, but 
deconstructive. Derrida affirms metaphor as a 
deconstructive strategy to undermine and dismantle any 
metaphysical claim to non-metaphoric truth and to expose a 
profound complicity between metaphysics and metaphor. In 
Derridian deconstruction, the journey of metaphor is like 
that of a guerrilla: it invades metaphysics in order to
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destroy it from the inside and then withdraw immediately. 
Here the question arises regarding where metaphor has to 
return to after withdrawing from the camp of metaphysics. 
Derrida neither provides any answer nor takes any position. 
If he has any position, it is an undecidable position which 
is suspended between truth as correspondence and truth as 
aletheia, and between the traditional concept of metaphor 
and Heideggerian metaphor as hint-words.
While Nietzsche's metaphor continuously destroys and 
replaces itself in order to resolve the inner contradiction 
of Apollonian appearances, Derrida's metaphor is in a 
continuous warfare with metaphysics. If for Derrida as for 
Nietzsche metaphor seems to be something to be avoided, it 
is because they are still bound to the metaphysical concept 
of metaphor as conceptual interpretation. However, if we 
forsake such a traditional paradigm of metaphor, why do we 
have to avoid metaphor or to use it for a deconstructive 
purpose? For Heidegger, metaphor happens in the struggle 
between the earth and the world, and that happening 
coincides not only with unconcealment, but also with 
concealment. As hint-words, metaphor travels in the time- 
space between Being and beings. This ontological journey 
of metaphor is a journey into the unknown, into the 
unthought, and beyond any metaphysical closure, 
concealment. As a mode of saying something without meaning
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it, metaphor for Nietzsche, Derrida, and Heidegger, has the 
same signification, but with different values. Seen from a 
Heideggerian perspective, an attempt to avoid metaphor and 
to undermine its value is tied up with the metaphysics of 
presence, which turns discourse into assertions and 
scientific statements, thereby forgetting the presencing of 
Being. For Heidegger, to affirm metaphor as hint-words is 
to enter into a thinking of difference between beings and 
Being and to stay within the space of difference, of course 
without attempting to translate or transform difference 
into sameness or the identity of logical space. Thus a 
metaphoric sameness, as Ricoeur says, is always within and 
in spite of difference. Without reducing the other to 
identity or suspending the presencing of Being, metaphor 
instigates truth to happen in its profound concealment.
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